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Abstract 
This study investigates the space in which Palestinian identity in the diaspora is formed and 
where moments of plurality emerge. By focusing on the Palestinian community in Canada, this 
study interrogates the processes of national identity formation and the achievement of 
belonging. The study utilizes empirical research in the form of interviews as well as the existing 
literature on the study of nationalism and identity to conduct a qualitative analysis of 
Palestinian national identity in the diaspora today. It thus demonstrates that the Palestinian 
identity is one that is intrinsically dual, with both essential and plural identities that are 
constructed and negotiated within a social matrix, and that incorporate national ideologies, 
collective memories, and cultural identities in the creation of a Palestinian nationality. In doing 
so, the study addresses a lack of scholarship on the identity formation in third generation 
Palestinian exiles, and illustrates the parameters of the ongoing Palestinian condition of 
statelessness. 
Key Words: Palestinian, Stateless, Diaspora, Nationalism, National Identity, Cultural Identity, 
Nakba 
ii 
iii 
Acknowledgements 
I am particularly grateful to my supervisor Prof. Daniel Drache at York University for his steady 
support, guidance, and insightful contributions to this thesis; as well as my supervising 
committee, Profs. Markus Reisenleitner and Susan Driver at York University, for all their 
patience, direction, and help throughout the process of writing this dissertation and completing 
my Master's degree. In addition, I owe an endless debt of gratitude to my family for their 
steady support and patience throughout the process of completing my studies and writing this 
dissertation. 
I would also like to thank the participants in this study, whose valuable input and candid 
conversations brought to light several issues of the Palestinian condition that would otherwise 
have remained invisible. I am very grateful for the enthusiasm and openness with which the 
participants approached this study, and am greatly appreciative of their continued support 
throughout its completion. 
This paper is dedicated to my late grandfather, Dr. Burhan Dajani, whose endless contributions 
and lifelong dedication to the Palestinian cause left behind an inspiring legacy of perseverance 
and an undying hope for the return of Palestine. 
"He says: I am from there, I am from here, 
but I am neither there nor here. 
iv 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Method 
Participant Profiles 
CONTENTS 
The Existing Literature: Nationalism and Identity Studies 
Nationalism & Authenticity 
Spaces in Diaspora: Home, Borders, and Belonging 
Memory - The Image from the Past 
Citizenship and Performance 
Modern Palestinian History: A Timeline 
Chapter 2. Historical Background - the Palestinian Narrative 
Palestinian Nationalism - a Brief Overview 
1948: The Nakba and 'The way of Transfer' 
1967: The Naksa and the Six-Day War 
Apartheid, Oslo, and the 'Peace Process' 
The West Bank/Gaza Strip Divide and the Gaza/Israel Wars 
Palestinian Refugees: The Cycles of Exile 
Palestinians in Exile: the Hierarchy of Experience 
Chapter 3. Conceptualizing Nationalism and National Identities 
Constructing Identity 
Becoming/Being Palestinian 
1 
2 
4 
8 
8 
9 
10 
12 
15 
16 
16 
18 
21 
22 
26 
29 
38 
42 
42 
45 
v 
vi 
Nationalism and Imagined Communities 48 
Constructing Palestinian Nationalism SO 
Land and Territory in National Identity 52 
Authenticating and "Othering" in Palestinian National Identity 56 
Essential Authenticity and Particularism in National Identity 59 
Membership and the Politics of Recognition 61 
Achieving Recognition in Diaspora 64 
Chapter 4. Statelessness, Exile, and Alienation 70 
Transnationalism, the Third Space, and Rhizomatic Becoming 70 
Finding Home in Alienation 73 
Palestinian Identity in an "Alien Space" 75 
Exile and Statelessness 77 
Statelessness and Alienation 79 
Stateless Boundaries 82 
Narcissism in the Stateless Identity 84 
The "inbetweens" 86 
Diaspora and Alienation 89 
Chapter 5. Memory and Myth 95 
Collective Memory and Collective Identity: The Nakba of the Palestinians 96 
Memory: Individual, Localized, and Collective 100 
Mythologizing Memories: Memory-Identities and Lived Conditions 102 
Symbolizing the Nakba 105 
vii 
Inheriting Palestine - Inheriting Memory 107 
Hybridity in Memories of the Nakba 110 
Palestinian Post-Memory, "Survivor's Guilt," and "Imposter Syndrome" 112 
Reinterpreting "the Nakba" 116 
Memory, Crises, and Identity 118 
Chapter 6. Cultural Pluralism, "Hybrids," and Citizenship Enactments 124 
Performativity and National Cultural Identities 125 
Cultural Capital 127 
The Role of Cultural Capital 128 
Performing Palestinian Identity 132 
"Othering" Palestinian Culture 134 
Cultural Capital and Effective Citizenship 137 
Power in the Public Sphere 140 
National Public Spheres and Palestinian Sphericules 142 
Negotiating a Palestinian Public Sphere 145 
Performing Citizenship 149 
Chapter 7. Conclusions and Further Research 156 
Findings and Results 156 
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Recommendations for Further Research 157 
Conclusion: Confluence in Alienation 158 
Additional Notes 166 
Notes on Palestinian Food 166 
Notes on Language 
Notes on Education 
Notes on Naji Al-Ali, Edward Said, and Mahmoud Darwish 
Works Cited 
List of Appendices 
viii 
167 
168 
168 
171 
Appendix A: Consent Form and Personal Data Collection Form 179 
Appendix B: Interview Questions Guide 183 
Appendix C: Passage from "Elegy for Edward Said" by Mahmoud Darwish 185 
Appendix D: Images 188 
1 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
National identity is often understood to be composed of a combination of essential and 
imagined qualities. It is both an inherited and a deliberately chosen process of identification 
that undergoes significant changes in one lifetime. In the millennium of hyper-globalization and 
the steady dissolve of state power and borders, nationhood and national identities are 
acquiring a new kind of fluidity that has shifted the understanding of national identity from the 
traditional essential model. This process has resulted in the constitution of hybrid national 
identities that encompass aspects of a global imagined community with highly permeable 
internal borders between different cultures and nations. However, these changes are not as 
seamless nor as inclusive as they at first appear to be, and greatly impact the ways nationalism 
is conceived of in many societies today. 
This thesis paper will focus on the space and discourses in which Palestinian national 
identity in the diaspora today is formed, what influences its development, and how it becomes 
a definitive and significant identity. The purpose of this research is to provide a clearer 
understanding of what being Palestinian today means, as Palestinian nationalism remains a 
controversial question under the scrutiny of global society. Furthermore, it is the goal of this 
study to provide a framework and launch pad for further research into the identities of various 
fragments of Palestinian communities in the world in order to provide evidence for the 
importance of the Right of Return and the need for repatriation of Palestinians worldwide. 
Due to the severe fragmentation and dispersal of the Palestinian community since the 
Arab-Israeli war of 1948 and the continued conflict that has prevented Palestinians from 
achieving statehood, Palestinian identity in the diaspora subsists in a unique space where it is 
contained and shaped by the forces of displacement, statelessness, and invisibility. By looking 
at the Palestinian community in Canada, this study will begin to interrogate the parameters of 
this space in which Palestinian identity is formed, in order to 
• locate instances of plurality and/or hybridity in the Palestinian identity in the 
diaspora, 
• understand how these instances arise, and what factors influence self-
identification within the Palestinian collective identity, and thus to 
• better understand how and why a distinct and prominent "Palestinian" national 
identity still exists within communities that are "stateless" - without a nation or 
"home". 
Furthermore, this study will engage with the existing scholarship on the subjects of identity, 
nationalism, memory, diaspora, and citizenship and performance in order to provide a more 
meaningful understanding of the Palestinian condition. 
Method 
The methodology of this study was based on qualitative analysis of phenomenological 
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interviewing of five Palestinian young adults, where participants were asked the question "How 
do you respond when someone asks where you're from?" and largely allowed to direct the 
conversation following. The interviews included questions on inherited nationalities, 
citizenship, memories, and utilized symbols and images of Palestinian culture to generate 
discussion. In addition, bilingual interviewing allowed participants the choice and opportunity 
to respond in Arabic, thus providing insight into what parts of their identity they feel are rooted 
in their native language - what parts they feel they need to express in Arabic - and how they 
perform their identity through their language. Purposive sampling was used, where the ideal 
participants were considered to be of Palestinian descent who would have either personally 
carried "stateless" status or have had close family members who did. The participants chosen 
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for the study were between the ages of 18-30, as it was considered important that the 
participants selected provide their own understandings of themselves and the ways they self-
identify. Therefore, Palestinian young adults who were not too young to clearly articulate their 
perceptions were considered ideal for the research. In addition, young adults were considered 
more suited to this study as they represent the future of Palestine to and within their 
communities. Expectations of this age group are therefore high, and performance of distinctive 
identities among this Palestinian generation is thus more tangibly prominent. 
Furthermore, young adults who constitute their family's third generation in exile were 
selected - ideally descendant from 1948 historic Palestine, whose grandparents were displaced, 
and whose parents were born in exile. The selection of this demographic is key, as it provides 
insight into a community where statelessness has been inherited over the course of 
generations for the past 65 years, and so provides a rich representation of the issues of 
authenticity and hybridity in national identities. Moreover, it is imperative that this sample be 
considered and understood in studies of Palestine, as 1948 Palestinians are most often ignored, 
avoided, and forgotten in the general representations of Palestinians and in all peace 
negotiation processes. In the mainstream discourses, 1967 has become the marker of 
Palestinian refugees, and it is only the 1967 refugees and borders that are often legally 
contested, leaving 1948 Palestinians unrepresented, "stateless," and invisible. Not only does 
this color their experiences differently from the rest of the Palestinian community, it also makes 
it doubly important to give voice to their situations in order to elucidate their demands for the 
Right of Return. 
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Finally, once the interviews were conducted and transcribed, they were analyzed 
through a process of interpretation where themes were extracted from the language cues, 
repeated words, common experiences, etc. that emerged from the interviews. These themes 
thus answered the questions of how frequently plurality is expressed, what the most prominent 
influences on feelings of belonging are, how collective and post-memories are expressed and 
referenced, and how national identity is expressed and performed. These themes were then 
further analyzed through the lens of the existing literature on the topics of nationalism, 
memory, diaspora, and citizenship and performance in order to unpack Palestinian identity and 
better understand how it is produced. The goal of this analysis has been to understand where 
and how~ balance between authenticity and hybridity is achieved in the Palestinian identity, 
and through this understanding, this thesis will outline the ways Palestinian identity is shaped in 
the diaspora and how a people without a "homeland" constitute a nation that is both fixed in 
its historic specificity and is fluid in its plurality of experience. 
Participant Profiles 
For the purposes of this study, a diverse sample of Palestinians in exile was chosen for 
interviews. The sample consists of five participants, three of whom are women and two are 
men. Of these five, four participants are classified as Palestinian refugees as per the definition 
stipulated by the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA). All five participants carry 
Canadian citizenship as well as other documentation, and have received undergraduate or 
higher level education in Canada. None of the participants interviewed ever lived in refugee 
camps, yet all have had ties to Arab nations surrounding the Palestinian territories. In addition, 
the participants interviewed fall into the upper-middle-class echelons of society, and have thus 
been privileged enough to avoid the poverty and dissolution of life in the camps, and whose 
families have had the opportunities to integrate into other societies and achieve successful re-
settlement. As a result, the identification processes for this sample differ from the typical 
identifications of Palestinian refugees suffering from the varied deprivations of camp life. 
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The participants also come from a variety of backgrounds, having lived in Jordan, Syria, 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Palestinian territories, and Canada; and with most of them 
having experienced at least one instance of migration and relocation. Furthermore, as the 
study's aim is to investigate the space in which Palestinians in exile form their national 
identities, four of the participants selected constitute their families' third generation in exile, 
representing the generation of the majority of the estimated 5 million refugees worldwide. This 
generational distance from the Nakba1 and the refugee camps is vital to the sample, as it 
delineates the possibilities for choice and plurality that are available to such Palestinians and 
how those possibilities become interwoven with their Palestinian identities. In addition, two of 
the participants interviewed are Christian, whereas the other three are Muslims. These 
denominations of faith represent the variety of the Palestinian nation's religious groups, and 
also influence the degree of identification and belonging to the Palestinian versus other 
communities achieved by the participants. All participants selected understand and speak 
Arabic to varying degrees of fluency and have engaged with the Palestinian communities in 
Canada and elsewhere in attempts to reconnect with their roots. 
1 Nakba (Arabic:~) meaning "catastrophe," is the Arabic term used in reference to the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. 
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Kismet2 (Female, 26 - 8 years in Canada): is a Syrian-Palestinian whose father's family 
originated from historic Palestine, but moved to Syria two generations prior to 1948 and gained 
Syrian citizenship. Her mother's family descends from Jaffa, Palestine, but moved to the West 
Bank after the Nakba, and from there to permanently reside as refugees in Syria. Her parents 
later moved to the UAE for career opportunities, eventually immigrating to Canada in time for 
her entrance to university at the age of 18. She is now a Ph.D. Candidate in Cell and Systems 
Biology, and carries both Syrian and Canadian passports. 
Carla (Female, 23 - 23 years in Canada): is a Jordanian-Palestinian whose mother's 
family escaped to the West Bank and from there to Jordan during the Nakba. Her father's 
family originates from the 1948 Palestinian territories, yet remained in their homes after the 
Nakba and were therefore granted Israeli citizenship. However, they eventually moved to 
Jordan due to the severity of the ostracism in their communities in the occupied territories, and 
from there, her parents immigrated to Canada. Born in Jordan yet raised in Montreal, she 
carries both Jordanian and Canadian passports and is currently a M.Sc. Candidate in Dietetics 
and Human Nutrition. 
Haya (Female, 24 -15 years in Canada): is a Jordanian-Palestinian whose family 
originated from Jaffa, Palestine. Her mother's family left Palestine during the Nakba to Beirut, 
Lebanon, and from there to Kuwait and eventually to Amman, Jordan. Her father's family 
escaped to Syria, and from there relocated to Jordan as well, where she was later born. With a 
B. Com. in International Relations, she has lived in Canada since the age of 9 and carries both 
Jordanian and Canadian passports. 
2 For the protection of the participants' confidentiality in this study, their real names have been withheld and 
substituted with pseudonyms that reflect their cultures and backgrounds. 
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Ayman (Male, 21- 11 years in Canada): is an undergraduate student of Law and Society, 
and a Palestinian refugee whose family on both sides originated from 1948 Palestinian 
territories and escaped to refugee camps in Lebanon after the Nakba. Born and raised in the 
UAE, he immigrated with his family to Canada at the age of 10, and had carried Lebanese issued 
Travel Documents until receiving Canadian citizenship. 
Haitham (Male, 29 - 16 years in Canada): is a Palestinian from Gaza whose family lived 
in the UAE before relocating to Canada for 5 years when at the age of 8, returning to the UAE 
for high school, and moving back again to Canada at the age of 18 for university. With a B.A. in 
Psychology and Political Science, he carries both Canadian and Palestinian passports, yet is 
prevented from returning to the Gaza Strip due to the blockade in effect by the Israeli 
authorities. 
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The Existing Literature: Nationalism and Identity Studies 
Nationalism & Authenticity 
Nationalism, according to Benedict Anderson, is developed through the shared 
ideologies and hegemonies of people who need not know each other, but who have a shared 
consciousness or image of their nation. Anderson argues that a nation "is an imagined political 
community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the 
members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their community". (6) 
Hence, due to the conceptual nature of imagined communities, the rupture between the image 
and the essentializing notions of fate and the body adds fluid dimensions to the concept of 
nationalism. Rather than limiting nationality and membership to a set of bodily characteristics -
ethnicity, ancestry, historic presence, etc. - it allows the concept of nationalism to become a 
pliable construction of an image that is determined by the members of that imagined 
community, and thus can be inclusive or exclusive, hierarchical or horizontal, fatalistic or self-
determined. 
Therefore, nationalism can be understood as a composite of the political ideologies that 
shape its imagined communities and the essentializing ideologies of ancestry and genealogy 
that are inherent in the notion of nationhood and that play a major role in defining those 
imagined communities. It is simultaneously an inclusive imagined community that provides the 
space for ideological affiliation and an essentializing and fatalistic reality in which membership 
is reliant on ancestry and genealogy. Hence, in the development of a cohesive national image, it 
is the surrounding circumstances and forces that determine which set of characteristics acquire 
greater value in the shaping of a national image - and, consequently, the selection of its 
members - at a specific place and time. The concept of democracy for instance implies a 
greater emphasis on the self-deterministic values to nationhood, providing an opportunity for 
belonging that is a matter of choice rather than fate. However, in instances of hardship and 
crisis, national values tend to revert to fatalistic values of fraternity based on ancestral ties and 
ethnic purity. Nationalism thus becomes a matter of interpretation that is dependent on the 
contexts of where different particular commonalities become most prominent. 
Spaces in Diaspora: Home, Borders, and Belonging 
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Paul Gilroy writes that diaspora "identifies a relational network, characteristically 
produced by forced dispersal and reluctant scattering. It is not just a movement through 
purposive, desperate movement is integral to it. Push factors like war, famine, enslavement, 
ethnic cleansing, conquest and political repression, are a dominant influence". (318) 
Distinguishing between diaspora as a form of forced displacement as opposed to other forms of 
nomadism - such as travelers and tourists, emigres, migrant workers, settlers, etc. - is 
therefore key in understanding the Palestinian condition. With the forced displacement of 
Palestinians came a colonial force of deliberate and systematic erasure. As such, the diaspora of 
the stateless Palestinian refugees is fundamentally tied to its history of ethnic cleansing. As a 
result, Palestinian identity in the diaspora is in a de facto struggle for self-actualization and 
reaffirmation of its essence and its distinctive boundaries. 
In his examination of borders and belonging, David Morley writes that "[i]t is at the 
boundary, where territorial control is, in fact, least secure that it is likely to be asserted all the 
more hysterically". (221) The implications of "boundaries" on the Palestinian identity are 
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therefore considerable. The lack of autonomy that defines their cultural boundaries with their 
host countries' challenges the Palestinian identity in multiple ways - the "statelessness" of 
Palestinians in the diaspora marks them as without origin, without past, and without culture, 
thus rendering their Palestinian-ness invisible and replaceable in the cultural landscape of their 
new homes. However, Morley also argues that understanding "home" as static undermines the 
possibilities for plurality and hybridity, as "the more strongly someone holds an image of 
Heimat [home] as something necessarily stable and unchanging, the more likely they are to be 
hostile to newcomers". (220) This creates a need for reaffirmation of the Palestinian 
"authentic" and universal identity that has been legally erased, thus leading to an even stronger 
desire to distinctively define and cement that "authentic". However, due to the severe 
fragmentation of the Palestinian community, the grounding of "authentic" ideals of the 
Palestinian "home" remains elusive. Consequently, the assertion and solidification of the 
Palestinian identity and "home" in its past conditions and image becomes a highly valued ideal 
and signifier of authenticity, and deviance from that historically rooted ideal less and less 
welcome. It is here, then, that collective and post-memory become salient contributors to the 
identification process with a Palestinian nation and "home". 
Memory - The Image from the Past 
A cursory look at Palestinians in the diaspora reveals that memories rather than a 
country have become their inheritance, and continue to act as substitutes for their unattainable 
national homeland. The importance of memory to the Palestinian identity is therefore 
fundamental - the rupture between homeland and people permanently relocated "Palestine" 
from its tangible physical land to the cognitive imaginary of its people, and severed all 
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communication between the two. As a result, "Palestine" necessarily exists in the collective 
memory of Palestinians in the diaspora, as there is no other means of access to it. This rupture 
thus features as a key moment in the Palestinian memory. In his article "The Past in the 
Present: Culture and the Transmission of Memory" Ron Eyerman writes that "cultural trauma 
refers to a dramatic loss of identity and meaning, a tear in the social fabric, affecting a group of 
people who have achieved some degree of cohesion ... [so that] collective identity formation, 
which is intimately linked with collective memory, may be grounded in loss and crisis, as well as 
in triumph". (160) The Palestinian Nakba thus represents the cultural trauma from which 
Palestinian identity emerged. 
Memory, however, is a construction - whether cognitive or tangible -that mutates and 
degrades as time progresses, thus changing the relations of trust between histories, memories, 
and cultures. This becomes highly significant in the case of collective memory, where memories 
are shaped into narratives and identities in and of themselves to which communities can relate. 
Here, the narrative aspect of memory then offers the cornerstone against which belonging and 
membership in a collective is measured. Yet memory can never be a fixed absolute due to its 
very changing nature - particularly as it disperses throughout, and is adopted by, entire 
communities. As a result, "post-memory," which can be understood as "a hybrid form of 
memory that distinguishes itself from personal memory by generational distance and from 
history by a deep personal connection," (Goertz 33) emerges as the means for relation and 
belonging within the newer generations of the Palestinian community. 
Post-memory differs from collective memory in that it changes the dynamic of power 
between collective and individual memory. Whereas in collective memory "individual memory 
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is conceived as [a] derivative of collective memory," (Eyerman 161) in post-memory, the 
generational distance allows for the incorporation of personal experience, education, cultural 
exchange, etc. into the narratives of collective and individual memory. This allows for individual 
memory to match and compete with collective memory in the formation of identity, thus 
challenging the universality of the collective "authentic" memory by providing individual 
memory the room for growth independently of the decaying memories of its prior generations. 
As a result, post-memory offers a divergence from collective memory and collective identity 
into individual and particular identity, thus heightening the fragmentation of Palestinian 
identity and adding to its plurality in the diaspora. 
Citizenship and Performance 
If nationalism is composed of an imagined community in which the image or concept of 
a nation is constructed from its territorial connections, its cultural identity, and its ideologies 
and hegemonies, then the space in which these components' values to the national identity is 
negotiated is vital in understanding the ways in which nationalisms are created and 
disseminated. Habermas's notion of a public sphere depicts a space in which equal and 
informed engagement is practiced through the medium of deliberative discourse, by providing 
a space that allows "citizens [to] deliberate about their common affairs, and hence [is] an 
institutionalized arena of discursive interaction". (Fraser 110) This public sphere therefore 
provides a forum within which the parameters of a nation's identity are negotiated, challenged, 
and defined. As a result, understanding how the dynamics of this space affect the building of 
nationalism within an imagined community's consciousness is necessary for understanding how 
effective nationality can be achieved. 
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Furthermore, the translation of a nationalism from the imagination of its community to 
a lived condition necessitates the creation of measurable modes of belonging. Membership in a 
nation's collective identity thus becomes translated into various modes of citizenship. Similar to 
conceptual membership in a national imagined community, citizenship requires the reflection 
of the nation's image, yet it differs in that it necessitates the internalization of a national image, 
as well as the performance of its markers. Citizenship thus entails "a set of rights both claimed 
by and bestowed upon all members of a political community ... in which the content and scope 
of claimed rights for protection, recognition, provision, etc., on the one hand, and the content 
of rights that are recognised as legitimate by the state and effectively sanctioned on the other, 
may differ". (Pakulski 73, emphasis in original) As a result, citizenship simultaneously requires 
knowledge of and affiliation to a nation's imagined community, as well as the performance of 
its values in order to achieve recognized belonging. Thus, Pierre Bourdieu's concept of "cultural 
capital" as the embodied, objectified, and institutionalized markers of cultural identity, in 
addition to the tacit knowledges that dictate the citizenship role, become necessary 
requirements for the achievement of effective citizenship. 
In the case of Palestinian communities outside the West Bank and Gaza, these dynamics 
significantly affect national and cultural identities. The statelessness of Palestinians and their 
resulting affiliations to other countries thus lead to dual and plural nationalities. Palestinians 
resort to carrying various citizenships - US, Canadian, European, Australian, etc. - in order to 
survive in a highly globalized economy where the lack of a passport means negligible 
opportunities for survival and success. The dispersal of Palestinians into foreign nations and 
cultures thus creates a multitude of national and cultural citizenships within the collective 
Palestinian community. This adds various layers of competing national identities to the 
Palestinian identity that overlap and possibly overwhelm it. As a result, the integration of 
Palestinians into host communities in terms of their official and cultural citizenships plays a 
large role in framing and contesting their "authentic" Palestinian identities. 
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Modern Palestinian History: A Timeline 
The contemporary history of the Palestinians turns on a key date: 1948. That year, a country 
and its people disappeared from maps and dictionaries ... 'The Palestinian people does not 
exist', said the new masters, and henceforth the Palestinians would be referred to by general, 
conveniently vague terms, as either 'refugees', or in the case of a small minority that had 
managed to escape the generalized expulsion, 'Israeli Arabs'. A long absence was beginning. 
(Sanbar 87) 
1917 The Balfour Declaration 
1948 The Arab-Israeli War and the Nakba 
1967 The Six-Day War and the Naksa 
1970 "Black September" 
1975 The Lebanese Civil War and the "Wars 
of the Camps" 
1982 Israel's war on Lebanon and the 
Expulsion of the PLO 
1987 The First Intifada 
1991 The Gulf War and the Exodus from 
Kuwait 
1993 The Oslo Accords and the "Peace 
Process" 
1995 Exodus from Libya 
2000 The Second Intifada 
2003 The Iraq War and the Exodus from Iraq 
2004 Death of Vasser Arafat 
2006 Blockade on Gaza 
2008 "Operation Cast Lead" 
2012 "Operation Pillar of Defense" 
16 
Chapter 2. Historical Background - the Palestinian Narrative 
The history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a significantly long and widely varied 
narrative that spans 65 years of exile and occupation. The extent of the fragmentation of the 
Palestinian community since 1948 expanded and layered the narrative such that countless 
collective events have accrued and amalgamated into a meta-narrative of a "Palestinian 
experience" of exile, statelessness, and loss. This has resulted in a blending of the different 
types of loss each experience wrought and has thus blurred the different ways those losses 
have individually shaped the collective Palestinian identity. Although most of the major events 
littering Palestinian history since 1948 include similar experiences of loss of life and 
dispossession, it is the ways those losses shaped the following divisions in the Palestinian 
collective that are key to understanding Palestinian identity today. For the purposes of this 
study, the events and experiences of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be classified according 
to the types of losses that they resulted in, in order to provide a clearer understanding of the 
contextual circumstances leading up to the events, as well as their consequent ramifications for 
the Palestinian community. 
Palestinian Nationalism - a Brief Overview 
The existence of a Palestinian nationalism and a Palestinian identity is often considered 
by Palestinians as an inherent component of their community, with the belief that "the nation 
was always there, indeed it is part of the natural order, even when it was submerged in the 
hearts of its members". (Smith 18) Therefore, although the history of the Palestinian region is a 
history of perpetual conflict and colonization where "Palestine was conquered in times past by 
ancient Egyptians, Hittites, Philistines, Israel, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Romans, Muslim 
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Arabs, Mamlukes, Ottomans, the British, the Zionists ... the population remained constant-and 
is now still Palestinian". ("Jerusalem, the Old City: An Introduction") 
Nevertheless, despite the romanticizing of Palestinian identity, in his book, Palestinian 
Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, Rashid Khalidi stresses that 
Palestinian identity has never been an exclusive and discrete identity, with "Arabism, religion, 
and local loyalties" playing an important role in building "overlapping identities" (19-21) within 
the collective of the Palestinian peoples. Writing that "local patriotism could not yet be 
described as nation-state nationalism," (32) Khalidi describes the Arab population of British 
Mandatory Palestine as multitudinous, with some or many communities expressing loyalties to 
villages, regions, a projected nation of Palestine, an Arab national project, as well as to Islam. 
(32) Therefore, Khalidi demonstrates that the modern national identity of Palestinians, as with 
most modern post-colonial nationalisms, is rooted in nationalist discourses that emerged 
among the peoples of the Ottoman empire in the late 19th century, and was sharpened and 
cemented following the demarcation of post-colonial nation-state borders in the Middle East 
after WWI and during the dissolution of the British empire. Yet it is also important to note that 
unlike most post-colonial nations, Palestine did not achieve sovereignty or independence after 
the dismantling of the British Mandate, and therefore the establishment of the state of Israel 
has since greatly affected the trajectory of Palestinian nationalism, so that "(a]fter this decisive 
date [1948], one can affix 'pre-' or 'post-' as markers of an apocalyptic moment" (Peteet 627) in 
Palestinian history and the Palestinian identity. 
However, although the Zionist project of a Jewish State on the land of Palestine played a 
role in shaping Palestinian nationalism today, "it is a serious mistake to suggest that Palestinian 
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identity emerged mainly as a response to Zionism". (Khalidi 19-21) The presence of loyalties 
and bonds within the collectives of the Palestinian Arab community prior to the end of the 
British rule provided Palestinians with the foundational basis of a distinct nationalism that has 
since developed as an amalgamation of its previous collective identities - religious, local, 
regional, Pan-Arab, and Palestinian. Thus, the rhetoric of Palestinian nationalism has historically 
been mired in the discourses of Pan-Arabism and Pan-lslamism due to its population's original 
diverse collectives. These discourses continue to influence Palestinian nationalism today, yet 
have also been counterbalanced by the historical events following the dissolving of the British 
Mandate, that have since forcefully shaped and dictated modern Palestinian identity. 
1948: The Nakba and 'The way of Transfer' 
In 1917, Great Britain's issuance of the Balfour Declaration3 provided the legal 
foundation for the creation of a Jewish state on the land of Palestine. However, the promise to 
the Zionist community inherent in this declaration could only find opportunity for its fruition 
after WWII and toward the end of the reign of the British Mandate in historic Palestine, as the 
British had notified the UN of their intent to terminate the mandate no later than August 1st, 
1948. (United Nations General Assembly) However, when in early 1948 Great Britain 
announced its intention to withdraw its mandate by May 14th, the Jewish Leadership declared 
the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-lsrael, to be known as the State of Israel, without 
mentioning its borders, and with the declaration to become effective from the end of the 
3 The Balfour Declaration (dated 2 November 1917) was a letter from the United Kingdom's Foreign Secretary 
Arthur James Balfour to Baron Rothschild (Walter Rothschild, 2nd Baron Rothschild), a leader of the British Jewish 
community, for transmission to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland. Its contents stated that "[h]is 
Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, 
and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country". (Yepp 290) 
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Mandate at midnight of that day. (Bier 49) With full knowledge of the existence of an 
indigenous Palestinian population, and with the understanding that "Palestine's indigenous 
Arab population would not acquiesce in its dispossession," the chosen method for the 
establishment of this Jewish state necessarily had to be through 'the way of transfer.' In fact, 
"'[t]he idea of transfer had accompanied the Zionist movement from its very beginnings', Tom 
Segev reports. 'Disappearing' the Arabs lay at the heart of the Zionist dream, and was also a 
necessary condition of its existence". (Finkelstein xi-xii) 
It is critical to note that throughout the West, the concept of population transfer had 
been, at the time, widely accepted "as an expedient (albeit extreme) method for resolving 
ethnic conflicts". (Finkelstein xiv) In fact, population transfer was cited by the British in the late 
1930s as a model for resolving the conflict in Palestine, based on the precedent set by the 
displacement of 1.5 million people between Turkey and Greece in 1923. (Finkelstein xiv) 
Therefore, during the chaos that ensued in 1948 following the declaration of the establishment 
of the Jewish state, "the Zionist movement exploited the 'revolutionary times' of the first Arab-
Israeli war ... to expel more than 80 percent of the indigenous population (750,000 
Palestinians)". (Finkelstein xv) This exodus, referred to as the "Nakba," Arabic for 
"Catastrophe," marked the first major milestone of the Palestinian experience of displacement 
and dispossession. Due to this original rupture between people and homeland, the collective 
growth of the Palestinian nation was divided - those that remained within historic Palestine 
became Arab-Israelis, others were displaced within Palestine to refugee camps in the West 
Bank and Gaza, and yet more were expelled to camps in neighboring countries - further 
stunting the development of a cohesive collective Palestinian identity and resulting in the 
Palestinian Refugee Status. 
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Unlike all previous and following instances of displacement in world history, Palestinian 
refugees gained a unique standing in the global legal system due to the political conflicts of 
interest between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries. Palestinian refugees were, and 
continue to be, legally restricted from officially and permanently resettling in their host-
countries throughout the Middle East. Further complicating their legal status, the UN Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA), an organization set up uniquely for Palestinian refugees in 1949, 
defines Palestinian refugees as persons who lived in Palestine "between June 1946 and May 
1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
conflict". (Pipes) Especially important is the UNRWA's extension of the refugee status to "the 
descendants of persons who became refugees in 1948". (Pipes) With the majority of 
Palestinians living in refugee camps across the Middle East - growing in number from 750,000 
to an estimated 5 million ("Palestine refugees") -the rippling effects of these limitations 
restricted the collective growth of the Palestinian "nation," resulting in collective experiences 
that were inevitably traumatic - the degradation and humiliation of life in the camps, the 
repeated expulsions, and the countless wars and casualties to which Palestinian refugees were 
subjected in the years following the Nakba and throughout the 65 years of exile from Palestine. 
Those events and conditions thus became the dominant and defining narratives of the 
Palestinian identity in the diaspora, unlike the more common developments of a nation-state 
that tend to include more positive experiences such as industrialization, economic 
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development, participation in the global community, etc. Therefore, the Nakba can be seen as a 
significant defining moment in Palestinian history and the Palestinian identity. 
1967: The Naksa and the Six-Day War 
Although the Nakba displaced 80 percent of the indigenous Palestinian population from 
the territories of historic Palestine, it left the communities of Palestinians living in the Trans-
Jordan Area (West Bank and surrounding municipalities) and Gaza Strip largely unaffected. 
However, when escalations between Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt resulted in the 1967 Six-
Day War, a second wave of Palestinian exodus ensued - displacing an estimated 300,000 
Palestinians out of the West Bank and Gaza, most of whom then settled in Jordan. (Sharp) 
Known as the "Naksa" (Arabic for "Setback"), 1967 has since circumscribed borders along "the 
lines of where Israeli, Jordanian, Egyptian, and Syrian military forces were deployed on the eve 
of what was then going to be the Six Day War," (Miller) and along which a two-state solution to 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could be reached. It is significant in that, as a result of the war 
and the illusory "borders" it created, 1967 has become the de-facto internationally recognized 
"Palestinian" territory in the UN and throughout the peace process. In fact, it is the borders of 
1967 that have recently gained recognition as those of a sovereign Palestinian state, upgrading 
the status of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) in the UN from "entity" to "non-member 
state," on November 29th, 2012. (Charbonneau) 
Significantly, in Palestinian culture the Naksa also holds strong symbolical value, further 
dividing the Palestinian collective experience. 1967 cemented the displacement of all 1948 
refugees when the Arabs were soundly defeated by Israeli forces in their attempts to liberate 
historic Palestine. The Naksa also laid the groundwork for the internationally endorsed "two-
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state solution," (Finkelstein xvii) in which both an Israeli and Palestinian state could co-exist 
within the borders of historic Palestine. Although seemingly the more rational and peaceful 
resolution to the conflict, the "two-state settlement" nullifies the map of historic Palestine to 
which millions of refugees wish to return and erases all chance of reversing the effects of 1948 
for the dispossessed Palestinians. This has further incapacitated 1948 refugees in the legal 
process, as they could not belong to or participate in the creation of the Palestinian state of 
1967, nor could they return to their homes or settle in the countries to which they fled; thus 
setting off a chain of events that would split the development of Palestinian communities in 
and outside the territory in two divergent directions. 
Furthermore, with Israel's capture of more Palestinian territories in 1967 came a reprisal 
of the original obstacle to the Zionist vision - they "wanted the land but not the people". 
(Finkelstein xvi) However, due to a change in the international community's perspective 
following the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention which ratified the "'unequivocally prohibited 
deportation' of civilians under occupation," (Finkelstein xvi) expulsion was no longer a viable 
option for Israel's takeover of the Palestinian territories. This meant that with 'the way of 
transfer' no longer available, the fulfillment of the Zionist dream of a purely Jewish state in 
Palestine would necessarily be through means of segregation and apartheid. 
Apartheid, Oslo, and the 'Peace Process' 
In the aftermath of 1967, Palestinian political forces began to emerge as significant 
obstacles to Israel's annexation of Palestinian territories. In particular, with Israel having 
officially accepted and endorsed the two-state settlement, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) "could no longer be dismissed as simply a terrorist organization bent on 
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Israel's destruction," which increased pressures on Israel to reach an agreement with the PLO's 
"compromising approach". {Finkelstein xviii-xix) In an attempt "to head off what Israeli strategic 
analyst Avner Yaniv dubbed the PLO's 'peace offensive'," {Finkelstein xix) Israel invaded 
Lebanon, where PLO officials were then headquartered, in June, 1982. This invasion and the 
resulting chaos and weakening of the PLO led to a sidelining of the question of Palestine and 
the '67 borders, thus allowing Israel to maintain its authority over the occupied Palestinian 
territories. Consequently, with the ongoing stalemate that prevented Palestinians from gaining 
autonomous control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, an uprising of the Palestinian 
population began in December of 1987 "against the occupation in a basically non-violent civil 
revolt, the intifada". (Finkelstein xix, emphasis in original) 
This First Intifada (Arabic for "shaking off"), which lasted from December 1987 to 1993 
and led to the Oslo Accord, marked the largest non-violent attempt at resistance by Palestinians 
since 1948, and more significantly "was the first time that the [Palestinians] of the territories 
had acted with cohesion and as a nation". (McDowall 2) Defined by the Palestinians' stone-
throwing offensive against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), the Intifada primarily consisted of 
peaceful acts of civil disobedience by Palestinians including "general strikes, boycotts on Israeli 
products, refusal to pay taxes, graffiti, and barricades," ("History of Conflict") and was quickly 
recognized as an uprising unlike all previous disturbances. Thus it began that the 
world was assailed by disturbing scenes of Israeli efforts to restore order. Television 
networks and newspapers around the globe relayed pictures of Israeli troops firing on 
stone-throwing demonstrators, or beating those they caught with cudgels. It rapidly 
became clear that many of the latter were not demonstrators at all ... [with] one such 
picture captioned 'Armed Israelis drag a Palestinian youth from his house yesterday, 
during a sweep through the town of Khan Yunis on the Gaza Strip. The youth was taken 
into an alleyway and beaten unconscious.' (McDowall 2) 
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As a result, Israel's brutal response, in concert with the inept and corrupt leadership of the PLO, 
eventually led to the uprising's defeat. (Finkelstein xix) 
This defeat was further compounded by the resulting agreement reached at Oslo by 
Israel and the PLO, known as the "Oslo Accord" when 
[a]fter the implosion of the Soviet Union, the destruction of Iraq, and the suspension of 
funding from the Gulf states, Palestinian fortunes reached a new nadir. The US and 
Israel seized on this opportune moment to recruit the already venal and now desperate 
Palestinian leadership - 'on the verge of bankruptcy' and 'in [a] weakened condition' 
(Uri Savir, Israel's chief negotiator at Oslo)- as surrogates of Israeli power. This was the 
real meaning of the Oslo Accord signed in September 1993. (Finkelstein xix) 
The significance of Oslo, and its effects on the Palestinian community both within and outside 
the occupied territories therefore was, and continues to be, considerable. It allowed Israel to 
maintain control by proxy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip through the establishment of the 
Palestinian National Authority (PA) as the Palestinian governing body, thus allowing the 
occupation and annexation of Palestinian territories to continue undeterred, and further 
cemented the apartheid rule over Palestinian territories - all of which eventually culminated in 
the Second Intifada. 
September 2000 saw the beginning of the second uprising of Palestinians against Israeli 
rule, often referred to as the Second Intifada, or the Al-Aqsa Intifada (in reference to the Al-
Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem). Several political events are cited as contributors to the uprising, 
with the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on July 25, 2000 being the most likely 
catalyst. ("Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report") As with the First Intifada, the Al-
Aqsa Intifada also saw excessive use of force in Israel's response to the largely unarmed revolt, 
further fueling the anger and desperation of the uprising. "Israel responded to the disturbances 
with excessive and illegal use of deadly force against demonstrators; behavior which, in the 
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PLO's view, reflected Israel's contempt for the lives and safety of Palestinians. For Palestinians, 
the widely seen images of Muhammad al-Durrah in Gaza on September 30, shot as he huddled 
behind his father, reinforced that perception".4 ("Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee 
Report") 
In addition to the policing tactics of the Israeli forces against Palestinian civilians during 
the Second Intifada, Israel proceeded with "Operation Defensive Shield," an invasion of the 
West Bank in March/April of 2002. The large-scale offensive, which was mainly carried out in 
the refugee camps of Jenin, Bethlehem, Nablus, and Ramallah, saw 
the targeting of Palestinian ambulances and medical personnel, the targeting of 
journalists, the killing of Palestinian children 'for sport' (Chris Hedges, New York Times 
former Cairo bureau chief), the rounding up, handcuffing and blindfolding of Palestinian 
males between the ages of fifteen and fifty, and affixing of numbers on their wrists, the 
indiscriminate torture of Palestinian detainees, the denial of food, water, electricity, 
medical treatment and burial to the Palestinian civilian population, the indiscriminate 
air assaults on some Palestinian neighborhoods, the systematic use of Palestinian 
civilians as human shields, [and] the bulldozing of Palestinian homes with the occupants 
huddled inside. (Finkelstein xxiii) 
Reports of the battles and struggles of the Second Intifada, like the First Intifada, were widely 
broadcast and became inescapable throughout the Middle East -Arabs, and more particularly 
Palestinians, everywhere were consumed by the unfolding events of the Intifada. However, 
unlike the First Intifada, when "all international and regional events were reported by Arab 
government-controlled services on a limited basis," the real-time coverage of the Second 
Intifada set a precedent as the "first televised conflict where Arab transnational TV [set] the 
agenda for Arab (and often Israeli) audiences - [constituting] the first comprehensive 
indigenous coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict". (Rinnawi 64) This coverage resulted in a 
4 Refer to image 5, Appendix D 
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heightened sense of reality for the viewers, and brought the horror and violence of the uprising 
into their homes. Solidarity with the Palestinians strengthened, and more importantly, 
solidarity within Palestinian communities re-emerged after having been side-lined in the years 
following Oslo. The crisis of the Second Intifada thus created the first collective experience that 
was uniquely Palestinian and that eliminated the distances and borders between them as it was 
unfolding, so that even Palestinians outside the territory experienced the Intifada as though it 
were first-hand. 
The West Bank/Gaza Strip Divide and the Gaza/Israel Wars 
Despite the extent of violence in retaliation to the uprising, the Second Intifada lasted 
until the death of Palestinian leader Vasser Arafat in November 2004, and disintegrated with 
Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip, announced in June 2004 and completed 
in August 2005. (Tenne) Following these events came what is arguably the most powerfully 
definitive divide for the Palestinian nation. General elections for the Palestinian Legislative 
council commenced in January 2006 during which the lslamist group Hamas won with an 
unexpected majority of "76 of the 132 seats in the chamber, with the ruling Fatah party trailing 
on 43". ("Hamas Sweeps to Election Victory") With this win, the conflict between Israel and 
Gaza intensified, with Israel sealing Gaza's borders, and largely preventing free flow of people 
and many imports and exports. ("Gaza Siege: Timeline") In addition, due to a breakout of 
internal fighting between Hamas and Fatah in 2007, a political split between Gaza and the West 
Bank eventuated, with Hamas establishing a government in Gaza, and Fatah maintaining the PA 
in the West Bank. ("Gaza Siege: Timeline") Consequently, the US, Israel and the EU cut off aid to 
Gaza in an attempt to undermine Hamas and force it from power while strengthening President 
Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah's position as the recognized Palestinian National Authority. 
(Erlanger) 
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Since the establishment of the blockade on Gaza, which has lasted since March 18th of 
2006, ("Gaza Siege: Timeline") numerous military conflicts between Gaza and Israel ensued. On 
June 25th 2006, Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was captured "by militants from Hamas and two allied 
groups who tunneled into Israel from the Gaza Strip," ("Hamas releases audio of captured 
Israeli") leading to massive retaliation by the Israeli army which was exacted over the course of 
several deadly operations. "Operation Summer Rains" and "Operation Autumn Clouds" marked 
the first major Israeli mobilization into the Gaza Strip since its unilateral disengagement plan 
was implemented in 2005. (ltim; Schippert) After the signing of a ceasefire agreement on 
November 26th, 2006, and its eventual breakdown, Gaza saw the Israeli offensive "Operation 
Hot Winter'' in February 2008. ("Israeli army kills 4 Palestinians in West Bank") In response to 
the escalating desperation of relations between Gaza and Israel, an Egyptian-brokered six-
month ceasefire agreement was reached, and came into effect on June 19th, 2008. (Kershner) 
However, when four months into the agreement, "Israeli troops killed six Hamas gunmen in a 
raid into the territory, Hamas responded by firing a wave of rockets into southern Israel". 
("Gaza Truce Broken as Israeli Raid Kills Six Hamas Gunmen") These mutual attacks 
consequently led to Israel's largest and deadliest offensive on Gaza, "Operation Cast Lead," 
which lasted from December 27, 2008, to January 19, 2009. ("Timeline: Gaza crisis") 
Titled as "22 days of death and destruction" by Amnesty lnternational's report on the 
2008/9 offensive, Operation Cast Lead was a massive scale attack that utilized "insane" force, 
weapons, and war tactics in the densely civilian populated Gaza Strip. ("Operation Cast Lead" 
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16) Testimonies from Israeli soldiers emphasize the degree of force used, with the frequent 
recurrence of its description as "insane" - "[w]e are hitting innocents and our artillery fire there 
was insane ... What's an insane amount of artillery? Ten of our bombs for every one of theirs". 
("Operation Cast Lead" 16) In a more detailed explanation of the extent of force used by the 
IDF, Amnesty International reports that 
the scale and intensity of the attacks against Gaza from Israel during the 22 day-conflict 
have caused more death and destruction than any other Israeli offensive in the past. 
According to Al's figures, some 1400 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces, while at 
least 900 of these were unarmed civilians not involved in the conflict, including 300 
children and 115 women. The organization also reports that the Israeli attacks that were 
the deadliest were carried out with high precision weapons. Israeli F-16 combat aircrafts 
targeted and destroyed hundreds of Palestinian homes without warning, with full 
knowledge of the circumstances, killing and injuring people, often while they were 
sleeping at night. Other victims were sitting in their yard or hanging laundry on their 
roof. Some children were struck while playing in their rooms, on the roofs of their 
homes, or outside near their homes. Rescuers and paramedics [were] attacked several 
times while trying to rescue the wounded or recover the bodies of victims. Dozens of 
civilians [were] killed by less precise weapons, including mortar shells and white 
phosphorous. Still others, including women and children, were shot at short range while 
posing no threat to the lives of Israeli soldiers. ("Factsheet: Amnesty International 
report"; "Israel/Gaza: Operation "Cast Lead"" 6-8) 
As with the two intifadas, Operation Cast Lead thus became a widely marked experience for 
Palestinians everywhere. The degree of violence of the 22 days, widely and thoroughly covered 
in the media, became a daily experience for Palestinians across the globe. It was a reprisal of all 
the injustices Palestinians ever experienced in their collective histories and was therefore a 
monumental tragedy that united all those who sympathized with the Palestinian cause. 
Similarly, Israel's latest war on Gaza, "Operation Pillar of Defense," which commenced 
from the 14th to the 21st of November 2012 also produced an awakening for the Palestinian 
communities in and outside the occupied territories. This most recent assault however was 
unlike the previous instances of Operation Cast Lead and the two intifadas, as the scale of force 
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utilized by Israel was tempered and did not exact the usual number of casualties as the prior 
attacks did. In addition, the brief period of the conflict and the significance of the military 
power demonstrated by Palestinian militia in Gaza reduced the possibility of its becoming 
another purely tragic moment in Palestinian history. This resulted in the emergence of different 
kinds of unities - and divisions - amongst Palestinians viewing the conflict from outside, based 
more on political alignments and perspectives than on emotional responses, as the trauma and 
victimization of Gaza was not as much in focus during these events as it had previously been. 
Palestinian Refugees: The Cycles of Exile 
As with life for Palestinians within the territories, life for Palestinian refugees in exile 
was exceptionally difficult from the outset. In addition to the loss of a national homeland, the 
dispossessed refugees were relegated to shanty camps on the margins of society and with 
varying availability of survival's most basic resources. In Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, camps 
provided shelter for the hundreds of thousands of refugees and sporadic availability of the 
minimal resources required for sustaining their communities such as food, water, electricity, 
and fuel. However, these camps also simultaneously restricted Palestinian refugees from 
achieving any long-term security or settlement. Smaller numbers of Palestinians fleeing to the 
Gulf, Iraq, Egypt, and other neighboring Arab countries were integrated into the communities 
of their host countries, yet were also limited in terms of their legal rights and freedoms. In all 
cases, Palestinians were and continue to be legally prohibited from attaining citizenship 
anywhere in the Middle East, so that, "although the Palestinian diaspora is situated in a variety 
of countries, legally the Palestinians are nowhere". (King-Irani 923) 
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As a result, the provisions for basic human rights and economic sustainability for those 
communities also varies to a large degree across the various refugee camps to which 
Palestinians fled. These circumstances culturally marginalize Palestinians and relegate them to a 
liminal legal zone where, at best, they are treated as second-class citizens and, at worst, are 
perceived as leeches to the countries in which they find themselves. In addition, the lack of a 
nation-state or a "homeland" to provide support for the refugees left Palestinians in the care of 
"UN-established institutions such as the UNRWA to deal with the Palestinians' needs and 
demands through exceptional channels outside the jurisdiction of the UN's human rights 
regime. As a consequence, Palestinians' rights are always open to question and [have been] 
frequently violated". (King-Irani 923) 
Due to a variety of political conflicts that arose amongst the Arabs "[o]ver the [65] years 
since the Nakba, Palestinian refugees experienced repeated expulsions from their second, third, 
and sometimes fourth homes". (Chronicles of a Refugee) These repeated expulsions began "as 
early as the mid-1950s [when] Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Libya expelled striking Palestinian 
workers". (Rosen 75) However, the first instance where large numbers of Palestinians were 
subjected to targeted onslaught and were forcefully expelled was during the "Black September" 
events of 1970-71, when Jordanian armies expelled "some 20,000 Palestinians and demolished 
their camps". (Rosen 75) With the goal of eradicating the power of the PLO, which had accrued 
in Palestinian enclaves and refugee camps across Jordan since 1968, the Jordanians conducted 
a systemic and meticulous campaign against the PLO, forcing them into the mountains where 
they were besieged by the Jordanian army and effectively expelled from the country. (Pollack 
343) As a result of the 1970 expulsion, the PLO lost its base of operations, and fighters were 
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driven into Southern Lebanon where their heightened presence and the intensification of 
fighting on the Israeli-Lebanese border stirred up internal unrest in Lebanon, eventually 
contributing and leading to the Lebanese Civil War from 1975 to the mid-1980s. (Fisk 74) 
Among the countless Palestinian casualties during the civil war was the destruction of the Tel 
Al-Za'atar ("The Hill of Thyme") UNRWA administered camp. Housing approximately 50,000-
60,000 refugees in northeast Beirut (Intersections 156), Tel Al-Za'ater was annihilated during 
the war on August 12, 1976 in an attempt to eradicate the presence of the PLO and Fatah at the 
camp. (Fisk 85-6) 
Furthermore, the conflict over Tel Al-Za'ater between the Lebanese and Palestinian 
militia resulted in sparking what is now known as the "war of the camps," where Palestinian 
refugees were systemically targeted and evicted during the civil war. This included the Sabra 
and Shatila Massacre of approximately 3,500 Palestinians by a Lebanese Christian Phalangist5 
militia assisted by the IDF in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, Lebanon, 
between September 16 and September 18, 1982. "The carnage began immediately. It was to 
continue without interruption till Saturday noon. Night brought no respite; the Phalangist 
liaison officer asked for illumination and the Israelis duly obliged with flares, first from mortars 
and then from planes". (Hirst 157) Similarly, another victim to the war of the camps was the 
Bourj el-Barajneh ("the Tower of Towers") camp, which was laid siege to by the Israeli army and 
Lebanese Christian Phalangists in 1982 after Israel invaded Lebanon earlier that year. It and 
5 The Lebanese Phalanges Party is a traditional right-wing political-paramilitary organization. Although it is officially 
secular, it is mainly supported by Maronite Christians. The party played a major role in the Lebanese Civil War 
(1975-90). (Fisk 290) 
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other Palestinian camps were further targeted by Amal militia6 from February 1984 to February 
1987 for the control of West Beirut, leaving Palestinian casualties in Lebanon in the tens of 
thousands. (Chronicles of a Refugee) 
The events of Black September in Jordan and the War of the Camps in Lebanon have 
thus become distinct collective memories within the Palestinian diaspora. The conflicts and 
resulting losses for the Palestinian communities in Jordan and Lebanon served as reminders of 
the status of Palestinian refugees as unprotected and marginalized minorities. Furthermore, the 
involvement of the PLO, who later became the official leadership of the Palestinian people in 
the West Bank and Gaza, drew a connection between Palestinians within and outside the 
territories - particularly at a time when Israeli/Palestinian borders had not yet been definitively 
drawn. Therefore the collectivity of the memories of Black September and the War of the 
Camps transcends the imagination of the communities who were directly affected by the 
attacks, and ties in with the meta-narratives of the Nakba. Although the number of Palestinians 
directly affected by the.se conflicts is smaller than, and farther removed from, the number of 
Palestinians directly affected by the conflict with Israel, the general themes of dispossession 
and the fight for recognition and stability unify the experiences in ways that allow Palestinians 
in and outside the territories to relate to one another. In fact, for many Palestinians who 
shuffled from camps in the West Bank and Gaza to camps in Jordan and Lebanon, the conflicts 
with Israel often become interchangeable with those with the Jordanian and Lebanese armies. 
6 The Lebanese Resistance were the armed militia of the Movement of the Dispossessed (or Movement of the 
Deprived), a political movement of Lebanon's Shia community. The militia's name, when abbreviated, created the 
acronym Amal, which means "Hope" in Arabic. The movement was founded in 1974 and its armed organization 
was founded in 1975. The Amal militia was a major participant in the Lebanese Civil War. (Augustus 37) 
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In addition to the difficulties facing refugees living in camps, Palestinians who fled to the 
Gulf and other Arab countries, although not relegated to camps, were also repeatedly 
prosecuted. In March of 1991, some 400,000 Palestinians (Rosen 75) living in Kuwait were 
targeted and forcibly expelled in the aftermath of the Gulf War, marking "the largest forced 
displacement of Palestinians from an Arab state". (Rosen 75) Unlike the previous expulsions 
from Jordan or Lebanon, where the presence and activities of Palestinian militia gave the 
governments cause to retaliate, the deportations from Kuwait stemmed from a desire for 
vengeance against the Palestinian community due to the positive political relations of 
Palestinian leader Vasser Arafat and the PLO with Saddam Hussein, who had earlier invaded 
Kuwait during the Gulf War. (Rosen 81) While Palestinian militia engaged in conflicts with the 
governments' official armies in Jordan and Lebanon, none existed in the population of 
Palestinian refugees living in Kuwait, rendering the exodus from Kuwait as nothing more than a 
viciously violent and vindictive vendetta against the Palestinian refugee population, who did 
not in fact pose any real security threat to Kuwaiti society. Palestinian refugees living in Kuwait 
had not in any way contributed to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, yet were punished for 
their leader's diplomatic relations with Iraq. As a result, "Kuwait's ethnic cleansing of the 
Palestinians is notable not only because of its exponentially large scale but because it afforded 
the ultimate proof of the cynical Arab manipulation of the Palestinian cause. The Palestinian 
Kuwaiti community was arguably one of the most settled and economically integrated of 
Palestinian Arab diasporas, yet this did not prevent its uprooting in one fell swoop through no 
fault of its own". (Rosen 83) 
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Significantly, these prosecutions of Palestinians occurred between the 1967 war and the 
signing of the Oslo Accords, during a time when Palestinians were legally and officially 
defenceless. However, despite the implied promise and hope of Oslo in the creation of an 
official Palestinian government that could ostensibly then support the exiled Palestinian 
communities, the expulsions and violations against refugees continued after the agreement. In 
fact, the signing of the Oslo Accords effectively instigated the expulsion of Palestinians from 
Libya in the mid-'90s. "In his speech during the Sept. 11994 celebrations, Colonel Mouamer 
Qadhafi announced his plan to expel Palestinians residing in his country in order to prove to the 
whole world that PLO Chairman Vasser Arafat had failed to establish a state and, therefore, was 
unable to fulfill the demands of the Palestinian struggle". (Sirhan) Following this 
announcement, from mid-December 1994 to mid-February 1995, the Libyan government began 
to methodically erase its Palestinian residents from all legal records, thereby refusing to renew 
expired residency permits or issue new permits, nullifying any existing renewable labor 
contracts, and preventing any Palestinians who had left Libya for personal or business trips to 
return - regardless of whether or not their residency permits were valid, and despite the fact 
that they were entitled to receive certain labor rights and compensation from the Libyan 
government. During its first stage, hundreds of Palestinians were expelled to the Egyptian 
border where they were refused crossing. As a result, "they were practically left in no-man's 
land near the Saloum border post while Libya refused to take them back". {Sirhan) 
The situation in Libya continued in such vein, with more Palestinian refugees unable to 
reach Syria or Jordan after being "stranded on board a ship opposite the coast of Cyprus, which 
denied them the right to enter its territory and did not allow their ship to dock in its ports". 
35 
(Sirhan) Furthermore, Lebanon also "turned back several hundred Palestinians who arrived 
from Libya on two ships in late August 1995. Their entry was made subject to obtaining an entry 
visa, even for those holding Lebanese travel documents". (Sirhan) As a result of this aimless 
exodus, hundreds of Palestinians were left stranded in the camps along Libya's borders and in 
no-man's land, living in severe conditions "compounded by the fact that the UNRWA was 
unable to provide refugees with food or health services on a regular basis since it operate[d] 
neither in Libya nor in Egypt and because Palestinians [were, and continue to be,] excluded 
from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, meaning that they were 
prevented from receiving UNHCR7's full support". (Sirhan) Eventually however, Libyan forces in 
1997 forcefully evacuated the Al-Awda (Arabic for "the Return") camp which had been put 
together in the no-man's land between Egypt and Libya's borders, "and ordered Palestinians 
residing in it (250 of them) to take buses to [another refugee camp within Libya] while carrying 
all their personal belongings". (Sirhan) 
The year 2003 also saw a reprisal of the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from their re-
settled homes - this time, in Iraq, and this time, again, due to the political support Saddam 
Hussein had offered Palestine and Palestinian refugees in the past. Like Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, 
and other Arab states, Iraq had played host to a significant Palestinian refugee population after 
the 1948 Nakba. Unlike those states however, "Iraq did not sign an agreement with the UNRWA 
... preferring instead to address the assistance needs of the Palestinian refugees itself". 
("Nowhere to Flee" 8) This left any and all support received by the Palestinian community 
entirely dependent on the Iraqi government, which was controlled by Saddam Hussein until the 
7 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
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US invasion of 2003. In the interim, support for the refugee community was provided through 
measures such as the standard issuance of travel documents instead of passports, government-
provided housing where rental of private property to Palestinians was paid for by the Iraqi 
government, and exemption of Palestinians from military service, including Saddam's 
"paramilitary force, the Jaysh al-Quds (Jerusalem Army), [established] with the aim of 
'liberating' Jerusalem," and into which "Iraqi males of military age, particularly Shi'a and Kurds, 
were often forced to 'volunteer'". ("Nowhere to Flee" 9-10) 
These conditions, along with Saddam Hussein's continued provision of "martyr'' 
payments to families of Palestinian suicide bombers and to the families of other Palestinians 
killed in the Intifada - a reported total of €1 billion - created resentment within the Iraqi 
community who were left to suffer under the strict sanctions regime. ("Nowhere to Flee" 10) 
The build-up of resentment culminated in a backlash against the Palestinian refugee community 
during the US invasion of 2003, when almost immediately following the fall of the government 
in April they "became subject to intense harassment, violent attack, and forced evictions from 
their homes". ("Nowhere to Flee" 12) The intensity of the Iraqi community's backlash against 
the Palestinians resulted in the displacement of most of the refugee community, with most 
Palestinians choosing to flee to Jordan mainly "because most of the other countries bordering 
Iraq kept their borders firmly closed, especially to Palestinians". ("Nowhere to Flee" 17) 
However, this did not mean that they were able to resettle in Jordan. New desert camps 
awaited the displaced refugees in conditions where "[f]requent windstorms [would] whip fine 
sand into every tent ... [r]espiratory problems among camp residents [were] omnipresent, and 
the heat in summer [was] unbearable. " ("Nowhere to Flee" 18} Refugees were thus forced to 
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choose between uncertain and dangerous futures in Baghdad and jobless and hopeless 
prospects in the shanty camps of Jordan's desert. Those who chose to return to Iraq were 
expelled again in 2006, yet were denied re-entry into Jordan. {"Nowhere to Flee" 22) As a 
result, stranded on the borders of Jordan and Iraq, makeshift camps emerged much as they did 
between Libya and Egypt. 
These repeated expulsions from Kuwait, Libya, and Iraq therefore also constitute 
collective memories that are strongly reminiscent of the Nakba and the original exodus of the 
Palestinian community. For those communities in particular, these expulsions came about 
through no fault of their own and were in response to the politics of the time. These expulsions 
however were also results of the lack of support the Palestinian refugee community had 
received from the PA and the inadequacy ofthe UNRWA in protecting their interests. Therefore 
the repeated ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian communities from their re-settled homes 
severed their ties with the nations in which they sought refuge and reaffirmed their 
statelessness. The victimization of the Palestinian refugees in Kuwait, Libya, and Iraq thus tied 
them to the communities in Lebanon and Jordan who had suffered similar ostracism, 
degradation, and prosecution. However, the lack of involvement of Israel or official Palestinian 
leadership in these attacks rendered them unique to Palestinian refugees rather than to the 
Palestinian collective writ large. The collectivity of these memories is therefore less tangible, as 
it exists mostly within communities in the diaspora and to a far lesser degree in the 
conventional Palestinian narratives. The contribution of these events to the Palestinian identity 
thus lies in providing irrevocable proof of its consistent prosecution on the basis of ethnicity, 
regardless of when, where, or how. 
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Palestinians in Exile: the Hierarchy of Experience 
Left with nowhere to go, Palestinian refugees have thus been tossed from one host-
country to another, where political agendas and conflicts dictated their increasingly hopeless 
futures. The experiences of the marginalization, targeting, violence, and repeated expulsions 
literally perpetuated the Nakba and the resulting homelessness and lack of security of the 
Palestinian nation, and have thus rendered it timeless and inescapable - for the Palestinian in 
exile, the Nakba did not end in 1948 but has continued, and remains a fact of their daily 
existence. In addition, by being separated from Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
and socially and culturally marginalized in their re-settled homes, Palestinian refugees are 
consigned to a liminal space where belonging remains elusive, not only in a legal sense, but also 
in the desire to build lasting and enduring ties to a "home". 
In essence, all the historical events outlined in this chapter boil down to a prosecution of 
Palestinians that is facilitated and made possible by their eternal "statelessness". With no 
national government or official army to shield and protect the interests of Palestinians, they 
have been rendered legally helpless and fair game in any and all conflicts that arise in their 
presence. 1948 succeeded in exiling a nation from its homeland and abandoning its people to 
the mercies of a desperate fate, and 1967 and the creation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
borders cemented their refugee status for the foreseeable future. As a result, Palestinian 
refugees will always continue to be refugees as they are denied citizenship in the occupied 
territories, the West Bank and Gaza, denied the Right of Return, and denied protection from 
the Palestinian Authority who is only responsible for Palestinians within the 1967 territory and 
borders. 
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The Palestinian population is thus divided from its home, and splintered into the 
fragments of communities that dispersed across the diaspora. The various experiences that 
ensued of this rupture resulted in an exaggerated plurality of devastation in the Palestinian 
narrative and have created a dichotomy in belonging to the Palestinian identity. The repeated 
cycles of rejection and prosecution, with no haven to which to return, separated Palestinians in 
exile from those who suffered different kinds of injustice within the occupied territories. This 
further led to the entrapment of Palestinian refugees in an endless cycle of transience, where 
deferral of achieving their one desire - finding a homeland - is the only constant. 
Further distinctions of the Palestinian refugees' identities lie in the uniqueness of their 
experiences. The Palestinian-ness of the refugees in exile is defined by their history of having 
been subjected to cultural and political marginalization, rendered as scapegoats for the various 
grievances of the communities in which they resided, and enduring repeated attacks and 
expulsions; whereas Palestinians within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are defined by the 
occupation, the PA and Hamas leaderships, and the intifadas and conflicts with Israel. As a 
result, the identity of the Palestinian refugee is necessarily shaped by its physical and legal 
transience, as opposed to that the Palestinian in the West Bank or Gaza Strip whose identity is 
informed more by experiences of oppression and apartheid. Although the distinction may be 
subtle, the difference between negative recognition and invisibility marks the division between 
Palestinians in and ·outside the territories - whilst those in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are 
actively oppressed, those living in the camps are entirely helpless and excluded from controlling 
their fates. The perception of differing experiences on either side of the border thus creates 
divisions in belonging to the overarching Palestinian identity. 
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As a result of the original expulsion and dispossession of May 1948, the Palestinian 
narrative is one that is littered with struggle, strife, and injustice. The Palestinian people were 
rendered "stateless" and for the large part homeless and unprotected by the Nakba and the 
following wars and upheavals, so that the Palestinian condition has become a unique and 
distinctive identity in world history. In his novel Gate of the Sun Lebanese author llyas Khuri 
writes that "[a]s with all disasters, the only thing that can make one forget a massacre is an 
even bigger massacre, and we're a people whose fate is to be forgotten as a result of its 
accumulated calamities. Massacre erases massacre, and all that remains in the memory is the 
smell of blood". (107) Such is the case with the identity of the Palestinian people, where war, 
conflict, repeated expulsions, and massacres upon massacres compete within the same identity 
for significance. As a result of this fragmentation, the combined experiences of the Palestinian 
nation fall within varying hierarchies of experience according to (a) the degree of devastation 
wrought, (b) the magnitude and collectivity of the experiences, and (c) according to the 
overlaps and similarities among them; leading to a stratified and indefinable collective identity. 
"He says: I am from there, I am from here, 
but I am neither there nor here. 
I have two names which meet and part ... 
I have two languages, but I have long forgotten 
which is the language of my dreams. 
I have an English language, for writing, 
with yielding phrases, 
and a language in which Heaven and 
Jerusalem converse, with a silver cadence, 
but it does not yield to my imagination. 
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Chapter 3. Conceptualizing Nationalism and National Identities 
Identity is a way of claiming personhood, instating existence, and achieving belonging. It 
is therefore an all-encompassing understanding of a person's being, and their place and 
belonging in the world. Identity is a slippery concept that is an attempt to classify the 
characteristics that define individuals to themselves and to the societies around them. Pinning 
identity down to one definition is impossible - it is fluid, and thus shifts and changes as time 
and circumstances change. It is both an essential quality that is fatalistic and a social 
construction that is shaped by society and life's experiences. (Lawler 1) It includes gender 
identification, sexual identification, class, religion, as well as ethnic and racial identifications, to 
name a few. These facets of identity tend to heavily overlap, yet when pressed, often one or 
another emerges as the "primary" identity, so that individuals identify as being gendered (eg. "a 
woman"), racialized (eg. "black"), classed (eg. "working-class"), sexualized (eg. "gay"), and 
nationalized (eg. "Canadian"), etc. In other instances, the distillation of a single primary identity 
is impossible, so that the overlaps of the layers of identity become the primary identifiers - eg. 
"black woman," "gay Jew," "African-American," etc. Thus, identity can be understood as a 
layering of various points of identification, and the dynamics between and amongst those 
layers. As a result, the identities of individuals vary according to the combinations of the layers 
of identification that are felt most prominently at a given time. 
Constructing Identity 
The formation of identity is therefore a highly fluid process that varies according to the 
experiences of individuals, and thus affects the value these various identifications accrue in 
their overall identity. The premise of this study is that the formation of identity can be 
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understood to include two distinct and simultaneous processes of identification: the 
essentializing of oneself, where identity is seen to be fixed and inherently formed at birth, and 
the pluralizing of oneself, where identity is seen to be socially constructed and open to 
negotiation. It is therefore the negotiations that take place within both processes, as well as 
between one another, that internalize individual identity and provide it with its fixed definitions 
as well as its fluidity. This understanding of identity reflects Erik Erikson's theory of identity 
where 
neither does the individual [fully] adapt to society nor does society [fully] mold him (sic) 
into its pattern; rather, society and individual form a unity within which a mutual 
regulation takes place. The social institutions are pre-conditions of individual 
development, and the developing individual's behavior, in turn, elicits that help which 
society gives through its adult members directed by its institutions and traditions. 
Society is not merely a prohibitor or provider; it is the necessary matrix of the 
development of all behavior. (Rapaport 104) 
Therefore, where the essentializing of identity is concerned with the inherent characteristics 
individuals are born with - their sex, ethnicity, and sexual orientation etc. - the pluralities of 
identity occur due to their existential circumstances - their social class, race, gender roles, 
citizenships etc. Both sets of traits are born-into yet their changeability across space and time 
suggests that they are not fixed and latent understandings of personhood, but are processes of 
encoding and decoding that are continuously influenced by the prevailing social orders of the 
environments in which they are produced. That is to say that the essential traits of individuals 
as well as their existential circumstances accrue meaning from the ideologies, hegemonies and 
understandings of the societies in which they are perceived. 
In their self-reflections, participants acknowledged both aspects of identity. They 
articulated the essential attributes of identity into which they were born - namely, their 
44 
Palestinian identities - but also stressed the importance of nurturing that identity through their 
lived experiences as well. 
[Ayman:] Identity is -we contribute to it as much as it is made for us. Your 
parents, or society, may try to feed you your identity as much as they want, but 
unless you feel a certain connection with it, unless you pursue it, there's nothing 
that will tie you to it. And that's why you'll feel that there are those who are 
detached, even though they may be born Palestinian and have the same 
knowledge of the issue. 
[Carla:] Basically, my identity, I was born with. But it was not nurtured, it wasn't 
given the importance that it should have been given. Then I grew up and I 
realized -you know, you give the importance to your identity, you give it the 
weight it needs. 
[Haya:] For me, it started off when I was young. You know, just given all these 
stories - and, especially in Jordan -you hear a lot of stories about Palestinians, 
and I just took that part of me for granted, I didn't really look too much into it. I 
think it was because of the community there, because there are so many 
Palestinians there that - and everyone I knew was Palestinian by origin - there 
weren't that many people who identified solely as Jordanians. And the other 
thing is that within the education system, you're always learning about 
"El'Adeyye',s (the "Palestinian Cause") and the story and it was always there. And 
I think more - there was the emotional attachment, but the intellectual interest 
grew more in university, when I myself wanted to learn more about the Middle 
East and the politics of the Middle East, and I became more interested in 
learning the history and the facts and the details of Palestine and identifying, you 
know, aspects of the Palestinian identity in myself. 
[Kismet:] I always felt that, for instance although I was born in Syria and I grew 
up there, I always felt more Palestinian. Part of it was because I spent a lot of 
time with my mom's family, so I always identified myself as Palestinian. I don't 
think necessarily having "Palestinian blood" is important in the sense that I'm 
half Syrian, half Palestinian - or more like 75% Palestinian; I have to be 
genetically correct. [Laughs] 
Here, the dynamics of identity formation are clearly expressed, where the participants reflect 
on and emphasize the dual nature of their identities as essentially inborn and socially produced. 
For both Ayman and Haya, the connection with the Palestinian identity is based more on a 
8 El'adeyye (Arabic: ~I) meaning "the issue" or "the cause," used in reference to the Palestinian cause. 
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personal relation to its narratives rather than an essential belonging attained at birth. Pursuing 
the Palestinian identity is a common theme referred to by the participants, indicating that 
belonging to the Palestinian identity is a matter of personal choice, rather than a latent destiny. 
Here, however, the construction of that identity becomes dependant on three variables: the 
essential qualities that are born-into, the social production of the Palestinian identity learned 
from their parents and social environments, and also their own research and synthesis of the 
Palestinian identity. The internalization of the Palestinian identity is therefore strongly 
influenced by the essential qualities and social matrices present in the lives of Palestinians, yet 
it is ultimately dependant on a personal attachment and interest in order to become a 
cemented primary identity where the lack of this personal connection renders individuals as 
"detached, even though they may be born Palestinian and have the same knowledge of the 
issue". 
Becoming/Being Palestinian 
Of particular significance is Carla's sense of identification, as her Palestinian identity was 
disclosed to her at a later age. The fact that Carla was unaware of her Palestinian heritage until 
she was 12 colors her sense of identification, and indicates that the lack of awareness of her 
essential inheritance and the absence of rigid social environments that dictate identity plays an 
equal role in shaping self-identification as their presence. 
[Carla:] I resent my parents for not telling me what I was, or who I was, or where 
I came from since I was a kid. I feel like, because, maybe the fact that I didn't 
discover or I didn't relate to my identity when I was a child, maybe gave me more 
- I became more attached to it when I realized who I was. Yeah, I guess I could 
say that that was lacking; asking myself "where am I from?" or "who are my 
people?" since I was a child. I've always been an outsider over here. I've always 
been different than any other Arab. [Emphasis hers] Because over here it's all 
Lebanese, Syrian, Egyptian. I could have never - I was never able to relate to 
them. I speak with a different accent for instance, and they'd make fun of it 
sometimes. But I had no clue who I was, I used to say - there was a time I used to 
say I'm Lebanese simply because I had no clue! 
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In contrast to other participants whose sense of being Palestinian was taken for granted as they 
grew up, Carla grew up in Montreal, removed from Palestinian communities, and was raised 
without the influence of her parents' nationalisms. However, this lack of a clear and 
unambiguous belonging led her to identify with the Palestinian identity more strongly as she 
discovered it as her "true" inherited identity. This illustrates that the Palestinian identity is 
perceived as a rightful and authentic inheritance by Palestinians born in the diaspora as their 
responses illustrate its significance in directing and anchoring their identities. Just as its 
essentialism limits the scope of identification to one "authentic" ideal, the lack of an authentic 
on which to fall back in Carla's upbringing created a void that prevented her from connecting 
with other nationalisms and collectives. As a result, authenticity and its markers remain a vital 
component of identity in general, and in Palestinian identity in particular. 
Similarly, in her responses, Kismet demonstrated her struggles in assimilating various 
nationalisms within her own "authentic" identity. 
[Kismet:] After I moved to Abu Dhabi, most of my classmates were Palestinians. 
So it made more sense for me to be Palestinian because I could fit in better. 
Now, one of the things I suffered from as a child is that I have a Syrian father and 
a Palestinian mother, so I felt odd. All of my classmates' parents came from the 
same place - both would be Egyptian or Palestinian - and I felt that I was weird. 
Somehow it made me feel that there was something wrong with me, so I always 
wished it were different. That feeling went away with time. In high school I felt 
more Palestinian. I grew up in a house where it didn't matter where you're from, 
we were really a family who strongly believed in "Qawmeyye 'Arabeyyen9 ("Pan-
Arabism"). So that's how my identity was shaped, I didn't care where anyone 
9 Qawmeyye 'Arabeyye (Arabic: ~.JC- ~_,i) meaning Pan-Arabism; an ideology espousing the unification - or, 
sometimes, close cooperation and solidarity against perceived enemies of the Arabs - of the countries of the Arab 
world, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Sea. It is closely connected to Arab nationalism, which asserts that 
the Arabs constitute a single nation. Its popularity was at its height during the 1950s and 1960s. 
came from. To me, the Palestinian cause was something very important that we 
all had to work for, and it didn't matter where you came from. When I had to 
deal with people in class who weren't like that, I found it odd, and thought there 
was something wrong with them. 
As with the other participants, Kismet's identification as Palestinian in an environment of 
Palestinians reflects the ways personal national identity is influenced by the social matrix. In 
particular, the nuances of being "75% Palestinian" as opposed to 100% Palestinian, and her 
emphasis on being "genetically correct" illustrate the importance of essential authenticity 
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within that social matrix as opposed to her home environment where Pan-Arabism shaped her 
identity as an Arab-Palestinian who strongly believed in the Palestinian cause. As a result, 
Kismet felt out of place in a society of "100 percents," which shifted the focus of her identity 
from a "pure" or "authentic" Palestinian identity, to a "more Palestinian" identity that 
remained inclusive of other Arab identifications. 
This demonstrates a stronger connection with the imagined community of Pan-Arabism 
as opposed to the Palestinian or Syrian nationalisms to which she also belongs; which, in turn, 
further emphasizes the ways the internalization of a nationalism through the essential and 
social matrices varies within the same "authentic" identity. Steph Lawler writes that individuals 
often "counterpose being an (authentic) identity against doing an identity (performing)". (101, 
emphasis in original) This process of differentiation thus results in the development of various 
levels of authenticity in the Palestinian identity and becomes palpably noticeable in the way 
Palestinians self-identify within themselves and within their communities, versus the ways they 
identify themselves to and in opposition to the non-Palestinian Other. 
In other words, it can be argued that identities are socially produced constructions, 
(Lawlerl} rather than essentially or socially dictated molds. Identities are composed of the 
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essential and existential characteristics carried by individuals and the meanings attributed to 
them by the social orders in which they are negotiated. As a result, identity formation becomes 
a dialogical process in which individuals utilize their own essential traits in dialogue with the 
meanings they hold in the ideological and hegemonic discourses that surround them in shaping 
and internalizing their own identities. Identity thus becomes a combination of fatalism and 
choice - it is what individuals are born to, yet it is also what they choose to make of it, all within 
the scripted values and systems of meaning-making of the societies in which they live. 
Nationalism and Imagined Communities 
By looking at national identity in particular, these processes become vividly apparent as 
the ideas of nation, home, personhood, and collectives dialogically form and shape identity. 
Nationalism is an ideological form of identification that groups communities under one national 
identity. (Anderson 6) It is a concept that is often used to develop and sustain cohesive 
ideologies and hegemonies within the boundaries of a nation-state through a common 
consciousness of its identity. Benedict Anderson's concept of "imagined communities," posits 
that nationalism is composed of a shared consciousness of universality and connectivity that 
define its identity within the borders of a state. (6) These imagined communities draw on a 
variety of ideologies and practices in order to establish a cohesive and universal understanding 
of the nation. The image created is one that is thus based on ubiquitous and normative 
understandings of its communities, and is therefore translatable across the divisions of class, 
gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, etc. Hence, nationalism can be seen as first and 
foremost an "imagined" construct that is constituted of, and further translated into, the 
ideologies, hegemonies, laws, and citizenship practices that direct its members. Thus the image 
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or concept of the nation becomes a malleable and fluid construction that can be (re)negotiated 
in order to reach the objective of a unified and holistic nation. 
The shared consciousness of a nation's imagined community therefore encompasses a 
variety of defining characteristics inherent to its identity including its geography and landscape, 
its history, its customs and traditions, as well as its politics. These imagined communities are 
thus essentializing in ways unlike race, gender, and sexual orientation in that they are essential 
to the land and its connected concepts rather than the body; and as such, are subject to more 
universally applicable definitions, limits, and laws that encompass the collective nation. 
Membership within an imagined community is therefore achieved through a reflection of this 
collective image in the individual self. This is not to say that the essentializing notions of the 
body do not feature in nationalism, yet the translatability of that nation's image across the 
divisions of gender, class, race, religion, and sexuality is heavily reliant on the conceptualization 
of the state's values in their shared consciousness. Understanding nationalism as an imagined 
community is thus useful in its distancing between the nation as concept and the citizen - the 
body - so that "members can only perceive the nation as a whole by referring to the image of it 
that they have construed in their own minds". (Tamir 421) 
The significance of imagined communities is therefore in their reliance on conceptual 
relations rather than tangible connections as they are perceptions that, although encompass 
essential qualities, mainly function to preserve the image of the nation across the varieties of 
its members, across geographical distances, and through its generations. Hence the unifying 
ideological frameworks and the historic, geographic, and ethnic essential characteristics 
inherent to the nation shape and solidify its image within the shared consciousness of its 
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community, whereas the conceptual nature of the nation's "image" or "identity" allows it a 
margin of fluidity in which to accrue symbolic rather than essential meaning. 
Conversely, where Anderson does away with the limitations of the physical ties between 
bodies and land, Yael Tamir argues in his article "The Enigma of Nationalism" that imagined 
communities in themselves do not fully account for nationhood. Imagined communities can be 
the result of any shared consciousness amongst individuals who otherwise may or may not be 
connected, whether that shared consciousness centers on nationality or other binding 
commonalities such as gender, race, class, religion, sexual orientation, etc. In essence, Tamir 
argues that not all imagined communities are nationalistic, claiming that "a definition of nation 
should not specify the causes leading to the emergence of nations but should stress those 
features common to communities that fall under the definition of nation and distinguish them 
from other imagined communities". (425) Such features thus constitute a nation's cultural 
identity, where commonalities are found through the hegemonic, ideological, and traditional 
outlooks and behaviors. As a result, cultural identity and national identity are inextricably 
intertwined, where cultural identity is a large influence on imagined communities. 
Constructing Palestinian Nationalism 
This process becomes particularly important and useful in the case of the Palestinian 
identity, where Palestinians are not united in one homeland and thus have little to connect 
them across the various geographical distances besides their conceptual understandings of 
Palestine. This condition of unanchored attachment is repeatedly referenced in the interviews, 
yet is succinctly expressed by the sentiment of "carrying Palestine" wherever they go. 
[Carla:] Wherever you are, you feel like "Palestine is in me". I carry my identity 
and who I am wherever I go. There's this saying and I've heard it a lot: 
"everybody has a country that they live in, we Palestinians have a country that 
lives in us". And it's very true. 
The lack of a sovereign Palestinian state within the borders of historic Palestine obliges 
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Palestinians in the diaspora to rely on the imagination in order to construct a homeland. Where 
Carla states that Palestine "lives in us," she expresses that condition of necessarily relying on an 
imagined community in order to find and construct a "homeland" and thus references a canon 
of Palestinian narratives, cultural traditions, literature, music, etc. that have been carried over 
by the generations of Palestinians living in exile in order to keep Palestine alive. 
It is important to note that the Palestinian imagined community, whether in the 
occupied territories or in the diaspora, like most other imagined identities, has not been static 
in the years since the occupation. It has fluctuated and been re-imagined at several moments of 
its history, yet a few staples of the Palestinian canon have remained consistent throughout the 
history of its occupation, and will be discussed further in this study. It is these staples that are 
referenced by the participants as their essential Palestinian markers, among them the ancestry 
and genealogy that ties their families to the land of Palestine, but also the vast array of 
nostalgic, romantic, and political and cultural practices that have been passed down from one 
generation to the next. This canon - this cultural identity - thus becomes the imagined 
community in which the Palestinian image and identity is constructed. It becomes the resource 
from which Palestinians in the diaspora draw their identities and the point of entry that 
connects Palestinians to one another and to their imagined homeland. 
Yet cultural identity is not enough to account for nationalism's ethno-, geo-centric 
essentialism. In the idea of the nation as "home" lies an essence of territorial connections, 
where "feelings of fraternity, substantial distinctiveness, and exclusivity, as well as beliefs in a 
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common ancestry and a continuous genealogy," (Tamir 425) are those distinguishing features 
that bind "nation" and "home" together, and differentiate between national identity, and other 
forms of imagined communities or cultural identities. Hence, "home" becomes symbolically 
located and tied to physical geographies and territories, as well as their histories and symbolic 
significances. 
Land and Territory in National Identity 
The territoriality of nationalism is therefore a complicated aspect of the Palestinian 
identity in the diaspora. The history of expulsion and erasure of historic Palestine presents 
Palestinians, particularly those descendant from the 1948 territories, with a dilemma where the 
question of "where am I from?" becomes mired in minefields of explanations and a necessity 
for self-reflection and introspection. The challenge to define "Palestine" when there is no 
tangible country to point to and to explain their feelings of attachment to this nation that 
cannot be found on a map thus forces Palestinians into a hyper-awareness of themselves and 
their national identities early on. 
[Interviewer:] Do you ever wonder if you believe that you're Palestinian because 
you were born there, or because it's what you've been told all your life, etc.? 
[Haitham:] I've been asked these questions. I think Palestinians are asked these 
questions more than anybody else. I've had to look at where Palestinians come 
from, what being Palestinian means. When was there a Palestine? Was there a 
Palestine? What was Palestine? Personally, I feel I'm Palestinian because my 
parents came from there, and ethnically, geographically, I'm from there. My 
family has been there for over a thousand years. I take pride that I was born 
there, but at the same time, most Palestinians here weren't born there, that 
doesn't make them any less Palestinian. So, I recognize that also. 
[Haya:] There were times when I've questioned you know, why it is that I self-
identify so strongly as a Palestinian if I've never seen that country, and I've never 
known what it's like to live there. But I think that being Palestinian is different 
than living in that country and with the occupation every day, because I feel like 
there's no hard and fast definition of a Palestinian, you know. The people who 
are living there - sure they might be living in Palestine, but some of them, their 
views or their ties to their country have changed throughout the time that 
they've been living under occupation. And so I don't think that they can be any 
more Palestinian than we are per se. But- I mean, I feel like I have as much of a 
right to call myself a Palestinian because I try to learn more about and represent 
the culture and the politics and all of that, just as much as the people who live 
there, but it's just I'm representing it in a different way and I'm abroad. 
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In their self-identifications, participants frequently referred to their ancestries and genealogy to 
articulate claims to Palestine. In their self-identifications, these essential qualities ranked 
highest in their claims to membership to the Palestinian nationalism, yet their responses were 
also tempered by acknowledgement that essential qualities are not all what the Palestinian 
identity is constituted of. The lack of a homeland and their absence from what is left of the 
Palestinian territories leaves Palestinians in the diaspora vulnerable to challenges against their 
identities. As a result, their inherited ethnic essentialism, although valuable to their personal 
identifications, becomes necessarily supplemented with knowledge of Palestine, of its cultural 
identity, its history, and its politics in order to strengthen claims to its national existence. 
Therefore, despite its inclusion of cultural markers of belonging, territoriality and the 
connection to the land of Palestine remains a vital component of the Palestinian identity. 
Claims of ownership based on the premise of inheriting Palestine are thus highly significant in 
the Palestinian identity. 
However, these claims are further complicated by the idea of the Right of Return - one 
of the most enduring staples of Palestinian identity. Where participants strongly identified as 
being Palestinian, and comfortably expressed the openness of their cultural identities and their 
connections to Palestine, the concept of the Right of Return brought out hesitations and mixed 
reactions in the participants' feelings of belonging to the Palestinian nation. 
[Haya:] I would like to have the Right of Return. Because it is an 
acknowledgement that this is my country and I have a right to return to it. I 
definitely want to go back, but I can't say I'd want to go back permanently until I 
know what it's like to be back there to begin with. I'm not sure I want to live 
there, I definitely want to visit. 
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[Ayman:] Of course I would go back. I actually haven't thought about it. Although it 
seems like something obvious, I never actually sat down and thought about it. If I were 
to go back, it would be to Sa/ad-well, 'Alma10 is totally destroyed anyway. I'd be living 
under the state of Israel - or in the West Bank. Maybe. 
[Carla:] I don't know, I wouldn't - I don't know. I find it so hard to believe, 
honestly. As much as I want it, I find it hard to believe that Palestine will ever 
return. On a scale of one to ten, I think it would be a 3. If I were to go back, it 
would be with a specific project in mind. To go back and live? It would have to be 
different. If I can go back to Haifa, or Akka, or Ramle10, I would. If I could 
establish a life there, I would. But even though there's little chance of Palestine 
coming back, I still hold on to my identity in hopes; right? I guess there's always 
that seed of hope in you. And I hold on to it, because even if Palestine doesn't 
come back, if only one Palestinian house remains, I would still say I'm 
Palestinian. Will Palestine come back? lnshallah 11• What's left of it is absolutely 
nothing, Montreal is bigger than what's left of Palestine. But what's left of it is 
worth everything. 
The hesitations over going back to live in Palestine expressed by the participants, coupled with 
their strong belief in the Right of Return, thus illustrate the ongoing nature of their unanchored 
Palestinian identities. The feelings expressed suggest that the Palestinian identity, drawn from 
the imagined Palestinian community, is untranslatable into a typical nationalism within the 
borders of a nation-state. The participants' responses signify that being Palestinian in the 
diaspora today cannot be transposed onto being a Palestinian at home tomorrow, but that a 
significant shift is needed in order to reground the Palestinian identity in its native territory. 
This further suggests that a traditional sense of territoriality is incompatible with the uprooted 
Palestinian identity in the diaspora, as the Palestinian image referenced by the participants is 
1
° Cities and villages in historic Palestine where the participants' families originated, lost to Israeli settlers in 1948 
11 /nshallah (Arabic: .iliLlUI) meaning "God willing". 
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one that they are unable to ground in their native land. On the other hand however, the 
connection to the land of Palestine demonstrated by the participants despite not having lived 
there also indicates that the essential qualities of the Palestinian identity are vital to its 
nationalism. These essential connections - as opposed to the cultural identity of Palestine -
provide Palestinian national identity with a tangibility that binds its collective together. It 
creates a common goal - the Right of Return - that directs their identities towards nationhood 
and achieving autonomy in their homeland. The unanchored territoriality and the desire for the 
Right of Return present in Palestinian nationalisms are therefore the necessary distinguishing 
features between Palestinian cultural identity and Palestinian national identity. 
Therefore, nationalism can be understood as a composite of the cultural identity that 
shapes its imagined communities, and the essentializing ideologies of ancestry and genealogy 
that locate an imagined community within a "home" or "homeland" - for instance, history is 
one influence that is essential to the location of a nation and directly affects its imagined 
community by its essentialism. The change of location changes the history connected to the 
community, thus changing the image of their national identity. In combining both fluid and 
essential elements, the concept of the nation as home thus allows for aspects of agency and 
choice in terms of affiliation and identification with its "image". Yet this agency is re-inscribed in 
nationalism's highly essentializing territorial and historical requirements for membership and 
cohesion - in order to form a collective identity from which to draw the image of home, the 
feelings of fraternity that are reliant on ancestry, genealogy, and historical belonging remain 
indispensible. 
Authenticating and "Othering" in Palestinian National Identity 
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The ideological narratives of an imagined community therefore determine the 
sustainability of a nation's image within and beyond its culture, state, and borders. It is also the 
ideological aspects of a nation's image that allow for its pervasiveness across the varieties of 
genders, classes, races, sexualities, and religions of its members. Therefore, although the 
creation of a nationalism and the building of a national identity are interchangeable concepts, it 
is also necessary to note their distinctions between the collective and the individual. In opening 
the concept of nationalism to an imaginary, the possibilities for individual agency in the 
construction of, and affiliation to, a communal national image allow for a dialogue between the 
community and the individual. Hence, the creation of a cohesive nationalism and the building of 
national identity inform one another through the splintered experiences and ideologies of 
individuals, as well as the uniting and fusing of overarching commonalities. The process of 
formation of both nationalism and national identity thus necessarily becomes a process of 
inclusions and exclusions, and a filtering between the romanticized authentic and the 
marginalized and opposing "other". 
In defining themselves, participants clearly delineated the differences between being 
"Palestinian" versus being "other" through the very language and logic used in their self-
identifications. Living in Canada where communities of various backgrounds continue to 
immigrate and settle renders it typical for Canadians to identify as both Canadian and other, 
with the result that hyphenated national identities (eg. Greek-Canadian, Italian-Canadian, etc.) 
are common. However, this is not the case with the participants, whose responses to being 
asked "where are you from?" strongly stressed their Palestinian backgrounds, and emphasized 
the deliberate process of answering this seemingly innocuous question. 
[Haitham:] I say I'm Palestinian. Because I like to be accurate, I think that's an 
accurate description. Sometimes I've said I'm from Palestine and people don't 
know where that is. I could say I'm from Palestine, but saying I'm Palestinian is 
more familiar to people. And it's a political statement too, meaning that I'm 
Palestinian and there's a struggle going on. We're fighting for a Palestine that 
isn't there right now, or that was there and isn't there anymore. I have Canadian 
citizenship, I'll say that, but I'm Palestinian. 
[Kismet:] It depends. Usually if I'm talking to some random people and it's small 
talk, I would just say I'm from Syria. When I first moved to Canada I used to say 
I'm from Abu Dhabi. But now I say I'm from Palestine. After I became involved 
with the Palestinian cause I started saying that I'm Palestinian more often. 
There's nothing wrong with being Syrian but it's just that I'm so involved in the 
cause that I feel more Palestinian than Syrian. 
[Ayman:] "Do you want the long story of the short story?" That's what I answer 
when people ask. [Laughs] I'd say that I'm a Palestinian. I identify right away as 
being Palestinian because I don't like it when people who are, don't. I don't 
blame them because I feel that they're justified in saying that they're Lebanese. 
Some Palestinian refugees I know who come to Canada say they're Lebanese, 
and they're justified in doing that because essentially their parents were born 
there and they were born there and they lived there. They don't know anything 
about Palestine, they don't know what life is like there, they know what life is 
like in Lebanon. So they rightfully should identify as Lebanese. But I feel that 
because I never lived in Lebanon I can't identify either way. So if I'm going to 
identify myself, I might say Emirati. But that's ridiculous; people would think I'm 
scamming them if I said that. I maybe have once or twice in my life said I'm 
Lebanese when I was trying to cut the conversation short and not have to explain 
anything. But even if I have a little bit oftime I'll say I'm Palestinian. I'd leave it at 
that. So I identify as Palestinian, or Palestinian refugee if someone pushes it. 
[Haya:] I always say I'm Palestinian. When I was younger, when I recently had 
come to Canada from Jordan, I used to say I was Jordanian or from Jordan. But I 
think I've been identifying less and less with the Jordanian part, even though I 
carry the passport, and I've just said I'm Palestinian. I mean, I always knew I was 
a Palestinian, but when I was in Jordan I also identified as a Jordanian; when I 
was living there. And aside from the fact that I was born there, and I lived there 
for a certain amount of time, I didn't feel like I had ownership or claim over it as 
my own country. It's - I feel I have more of a claim in Palestine because that's 
where generations of my family were, and it was their country - they weren't 
immigrants or visitors, it was their own country. 
[Carla:] Sometimes I say I'm Jordanian, sometimes I say I'm Palestinian. It really 
depends. Before - now I'm much better, I really do try to say that I'm Palestinian. 
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Generally, when Arabs ask, I immediately say I'm Palestinian. With 'ajanib12, let's 
say- I'll tell you: once, I did my internship at the Jewish General Hospital. It was 
like I was afraid of saying that I'm Palestinian, you know? I didn't want to, like, 
fail, I didn't want to - and any time I had to work with someone whose 
nationality I did not know, I used to say Jordanian. I mean, legit, this is probably a 
fear that my parents planted in me- say anything but Palestinian. [Emphasis 
hers] You know? It's not shame - I'm not ashamed or embarrassed to say I'm 
Palestinian, it's just a fear of being judged or misunderstood. Now I'm feeling 
much better saying, "you know what, I'm just going to say I'm Palestinian 
because that's what I really am". 
What is immediately apparent from the participants' responses is that there is no 
straightforward answer when it comes to their backgrounds and origins. The context of the 
58 
question greatly affects their responses, indicating that not only is it difficult for Palestinians to 
define their identities to themselves, but that it is even more so when identifying themselves to 
non-Palestinian others. 
A common sentiment expressed by the participants is the need to justify and validate 
their Palestinian-ness, both to themselves and to others. The participants identified "accuracy" 
and "justification" as means of defining the parameters of their identities, suggesting that it is 
not enough to be a Palestinian, period, but that evidence in support of their claims is needed. 
This indicates that the Palestinian identity is intrinsically perceived as a distinct identity that is 
different from Other non-Palestinian identities, and that can only be expressed in relation to 
other identities. Rationalizations and defenses of their identities in order to validate and justify 
their claims to the Palestinian identity immediately arise - Kismet's involvement in the 
Palestinian cause is why she feels more Palestinian than Syrian, Haya does not feel a claim to 
ownership of the Jordanian identity because it is not the country in which her family's 
12 
'Ajanib {Arabic: ~4-1) plural for 'Ajnabi (Arabic: ~I) meaning "foreign," is used to denote outsiders or 
foreigners, mainly signifying non-Arabs. 
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generations had lived, Ayman does not feel "justified" in saying that he's Lebanese because he 
had never lived there, nor is he comfortable identifying as Emirati because he does not fit the 
mold of Emirati identity. 
The language of self-identification of Palestinians is therefore inherently a language of 
differentiation, indicating that it is not enough to merely identify as Palestinian, but that an 
explanation of each individual trajectory is required in order to support their claims to 
Palestinian authenticity. This is also expressed in the participants' choices of other 
identifications when they are unable to provide these explanations, or even when a danger of 
misunderstanding and possible backlash against their Palestinian nationalities is perceived. 
Therefore, in small talk conversations or in instances where Palestinians may feel targeted, they 
sometimes choose to identify differently in order to avoid misconceptions and 
misunderstandings of their Palestinian identities. These deliberate choices and the language of 
self-identification used by the participants reflect the position of the Palestinian identity as one 
that is under threat of erasure, and that is continuously undermined by the opposing myths and 
narratives of the Israeli identity, as well as the general lack of awareness of its existence often 
encountered in most non-Palestinian communities. 
Essential Authenticity and Particularism in National Identity 
The construction of a Palestinian "authentic" identity is therefore fundamentally 
inherent to the Palestinian subjectivity, as it allows Palestinians to unequivocally mark 
themselves as members of the Palestinian community. As a result, markers of authenticity 
begin to include the essentializing aspects of identity such as lineage, ancestry, genealogy, and 
historicity, as well as the ideological ideals and cultural norms of what it means to be a 
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Palestinian such as the customs and traditions, rules, and hegemonies. National identity at both 
the collective and individual levels thus becomes a balancing act between the fluidity of its 
cultural identity and the fixity of its territoriality and genealogy - between idealized 
authenticity and inescapable assimilation. 
In his investigation of the ways universalism and particularism shape identity, Ernesto 
Laclau begins by suggesting that "there is no possible mediation between universality and 
particularity: the particular can only corrupt the universal". {84) Similarly, Meaghan Morris 
writes that "[n]ational identity occurs in an encounter with cultural difference when and only 
when that difference cannot be represented to the satisfaction of all concerned". (1) Thus it can 
be argued that national identity is cultivated in the instances when cultural particularlism 
cannot be universalized. These concepts highlight the fact that the process of formation of a 
"universal" nationalism based on an "authentic" ideal necessitates a separation between that 
"universal authentic" and the "particular other". Consequently, the "universal" becomes tied to 
essential "authentic" qualities and the "particular" becomes a signifier for difference, implying a 
lack of compatibility between the "universal" and "particular" such that they become mutually 
exclusive. Hence, in the developing of an "authentic" Palestinian identity, a process of 
identification of the "universal" versus the "particular," and a strain between the two identities, 
arises. This results in a tension in the Palestinian identity between the romanticized "authentic" 
- framed by the universal and essential narratives of Palestinian identity- and the emerging 
fluid, plural, and "hybrid" identities of its members; further suggesting the notion of a 
disjointed and unbridgeable divide between the "universal" and the "particular". 
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Membership and belonging to imagined communities is therefore dependant on 
bridging the divides between the "universal" and "particular," the "authentic" and the 
"acquired," as well as the moments of overlap between them, in ways that reflect the image of 
the nation "to the satisfaction of all concerned". Thus, membership of individuals to collective 
identities is contingent on two different dynamics: the ability to share the same image of a 
nation amongst the imaginations of all members of the community, and the ability to share a 
consciousness and awareness of each other amongst all the individuals who share that image. 
In other words, it is not enough to have the same understanding and image of a nation as that 
of its imagined community in order to belong to that community, recognition from within the 
community itself is vital in order to attain belonging and responsibility within it. Therefore, 
although Anderson's definition of "imagined communities" does not require that its members 
know one another, and suggests that their nationalism exists as a conceptual construction in 
which belonging is a matter of affiliation with the "image", it still necessitates an awareness and 
affinity amongst its members in order to foster solidarity and cohesion. 
Membership and the Politics of Recognition 
The combination of conceptual and essential, collective and individual sets of 
characteristics that form a nation's image and determine its members is the premise of Charles 
Taylor's Politics of Recognition, in which he suggests recognition as a main component for 
achieving belonging. Writing that "[n]onrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a 
form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being," 
(225) Taylor argues that recognition is subject to two types of politics: the politics of dignity and 
the politics of difference. Where the first refers to the rational understanding that a universal 
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human potential for respect is the driving value for recognition, the latter identifies the 
universal human potential for forming and defining one's own identity as the driving value for 
recognition. (Taylor 235) In essence, Taylor's politics of equal dignity "is based on the idea that 
all human beings are worthy of respect, whereby the basis for respect is a universal human 
potential such as human beings' status as rational agents who are capable of directing their 
own lives". (Cooke 259) Taylor's politics of dignity is "difference blind" (234) in the sense that it 
does not value essential qualities in order to recognize members of its nationalism, and 
therefore, essential difference neither adds to nor detracts from the belonging of individuals to 
an imagined community. Conversely, Taylor's politics of difference focuses on the notion of 
essential difference - identifying the universal human potential for difference, or particularism, 
as a key value in achieving recognition. 
However, Taylor's use of the politics of difference is significant in that he does not limit 
the value in difference merely to its potential, but expounds on the importance of also 
recognizing value in its results for a functional politics of difference. Therefore, equal 
recognition of the manifestations of difference is a vital component towards achieving a politics 
of recognition. The politics of difference therefore becomes a much more complex forum to 
navigate, as it is widened by the need to account for not only the possibility of difference, but 
also for the products of difference, and to afford equal recognition to the variety of those 
products. For instance, as in the case of Palestinians in and outside the territories, a common 
inherited history of conflict that is shared within a national imagined community can be 
interpreted exclusively, with hierarchies of experience, or inclusively, as victims together. The 
recognition of a potential for difference in an exclusive understanding in which the differences 
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between the various historical experiences of Palestinians are identified is not enough for an 
effective politics of difference. Equal recognition must be given to all the products of the 
conflict that led to the Palestinian experience whether within or outside the occupied 
territories. In other words, even in the dichotomy and stratification that arises from difference, 
equal value must be recognized in either side's position, rather than the creation of a bias in 
which one set of essential characteristics is given preference over another. Taylor's argument 
here is that authenticity and essential difference must be recognized without allowing for one 
set of traits to overpower the other. 
In order for recognition to be effectively procured, Taylor argues that a balance between 
what he calls the "politics of dignity" and the "politics of difference11 must be achieved. Where 
"the politics of equal dignity focuses on what all human beings share in common, the politics of 
(equal) difference focuses on each person's (or group's) distinctness from every other". (Cooke 
259) Here, the ideological narratives determine whether greater emphasis in a community is 
placed on the autonomy and dignity of its members, or whether the inherent authenticity and 
difference of its members is more valued. Therefore, this framework is equally as important in 
understanding the structures that shape an imagined community in that it points to the 
different inclusive and/or exclusive ideologies that determine recognition within that 
community. Taylor concludes that a balance between the politics of dignity and the politics of 
difference is vital to the development of a functional politics of recognition. He suggests a 
"fusion of horizons," (252) which he describes as a space in which deliberation and discursive 
engagement can flourish in order to determine this balance. Similarly, for the creation of a 
cohesive nationalism, a balance between the ideological and essential qualities of that 
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community must be achieved. Therefore, Taylor's fusion of horizons provides the forum for the 
negotiation of where value is placed, and when; and hence, the space that provides this forum 
becomes key to the determination of a national image. 
Achieving Recognition in Diaspora 
However, the politics of recognition in the Palestinian identity are further complicated 
due to the diaspora of its population that has splintered the Palestinian experience and resulted 
in various Palestinian communities that reside within nationalisms other than their own. As a 
result, the politics of difference that separate Palestinians from the Other become the focal 
definitions of their identities within their host communities, and a process of self-differentiation 
complemented by the systemic and institutionalized marginalization of Palestinians in their 
host countries emerges as an inescapable component of the Palestinian identity. 
[Kismet:] I remember once, a Palestinian girl was thanking me for participating in 
an activity or other for Palestine that we were doing. I was in gth grade I think, it 
was during the Second Intifada. It annoyed me that she was thanking me, I felt 
that it was something everyone had to do. And when she said something like 
"God bless you Syrians," my thought was that "no, we're all Arabs and we all 
know what this cause is and it's our cause". When I was in Grade 12, I drew 
Handala13 on the blackboard and someone said that it was very well done and 
asked who drew it. When I said it was me, she said "You? But you're Syrian!" And 
I was so bothered because they keep thinking along these citizenship or 
nationalist lines and I felt really sad that people thought that way. I don't know 
why. That's when I realized that I was raised differently, because it was at that 
point that I felt different. 
[Ayman:] And you know. Even though you're young, you know there's a 
difference between you being a Palestinian and being Lebanese. You just grow 
up knowing it. Like, there's something not the same about you and everyone 
else. For instance, every time we travelled to Lebanon they've treated us 
differently at border security. They have to rub it in your face that you're a guest. 
You've been a guest in their country for two generations, but you're still a guest. 
Even after we got our Canadian passports - once they realize that we're 
13 Refer to Image 3, Appendix D 
originally Palestinians they would treat us that way again. You're put into that 
category and there's no getting out of it, no matter what you do. You're a 
Palestinian refugee, even if there's no connection, even though you're not the 
one who left the country. I don't even understand what the bad thing is about 
being a Palestinian refugee, it's supposedly an honor, right? You're supposedly 
the representative of Palestine and it's a huge identity for the Arabs in general 
and they parade with it left, right, and centre. But as Palestinians, they treat us 
terribly. Why? Aren't we the representatives of the struggle? 
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Although the participants' self-identifications illustrated a heightened sense of fluidity, agency, 
and inclusion, the positioning of Palestinians in their host communities reflects the opposite. In 
their experiences with other nationalisms, the participants illustrate the lack of a politics of 
recognition of their identities, as being Palestinian automatically excludes them from the 
nationalisms of other countries in which they resided. Ayman's anecdotes on the treatment of 
Palestinians in Lebanon for instance highlight the dual space occupied by Palestinians in the 
Arab imagination: they are simultaneously "heroes," whose cause is touted as an "Arab" cause, 
yet they are systemically marginalized and ostracized in most Arab societies. Similarly, Kismet's 
understanding of the Palestinian cause as opposed to the perceptions of her Palestinian 
classmates underscores the untraversable divide that is socially constructed between 
Palestinian and Other, so that Handala for instance, the heroic representative of Palestinians, is 
seen as a purely Palestinian symbol that only Palestinians are expected to use, recognize, and 
relate to. 
Therefore, it becomes apparent that in the traditional nationalisms of these 
communities, a politics of difference is valued more strongly, and the differentiation between 
the Palestinian authentic and the non-Palestinian Other is conducted by both Palestinians and 
their counterparts. This thus results in further differentiation in the self-identification of 
Palestinians, as they instinctively cling to their Palestinian difference from the Other in 
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retaliation to the lack of effective recognition they receive in their non-Palestinian 
environments. As a result, this internalization of difference imbalances the Palestinian image in 
its own community toward a stronger emphasis on a politics of dignity, where the essential 
qualities of ancestry and genealogy and "blood" become more highly valued. As a result, this 
further heightens the significance of authenticity in procuring membership within the 
community- as seen by the ways Kismet's Palestinian classmates differentiated between her 
and themselves - and thus creates a hierarchy of belonging where degrees of "authenticity," 
measured by the presence of essential qualities, determine belonging. 
Identity is therefore inherently a process of creation, in which various facets of identification 
are layered and overlapped to form an individual's defining identity. It includes essential 
qualities that are inborn - including sex, ethnicity, etc. - as well as the symbols and meanings 
ascribed to these qualities by the social matrix in which individuals reside - including gender, 
nationality, etc. Identity is thus a socially produced process, in which an individual's identifiers 
are continuously negotiated in dialogue with the overarching hegemonies and ideologies of 
society. As a result, one can conclude that identity is innately dual, as it is both essential and 
fluid, and it is the internalization and synthesis of those qualities that determines an individual's 
sense of self-identification, and the emergence of his/her primary identity. 
In the study of national identity and Palestinian nationalism, the processes of identity 
construction become particularly vivid. The responses of participants in this study reveal that 
identity is simultaneously essentially inherited and socially constructed, as it is continuously 
renegotiated and in flux. Therefore, Palestinian national identity presents an inherent duality, 
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where essential authenticity and the potential for plurality both dictate its parameters. As a 
result, Palestinian nationalism can be seen as a confluence of both its authenticity and its 
hybridity, wherein essential characteristics are affixed absolute and universal meanings that are 
genealogically inherited only to be reinterpreted through the social matrices of the 
communities in which individuals reside. 
Furthermore, nationalism can be understood as a process in which a national image is 
conceptualized within its imagined communities, through the negotiations that occur between 
its ideological perceptions and essential characteristics. It is a creation of an image of the nation 
that is translatable across its various divisions of gender, class, religion, etc., and thus 
constitutes an identity that includes a community's essential characteristics, ideologies, and 
cultural cannon. National imagined communities are therefore unique from other types of 
imagined communities in that they are tied to the essential qualities of land, ancestry, and 
genealogy in order to foster cohesion and feelings of fraternity and solidarity. Therefore, the 
construction of imagined communities is also a process where the balance of a nation's values 
between authenticity and autonomy is achieved and perpetuated. Anderson's imagined 
communities thus function to provide the overarching narratives of a national image, however, 
they are not enough to define and shape national identity in itself. As a result, membership 
within an imagined community is achieved through a reflection of this collective image in the 
individual self, thus necessitating the individual internalization of its collective values and ideals. 
In the case of Palestinian nationalism, this process becomes particularly significant as 
the Palestinian nation necessarily exists only in the imagination of its community, and cannot 
be located on a world map. This results in a heightening of the value of authenticity and 
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essentialism in the Palestinian nationalism, as demonstrated by the participants' responses and 
experiences. Palestinian nationalism is thus constituted of a continuously shifting balance 
between its members' essential and acquired identities, where authenticity and plurality carry 
varying value in defining members' national identities and their belonging to the overarching 
Palestinian collective. And it is therefore through these dialogical negotiations that the 
Palestinian national identity becomes a cemented primary identity within individuals' self-
identifications that simultaneously encompasses and transcends the numerous other facets of 
their identities. 
It can thus be concluded that national identity at the individual level is necessarily a self-
invention that simultaneously reflects and shapes the collective nationalism and identity of the 
imagined community. The process of constructing identity is therefore a circular loop of 
meaning making where the collective ideologies and hegemonies inform individual identities, 
which in turn influence and direct the community's image. As a result, the universal and 
essential authenticity of a national identity is always already in dialogue with the difference and 
diversity of its individual members, and is therefore always already open to plurality. 
"What about identity? I asked. 
He said: It is self-defence ... 
Identity is the child of birth, but 
at the end, it is self-invention, and not 
an inheritance of the past. I am multitudinous ... 
within me an ever new exterior. And 
I belong to the question of the victim. Were I not --
from there, I would have trained my heart 
to nurture there deers of metaphor ... 
So carry your homeland where you go, and be 
a narcissist if need be/ 
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Chapter 4. Statelessness, Exile, and Alienation 
Post-colonial nationalism has developed markedly in the last century and the inexorable 
tide of globalization has resulted in various forms and modalities of collectives and 
membership. Carriers of multiple citizenships, transnationals, nomads, ex-patriots, immigrants, 
refugees, and exiles have complicated the simple structure of the homogenous nation by 
crossing borders and challenging the notions of discrete and essential difference amongst 
nations and cultures. Furthermore, post-modernity has challenged and renegotiated statehood 
and the power of national borders to the extent that the nation-state is arguably in decline and 
transnationalism and uprooted existence are on the rise. Yet despite these developments, 
statelessness and its disempowerment remain an uncommon condition that is unique to 
Palestinians - historic Palestine has been wiped off the map and those who originated from it 
are largely homeless. The uprooting of the Palestinian identity and its resulting statelessness 
through multiple generations thus relegate it to a non-tangible and transient space. Therefore, 
the Palestinian nation is by necessity, and as a result of conflict, relegated to the imagination -
as more than just an imagined community, but as a nation that only exists in the imaginations 
of its members. As a result, the Palestinian identity cannot be located specifically within a 
spectrum of traditional nationalism, transnationalism, diaspora, and nomad ism, but draws on 
elements of each modality of being in order to exist. 
Transnationalism, the Third Space, and Rhizomatic Becoming 
If traditional nationalism is understood in terms of discrete imagined communities in 
which collective identities are shaped, and where "nationalism's specificity is that it is 
necessarily territorial, in so far as to be a national is to possess a territory-without which there 
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can be no national existence," (Morley 208) transnationalism can be understood to mean 
"belonging both to the community of the receiving country and the community in the country 
of origin". (Madsen 68) More specifically, transnationalism is a concept used to describe 
"'contracts, coalitions and interactions across state boundaries that [are] not directly controlled 
by the central policy organs of government". (Clavin 425) This definition places 
"transnationalism" as a condition unique to such multi-national organizations and their 
workers, and the border-crossings that are integral to their functionality. It is significant in its 
independence of the state - and thus, possession of territory - for the emergence of 
collectives, and instead relies more on the border crossings of imagined communities rather 
than merely state lines. Rather than drawing on an image of a nation in determining a collective 
identity, brands and cultural identities become the common denominators that reflect 
membership within a collective. From this perspective, the progress of technology and the 
"global flows of information, investment, trade and people across national borders" have come 
to mean that "we are heading in the direction of a 'borderless world,"' (Morley 204) where a 
dominant culture of consumption rather than civil responsibility defines the boundaries of 
belonging. This also implies a dissolving of difference as the ubiquitous acts of trade and 
consumption overpower the markers of cultural difference in determining inclusions into the 
transnational collective. 
However, this explanation simplifies the relations between individuals and collectives, 
and amongst communities in and of themselves. Morley writes that "(d]espite the fact that 
many people have links (of various sorts) which transcend the space of the nation, these do not 
often, as Hannerz puts it, 'coalesce into any single conspicuous alternative to the nation."' (205) 
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This harkens back to the idea of imagined communities that are not nationalistic in nature 
presented earlier by Yael Tamir - that culture, gender, race, religion, etc. can offer 
commonalities that bind collectives regardless of national and territorial borders. As a result, 
the existence of both national and non-national collectives suggests a negotiation between 
various forms of collectives in defining and shaping identities yet cannot definitively challenge 
the importance of national communities. As Hannerz continues to suggest, "if the 'nation is not 
really withering away ... it is changing' -but he rightly argues it is not ... 'being replaced by any 
single transnational culture."' (Morley 205) Here the implication is that non-national collectives 
cannot replace nations and nationalism, nor can they provide a universal transnational culture 
despite the decline of the relevance of national borders in the shaping of identities. This 
indicates that national identity is necessarily always already rooted in territoriality, yet develops 
to transcend its essential boundaries (of ancestry, genealogy, etc.) to connect with, and 
incorporate, various other nationalisms, cultures, and collectives. 
This model of understanding national identity echoes lain Chambers' concept of 
"rhizomatic becoming" and Homi Bhabha's "third space" as the post-modern alternatives to 
traditional nationalism. Based on Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualization of the "rhizome," an 
"acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General and without an organizing 
memory or central automation, defined solely by a circulation of states," (Deleuze and Guattari 
23) Chambers describes the condition of "rhizomatic becoming" as an organic, non-structured 
development of identity that is interconnected and continuously in flux. Similarly, Homi 
Bhabha's "third space" suggests that belonging is achieved not in a space of discrete and fixed 
boundaries, but a space "where the familiar and the foreign are conjoined, where it is less clear 
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where home concludes and the foreign begins-where we must dwell in home as itself a hybrid 
space of coeval times and lives". (Morley 211) This blurring of boundaries is integral to the 
concepts of a mobile and hybrid identity, and thus the "third space" and "rhizomatic becoming" 
represent the conditions in which plurality of identities is developed and negotiated. 
Finding Home in Alienation 
In the case of the Palestinian identity, whose borders and boundaries are untenable at 
best due to the disappearance of its home territory, the potential for achieving a "third space" 
and "rhizomatic becoming" is significantly heightened. "Home" for Palestinians in the diaspora 
is therefore an indefinable space that includes elements of their combined experiences, yet 
that cannot be clearly and definitively articulated. 
[Carla:] Do I feel at home when I'm in Canada? [Emphasis hers] Yes; yes and no. 
It's a weird feeling, I don't know where I belong. If you told me to go live in 
Jordan, I won't have a problem. If you told me to go live in Palestine, even better, 
because I would love to go live there. I would miss over here, yes, of course, but, 
do 1-1 don't know. It's -1- it's weird. I don't know. I wouldn't be able to tell 
you. 
[Ayman:] Canada is my home. Canada is what I know as my home. The only 
reason why Emirates isn't home is that there's nothing for me there anymore -
no family or friends. Emirates is therefore not a country I would call home, even 
though it had a lot of influence on my life. I still sometimes look up their soccer 
leagues that I used to follow, when I feel nostalgic. But that doesn't mean that I 
feel any loyalty or allegiance to Emirates. It's part of my past. 
[Haitham:] I've been everywhere in the UAE so I definitely have a sense of 
belonging there. It's not as strong as it used to be, because I've spent a lot of 
time here now and actually because my political understanding of the Emirates 
affected my sense of belonging there. I do think of the UAE as one of my homes. 
Palestine, UAE, Toronto, York University. Believe it or not York is like a home on 
its own for me now. I've been here for 11 years. The tug of war happens when I 
think of the first 5 years I lived in the UAE because those were the best years of 
my life, my childhood years. I'm very nostalgic about those years. That period of 
my life has the top spot in terms of where I belong. And I guess I should say 
Toronto is home. It took a while for me to call this place home actually. It took a 
longtime. 
[Kismet:] The thing is, I would say that according to this poem14, he has more of a 
conflict inside of him than I have inside of me. He's saying that there are two 
different banks and there is something in the middle between them. I wouldn't 
describe myself as that, because I wouldn't say that there are two mutually 
exclusive sides to my personality, I feel I like it here and I would like it there. It's 
not either or. I understand where he's coming from and what he means, and 
maybe with time I will feel this division more, but now, I feel like I don't have 
that much of a division. Yes I do feel that I'm from here and there, and neither 
here nor there, but I don't feel that it's creating a division. 
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As illustrated in their responses, Palestinians in the diaspora relate to the concept of "home" as 
a necessarily fluid and indefinite space. The mobility of the Palestinian identity and its lack of 
ties to a national homeland allow it to acquire multiple physical homes, and a conceptual Home 
that is a combination of all of them. As described by the participants, Home is indefinable; it is 
both Canada and not. It is a merging of history, memory, experience, and yet it is also an ever-
expanding sense of belonging where divisions and commonalities are constantly in flux. 
The mobility and the adaptability of the Palestinian identity is therefore evident in the 
ways the participants elucidate on their migratory experiences - home is here in Canada, home 
is in their childhoods, home is in Palestine. However, the various "homes" described are not 
discretely divided and categorized, nor do they seamlessly blend together. As Carla describes it, 
"I would miss over here, yes, of course, but, do 1-1 don't know. It's -1- it's weird. I don't know. 
I wouldn't be able to tell you". This response, coupled with the fact that it took Haitham a long 
time of residing in Toronto before being able to identify it as home, and the ways Ayman works 
through his understanding of "home," indicate that the various "homes" to which Palestinians 
belong are in constant dialogue and negotiation with each other. Rather than melding into one 
14 Refer to Appendix C 
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Home, in which the boundaries between the various experiences dissolve into one hybrid 
space, the distinctive boundaries of each home within the Palestinian identity remain intact. 
Conversely, the internal boundaries of the Palestinian identity's homes are also constantly 
reformed and shaped by coming up against one another. In other words, Home for Palestinians 
is neither a fixed nor a borderless fluid space, but rather it is a space in which the borders of 
various home(s) are porous and semi-permeable, where each experience of belonging is 
distinctly identifiable, yet where Home remains unanchored. Belonging for Palestinians in the 
diaspora therefore remains elusive, contested and indefinable. 
Palestinian Identity in an "Alien Space" 
As with Deleuze and Guattari, both Chambers and Bhabha reveal the fluidity of 
belonging by emphasizing the importance of dispensing with essential difference and discrete 
boundaries to identities by framing "home" as itself a fluid and indefinable space of belonging. 
In Deleuzeguattarian terms, the rhizome is populated by lines of flight 
(deterritorialization) as well as lines of 'territorialization' by which flows become halted, 
ordered, and attributed. As Deleuze and Guattari write, 'there exists tree or root 
structures in rhizomes; conversely, a tree branch or root division may begin to burgeon 
into a rhizome' (p. 15). Neither the rhizome (the potential for things to deterritorialize 
and enter into new assemblages) or the root-tree (the stratification of things into 
orders, taxonomies, or structures) is primary. (Wallin 84) 
However, Deleauze and Guattari emphasize that despite the capacity of the "rhizome" to 
deterritorialize identity, "the kind of smooth or non-hierarchical spaces created by the rhizome 
are 'not in themselves libratory ... [n]ever believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us."' 
(Wallin 84) Similarly, both Chambers and Bhabha are unable to entirely dispense with 
traditional nationalism, so that the "familiar'' is a necessary component of the "third space" just 
as "rhizomatic becoming'' has an origin of departure that is rooted in the original "home" from 
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which the rhizomatic connections develop. Indeed, Chambers continues to write that "despite 
the optimistic theorising of nomad ism and rhizomatic becoming, the mystery of that sense of 
belonging-deposited in the desire, the need to be a part of a historical social and cultural unit 
that is called "home" [or] "homeland" -refuses to fade away". (Morley 211) 
Therefore, while the Palestinian identity displays the traits of a "third space" and 
"rhizomatic becoming," it is even more bound due to its uprooted nature by the desire for a 
"homeland" than the mobile identity that is grounded in traditional nationalism. That is to say 
that if the "third space" and "rhizomatic becoming" allow rooted national identities to achieve 
fluidity and hybridity, the lack of a homeland in the Palestinian identity prevents it from 
achieving those conditions to the same degree. Instead, Palestinian identity can be perceived to 
occupy an "alien space," where its statelessness allows it a measure of fluidity that is bound by 
the desire for a grounded homeland. This is further reflected in the dual presence of discrete 
Palestinian-ness as well as a multiple consciousness in the identities of the participants, who 
are comfortable in their belonging to multiple identities, yet are unable to dispense with their 
primary Palestinian identities. 
[Kismet:] I don't feel a tug-of-war as Palestinian-Syrian. I still feel more 
Palestinian than Syrian. I don't see a conflict, but I still see myself as being more 
Palestinian than Syrian. As for Canada - I do like it here, I really like living here. 
But I want to go back to Palestine. I never doubted my right to go back. Before 
my grandma died, the only thing she wanted to do was go back. When I visited 
Syria in 2008, no matter what we talked about, she would bring up Palestine. She 
would say that the weather is better in Palestine than in Syria, which didn't make 
much sense really. And whenever anyone tried to reason with her she would 
insist that the weather in Palestine was the best. If we were eating beans, she'd 
say beans in Palestine were the best. It was very clear to me then how much she 
wanted to go back and because she couldn't go back, I promised her that I 
would, and that if she had lost hope, then I hadn't. It's my right, no one will take 
it away from me. And it doesn't matter whether I actually move back there or 
not, it's still my right. My grandparents worked really hard when they were in 
Palestine, they deserved everything that they owned there and it was taken 
away from them and someone needs to be accountable. 
[Haya:] I do want to explore and learn about other cultures, but I still feel firmly 
grounded in my own. I don't feel it's such a hybrid thing where I can take it off 
whenever I want to. I don't feel.- I do feel that I belong to multiple places but I 
don't feel that self-identifying as a Palestinian would diminish from the others, 
simply because I almost feel that they're mutually exclusive. I mean, the way that 
I feel that I belong to Palestine is much more like we said before, in an abstract 
way- it's the Palestinian identity, and the culture and the literature and all of 
that and the history. It's different from the way I identify as belonging to Jordan 
- which, I know Jordan's streets, I know Jordan's, you know, the way of life there 
and I don't identify with the Jordanian identity per se. In Canada it's a bit of both, 
it's identifying with the culture and the politics and the cultural references and 
things like that, and knowing the city itself, but knowing that I'm not from here. I 
can live here, and I can see my future here, but my past is not from this country. 
Both Kismet and Haya here display a fluidity of identity that encompasses multiple "homes," 
yet both return to the point of departure - Palestine - as the "original" source of their 
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identities. It is where Kismet longs to "go back," and where Haya's past is from, and it therefore 
represents a void that prevents Palestinians from fully connecting with their other "homes" and 
dispensing with the unattainable homeland of Palestine. The rootedness of the Palestinian 
identity in its connection to historic Palestine thus reflects its deep territorialization, despite the 
fact that being Palestinian and belonging to the Palestinian community necessitates an 
unequivocal state of wandering as it is simultaneously deterritorialized by the migrations of its 
diaspora. As such, the Palestinian identity is always already rooted in historic Palestine; it is only 
capable of branching into other nationalisms, yet can never take root elsewhere. Therefore, 
where the "rhizome" and the "tree-root" structure of "rhizomatic becoming" are capacious to 
possibilities for new assemblages, the Palestinian identity remains one that is incapable of 
being entirely re-grounded within other collectives. 
Exile and Statelessness 
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Barry Curtis and Clare Pajaczkowska argue that "if the tourist travels, for the most part, 
backwards in time, then the immigrant, the exile and the diasporic travel forward with no 
promise of a restored home," rendering the condition of the refugee an "inversion of the 
tourist's experience, on a journey in which the return to the 'present' of home, the lost 
equilibrium which brings closure, coherence, and the security of identification, is hopelessly 
deferred". (Morley 227) Curtis and Pajackowska's argument further emphasizes the fact that 
underlying the fluidity and openness of the "rhizomatic becoming" and "third space" is the 
"equilibrium," "coherence," and "security" of a distinct and definable Home. This indicates that 
the achievement of Chambers' and Bhabha's fluidity of being is necessarily facilitated by a 
definable and distinct point of departure - the traditionally understood essential and native 
Home. Therefore, despite displaying numerous similarities to the conditions of "rhizomatic 
becoming" and the "third space," stateless identities cannot be classified as such, as they are by 
definition without origin and without a home. This relegates the stateless identity to a different 
form of plurality and fluidity than is understood by the post-modern alternatives to traditional 
nationalism, as it lacks a definable point of departure - namely, its original homeland. 
Although Curtis and Pajaczkowska classify immigrants, refugees, and exiles under one 
category in their analysis, it is important to note that the exile referred to in the case of 
Palestinians is uniquely different from the status of conventional exiles. Traditionally, the 
condition of exile is one that has historically existed since the dawn of time, and was an ancient 
tool of punishment in banishing individuals from the support and safety of their communities. 
(Said 137) In his essay "Reflections on Exile," Edward Said distinguishes between exiles and 
other forms of mobile identities, writing that exile "is the unhealable rift forced between a 
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human being and a native place, between the self and its true home: its essential sadness can 
never be surmounted .... The achievements of exile are permanently undermined by the loss of 
something left behind forever". (137) However, while those in exile can never return to their 
native homes, the condition itself has never resulted in the erasure of those homes from the 
understandings of the surrounding world. In fact, it is arguable that the case of statelessness is 
further removed from the common experiences of mobility and exile, as the home to which 
Palestinian refugees long to return has been quite literally erased from the consciousness of the 
global community. Where emigres, tourists, or migrant workers may not feel that they belong 
entirely to any "Home," there is always a home to return to, or at the very least to reference as 
a point of origin even if it no longer resembles the home they once knew. Palestinians on the 
other hand, particularly those descendant from the occupied territories of 1948, cannot even 
locate their original home on the global map, nor can their newer generations credibly claim 
origin of a location they had never even physically visited, rendering the pathos of stateless 
exile "in the loss of contact with the solidity and satisfaction of earth: homecoming is out of the 
question". (Said 142) 
Statelessness and Alienation 
As a result, the condition of exile in the case of Palestinians is further removed and 
distinct from all other forms of transnational mobility. The statelessness and alienation of 
Palestinians is therefore better understood as a condition that encompasses the experiences of 
exile, but carries with it more perplexing and even direr implications than exile does, for it 
challenges the validity of the Palestinian identity by posing the question of how one, or indeed 
an entire nation, can exist in a condition of exile of a state that in fact no longer exists. 
[Haya:] In terms of my own family, I'm sure they must have been stateless when 
they first left Palestine, but it wasn't for very long. They got the Jordanian 
passport in the '60s or '70s. And well - it's different what things it says on paper, 
because to me - Palestinians from 1948 - nothing will say that they are actually 
Palestinians. They either carry other passports or they're stateless, but 
regardless of whether they carry a passport for a different country, be it 
Canadian or whatever, I don't correlate the two to each other. They're still 
Palestinians. 
[Haitham:] Legally stateless? Without a passport? That's my whole family. It 
means they don't have a legally recognized state. They're stateless. It means 
there's some kind of conflict. For me, when I hear that I'm stateless, it means 
that I've been affected and oppressed by something more powerful, usually a 
colonial capitalist phenomenon. There are many stateless people in the world. I 
don't find the term itself problematic, it's the reasons behind it. So if someone 
says I'm stateless, I'd be like "Yeah, I'm stateless, and here's why". I wouldn't say 
"don't call me stateless". For me, that's just getting emotionally nationalistic. I 
don't care about statehood in general, I care that there is a particular injustice 
that was committed. 
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Participants here acknowledged the differences between their self-identifications and the ways 
they are officially classified in the ways they describe their own condition of statelessness. The 
ways Palestinians in the diaspora view their own statelessness illustrates that, in their self-
identifications, it is no more than a legal status that does not adequately describe their sense of 
belonging or their national identities. Yet in their responses, the participants were also careful 
not to dismiss the realities of being stateless in favor of asserting a national existence, but 
instead identified statelessness as an inherent aspect of the Palestinian identity rather than its 
primary identifier. The inclusion of Palestinians born outside of Palestinian territories within the 
conceptual understanding of the Palestinian nationalism is therefore key, as it functions as a 
response to the uprootedness of the stateless identity by maintaining the ties that Palestinians 
feel to their national community. It also reflects the necessity of resorting to essential and 
"authentic" commonalities in the construction of a national identity, as the official status of 
81 
Palestinians as "stateless" further heightens the literal and figurative distances between them 
and their homeland. 
Nevertheless, the difficulties faced as a result of the legal restrictions imposed by the 
label of "statelessness" remain inescapable and feature prominently in the narratives of most 
Palestinians' lives in the diaspora. 
[Kismet:] I was never stateless, but my mom's family was and still is. And it's a big 
problem for them now because they can't leave to Jordan or Lebanon, so they're 
stuck in Syria. It makes me angry- most of my anger is directed basically against 
Zionism, because they caused the problem, but also at Arab regimes. Most of my 
anger right now is just -why can't they run away like other people? Palestinians 
from Syria are stuck there because they're Palestinians. Syrians can leave, they 
can escape. Palestinians can't. 
[Carla:] My mom's aunt is stateless. Honestly, like, I don't know how to say this in 
a proper way, but it's meaningless. I've always felt - I mean, these people don't 
even - like - how do they define themselves? "I'm Palestinian". But they don't 
even have a paper to justify it, you know. When they come - for them to travel, 
they're treated terribly. For us, we say - we know they're Palestinians. [Emphasis 
hers] We know, "ok, these are Palestinians - whether they have a passport or 
not". But when it comes to the whole legal system, and you have to justify- to 
validate where you come from, what are you supposed to say? [Says in disbelief] 
"I have a 'green card15'?J" What does that even mean? 
[Ayman:] Oh yeah. A story that's imprinted in my head was when we lived in Al-
Ain in Emirates. It's almost at Oman. They actually share a border with Oman, so 
you're literally on the border of Oman and Emirates. The story that I remember 
was about my brother, when we were in school. He was in Year Six, and there 
was a field trip going to Muscat, the capital of Oman, and you definitely need a 
passport to get through to Muscat. So the school asked the students for their 
citizenships and they refused to let my brother go on the trip because they said 
that Oman doesn't allow people with travel documents to enter. And you have 
to realize that for people with travel documents, getting a visa is close to 
impossible. You would have to go through a rigorous process in order for you to 
15 The green card referenced here is one that is held by Palestinians in Jordan. It is "not an ID but is called a Bridge 
Card. The green card is temporary (for two years) and is issued to residents of the West Bank who are not 
Jordanian citizens. Each time the resident crosses the bridge, the Jordanian authorities enter a note on the card by 
hand. The yellow card is issued to Jordanian citizens (many of whom are residents of the West Bank) for five years. 
In effect it serves as an alternative passport so that the Israeli crossing stamps do not appear in the original 
Jordanian passport, which would cause problems in other Arab states for these residents". (Immigration Refugee 
Board of Canada) 
get it and we literally found out a week before the trip. Eventually my brother 
got it, because he was only 10 or 11 years old at the time and my dad had 
connections who helped us. But by then it was too late to register for the trip. It's 
tough to be stateless and have a travel document. 
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As illustrated by their various experiences, travel is particularly difficult for Palestinians lacking 
other citizenships and passports. This indicates that, in a world of hyper-globalization and 
transnationalism, the Palestinian identity is officially non-recognizable due to the lack of a 
Palestinian state, and thus the various forms of stateless Palestinians' documentations are 
insufficient in meeting global standards of travel. This process of regulating Palestinian bodies 
and migratory movements thus replaces the Palestinian identity with a stateless status in the 
official regulations of migration, so that the Palestinian-ness of individuals becomes a 
negatively perceived and regulated aspect of their identities, replaced by their less-than-
adequate official documentations and "stateless" status. 
Palestinians in the diaspora are therefore non-recognizable as members of a discrete 
national community, but are only visible as "stateless" bodies without origin. As a result, this 
process fundamentally questions the existence of a Palestinian collective as it erases any and all 
official claim to a Palestinian citizenship. Furthermore, the connotations of a "stateless" identity 
as opposed to that of a "traveler" or even a "refugee" erase the possibilities for return by 
denying the existence of a state to return to, further disrupting and challenging Palestinians' 
claims to a national home. Hence, the exile and statelessness of Palestinians becomes more 
than a condition of anchored mobility - it in fact becomes a question of existence so that 
Palestinians are either "stateless" or carry non-Palestinian citizenship, neither of which 
recognizes their own Palestinian nationalities. 
Stateless Boundaries 
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In his examination of borders and belonging, David Morley writes that "[i]t is at the 
boundary, where territorial control is, in fact, least secure that it is likely to be asserted all the 
more hysterically". (221) The implications of "boundaries" on the stateless Palestinian identity 
are therefore considerable. Where other mobile or plural identities reference a Home, the 
Palestinian is locked in "a circular quest for an increasingly elusive identity". (Morley 227) This 
elusiveness of the Palestinian identity and the questioning of its existence therefore not only 
leave its members vulnerable to violations of human rights, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, but 
they also render the identity itself, at the conceptual level, particularly vulnerable to dilution by 
external cultures. The lack of autonomy in defining their cultural boundaries with their host 
countries erases the Palestinian identity in multiple ways, just as the "stateless" status of 
Palestinians renders their national identity as invisible and forgotten. 
The threat of disappearance or evolution into a national image that does not even 
resemble the "authentic" that has been otherwise removed from the global community's 
imagination therefore becomes a real deterrent to plurality in the Palestinian identity and a 
stressor of essentialism and authenticity in the Palestinian collective. 
[Carla:] As a Canadian-Palestinian, I tend to always shut off that Canadian side 
and always want to embrace that Palestinian culture because I feel that, 
basically, give us a couple of years and we're going to be an extinct species. Yes 
I'm happy we're in Canada, and yes I appreciate the Canadian culture, but I also 
don't feel it flows, because they are not like me and I am not like them. I wish I 
could be one of these people who could say that "yes, I am Canadian and it 
merges perfectly with my Palestinian one because I feel such an open connection 
between both". I don't feel that, no. Not at all. I never felt an appartenance 
[French for "membership of'] to Canada. I mean we really do celebrate - like, 
the holidays, the religious holidays we relate to, you know. But, like, 
"thanksgiving"? We don't have this, "thanksgiving''. It means - it doesn't mean 
anything to me - [says nonchalantly] "thanksgiving". But I only feel pride, let's 
say, during the national holiday, you know, [enthusiastically says] "Vay, it's 
Canada day!" But other than that I won't. I've never said that "yeah, I'm a 
Palestinian-Canadian". And if anybody asks me, I tell them that I'm a Palestinian 
from Jordan. Which isn't even true! [Laughs] I'm actually a Palestinian from 
Canada. 
[Kismet:] I don't really have any conflicting feelings about being Palestinian-
Canadian, because I'm wondering how Canadian I am to begin with. A lot of 
times I feel like I don't want to be Canadian, I want to move back - I actually 
want to go back to Palestine. 
In their responses, participants displayed elements of strong resistance to the assimilation of 
other nationalisms in their own identities. Although they are comfortable in acknowledging 
their own fluidities and the ways they've adjusted to incorporate their own exile and 
statelessness within their identities, they strongly denied and rejected the incorporation of a 
Canadian nationality in their own identifications, despite often recognizing it as a home. 
Therefore, not only does the Palestinian identity remain their primary "authentic" identifier, 
the participants' responses demonstrate that it is also jealously guarded and preserved to the 
extent that it becomes inviolable, and any and all cultural markers of belonging to other 
nationalisms actively rejected and resisted. 
Narcissism in the Stateless Identity 
In his examination of multiculturalism, Michael lgnatieff describes this mode of 
collective self-identification in which authenticity becomes idealized at the expense of the 
integration of other cultures as a form of autism "in which members of a group become so 
enclosed in their own sense of self-righteous victimhood, so trapped in their own mythology, 
that they become unable to listen to outsiders". (Morley 221) Although aspects of "self-
righteous victimhood" and mythology do exist in the Palestinian identity, what is expressed 
here by the participants is a greater desire to protect their identities from the erasure caused 
by their statelessness - albeit through the same processes of entrapment and self-isolation 
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referenced by lgnatieff. A more essential form of nationalism, where not only ancestry but also 
heritage, culture, and custom are fundamental to belonging thus becomes dominant in 
Palestinian communities, and encapsulates the Palestinian identity within the discourses of 
authenticity and fixity. It becomes "an assertion of belonging in and to a place, a people, a 
heritage. It affirms the home created by a community of language, culture and customs, and, by 
so doing, it fends off exile, fights to prevent its ravages". (Said 139) 
[Haitham:] For instance, we had a dabke16 here in the Student Centre last week. 
It symbolizes culture - Palestinian culture. And maintaining it as a Palestinian 
dabke is resistance to the eradication of our culture. And - for instance, here, 
where he says "carry your homeland wherever you go and be a narcissist if need 
be". That line invokes activism for me - be a narcissist. I appear as a narcissist to 
a lot of people. I feel a sense of responsibility too, but the narcissist part is very 
invocative of activism because I think that because of the activism of Palestine, 
there's an image of narcissism that I've projected that probably wouldn't be 
there if I were an activist for any other cause. 
[Kismet:] The part what struck me the most was this one: "so carry your 
homeland wherever you go, and be a narcissist if need be". Because I think that's 
what I do. I carry Palestine with me everywhere, Palestine more than Syria. And I 
like telling people about Palestine all the time. It's not that I love Palestine more 
than Syria, which might be true, but I feel that Palestinians are always 
misrepresented and misunderstood. And I know it annoys a lot of people when I 
talk about Palestine, which is why it says "be a narcissist if need be," so they 
have to listen to me whether they like it or not. And I'm not afraid of telling the 
people what Palestinians are fighting for. I'm not ashamed of saying what they 
want or who they are. The reason I like this, especially the part about being a 
narcissist, is because I don't want to play the game that a lot of liberals play -
saying that "I hope that Palestinians find their Ghandi," you know, because then 
they don't explain things the way they are. They don't talk about who the victim 
and who the oppressor are, and they treat both sides as equal, and that really 
annoys me. If it offends people when I tell them the truth as it is, then it's their 
problem, not my problem. 
16 Dabke (Arabic:~) also transliterated 11dabka," 11dabki," "dabkeh," 11debke," 11 debkah," "debki," "debka" is an 
Arab folk dance native to the Levant. It is popular in Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Bosnia, Turkey, Syria and Iraq. 
Either as a line dance or a round dance, it is widely performed at weddings and joyous occasions. The line forms 
from right to left, and the leader of the dabke heads the line, alternating between facing the audience and the 
other dancers. 
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The threat of extinction - which is a real threat in the case of a stateless identity that cannot 
perpetuate itself through a "natural" development in its "home" environment - thus leads to 
the emergence of lgnatieff s narcissistic nationalism in the Palestinian identity, where hyper-
differentiation between the "authentic" and the "other'' that threatens the national identity 
becomes a means of protecting its boundaries, and fending off the ravages of exile. However, it 
is also important to note that this narcissism, as illustrated by the participants' fixation on the 
question of Palestine, refers to an actively and deliberately adopted mode of being. This 
indicates that narcissism in the Palestinian community is not a "natural" condition, but rather a 
chosen way of identification that is utilized as a form of resistance to "the eradication of 
Palestinian culture," and becomes necessary in circumstances where a threat to their claims to 
a Palestinian identity arises. 
The "inbetweens" 
As a result of these modes of identification, the ideal of "authenticity'' in the Palestinian 
identity gathers significant value, yet the various markers of the Palestinian identity's 
"authentic" begin to accrue different symbolic meanings to the various communities of 
Palestinians dispersed across the globe, as they interact with their host countries and cultures, 
and as newer generations are born in exile. The universality of the Palestinian "authentic" as 
defined by their cultural heritage is thus gradually eroded by the inevitable cultural plurality 
and intermingling that arise in response to the pressures for survival and resettlement. As a 
result, Palestinians in the diaspora are not necessarily entrapped in the space of self-
victimization and narcissistic autism necessary for maintaining their identities, but are rather in 
constant dialogue with it. The participants in this study reflect this dialogical process of 
identification by consistently displaying pluralities that challenge lgnatieff s argument, while 
preserving the precarious boundaries of their Palestinian-ness and culture. 
[Haya:] I have two parts of my identity, and two languages that I'm comfortable 
with, and I don't know at times which one I belong to more. I'm comfortable with 
the language that is not of my own origin, but at the same, I can appreciate the 
other one. I full identify as being an Arab and Palestinian, but I'm more 
comfortable speaking in English and reading in English, and I don't know my own 
country so much. Belonging to two places at once. So in terms of "carrying the 
homeland wherever I go," or "I am two in one," you know - I think I can relate to 
all of that. On the other hand, "the outside world is exile, exile is the world 
inside," - I see it as opposite. There are many places in which I belong in different 
ways. I think that's a little bit of how I feel at home here and in Jordan. In Jordan 
I feel at home in terms of being the same one as everyone around me, you know, 
with the language and the culture. But at the same time because I've lived so 
long in a Canadian system, I feel I can be at home here. It's just belonging to 
different places in different ways, I feel that I don't feel like an outsider here or 
an outsider there. 
[Ayman:] In everything I've said I don't mean to say that I don't feel loyalty to 
Canada or feel that I'm not Canadian. I've lived more than half my life here, I've 
lived longer in Canada than anywhere else in the world. So yes, in that sense, I'm 
a hundred percent Canadian - just as Canadian as anyone else. What has helped 
me with that is that in coming to Canada, we haven't come here as guests, we've 
come here to be part of the country. In fact, you could say that everyone who's 
here doesn't actually belong here, except for the indigenous peoples. So 
everybody is a settler, and I'm as much a settler as anybody else. 
The participants' own multiple consciousness is therefore apparent, and is an acknowledged 
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facet of their identities. They are comfortable with their sense of belonging to collectives other 
than the Palestinian, as they acknowledge the variety of cultural capital they've acquired and 
relate to. Their cultural identification with the Palestinian identity thus allows them to interpret 
the cultures of other nationalisms through the various knowledges that they've accrued, 
without separating them into distinct and mutually exclusive identities - Haya is comfortable 
articulating her Palestinian identity in English and Ayman considers himself a "settler" in 
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Canada as much as everybody else. As a result, Palestinians in the disapora are, as Stuart Hall 
puts it 
people who belong to more than one world, speak more than one language (literally and 
metaphorically), inhabit more than one identity, have more than one home, who have 
learned to negotiate and translate between cultures and who, because they are 
irrevocably the product of several interlocking histories and cultures, have learned to 
live with, and indeed to speak from, difference. They speak from the "inbetween" of 
different cultures, always unsettling the assumptions of one culture from the 
perspective of another, and thus finding ways of being the same as and at the same time 
different from, the others amongst whom they live. (Morley 207, emphasis in original) 
However, the degree of fragmentation and dispersal present in the Palestinian diaspora 
limits the possibilities for interaction and communication within the collective itself, resulting in 
different trajectories of development within each different segment, with no way of achieving a 
cohesive image across its various communities. This creates a sense of alienation within the 
Palestinian communities where one fragment cannot relate to the other, unless it is through 
the indisputable essential and universal meta-narratives of their identity. This internal 
alienation is represented through the divisions in the Palestinian narrative that shape and 
define Palestinian identity, specifically for those in the diaspora who are often caught between 
the "question of the victim" and the liberating reality of their own fluid identities. 
[Haya:] You know, I think I relate to it in different ways. "I belong to the question 
of the victim" .17 I see Palestinians as victims, I don't so much see myself as a 
victim. So in some things I guess I distance myself a little bit from the rest of the 
Palestinians. But then again, I am still a Palestinian. 
Here, Haya identifies the victimhood of Palestinians as a meta-narrative to which she does not 
relate, demonstrating at once the fragmentation of the Palestinian identity and its internal 
alienations, as well as the varying significance of its collective narratives. This distancing that 
17 Refer to "Elegy for Edward Said," Appendix C 
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occurs as a result of the diaspora thus causes aspects of authenticity to coalesce into fewer -
yet more universal and all-encompassing - narratives of the Palestinian identity and the 
Palestinian "Home," such as the Nakba and other universally acknowledged Palestinian symbols 
identified by the participants as their signifiers of belonging (eg. olives, oranges, the kofeyye18, 
etc.). As a result, authenticity in the Palestinian identity becomes bound by an unchanging and 
static image of "Palestine," and plurality becomes a process that is separate from, but in 
dialogue with, the Palestinian identity of the participants. 
Diaspora and Alienation 
Paul Gilroy writes that diaspora "identifies a relational network, characteristically 
produced by forced dispersal and reluctant scattering. It is not just a movement through 
purposive, desperate movement is integral to it. Push factors like war, famine, enslavement, 
ethnic cleansing, conquest and political repression, are a dominant influence". (Gilroy 318) As 
such, the diaspora of the stateless Palestinian refugees is fundamentally tied to its history of 
ethnic cleansing. Due to the forced evictions and the instability of the refugees, as well as their 
inability to develop a new fully cohesive image of Palestinian nationalism because of the extent 
of their fragmentation, the imagined understanding of the Palestinian identity and the 
Palestinian "Home" becomes even more strongly rooted in the unchangeable past. The 
essential element of "land" thus becomes particularly vital as "territory and indeed Nature itself 
are engaged ... as a means to define citizenship and the forms of rootedness that compose 
national solidarity and cohesion". (Gilroy 316) 
18Refer to Image 8, Appendix D 
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However, due to the lack of connection to the Palestinian territory from which the 
refugees originated, only the figurative identifications remain in their image of Palestine. The 
divide between the symbolic meanings of Palestine and the land itself thus stunts the growth of 
the image and encapsulates it in the unchangeable image of what Palestine means -
dispossession, struggle, and cultural heritage - and therefore creates an unchangeable 
"authentic" image of the Palestinian identity and "homeland". As a result, despite their 
multiplicity of belonging, the "authentic" Palestinian-ness of Palestinians in the diaspora 
remains "objectified as fixed and closed, a latent destiny, rather than the result of a process of 
self-making and of social interaction". (Gilroy 313) 
Gilroy's concept of diaspora can be further understood as "a historical narrative that 
escapes the conflation of nation with race with place with kin". (Helmreich 244) This allows 
diasporic communities to emancipate their histories from the borders and histories of nation-
states, so "that a 'diasporic perspective' might be gained," that would place diasporic 
communities "not as falling 'between' traditions but as constitutive of a tradition that 
transcends national boundaries". (Helmreich 244) Whilst this analysis of diaspora is highly 
useful in understanding the fluidity and plurality of diasporic identities, it is problematic in its 
(unsuccessful) attempts to divorce the ideas of home and territory from one another, and 
becomes most evident in the Palestinian diaspora, where the territoriality of the Palestinian 
identity is inescapable due to the ongoing nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Although participants in this study largely display the traits of Gilroy's "diasporic 
perspective," it is also dangerous to ascribe this experience to the entirety of the Palestinian 
diasporic community. With vast numbers of Palestinians in the diaspora living in refugee camps, 
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the conditions that allow some communities to attain a degree of Gilroy's "diasporic 
perspective" and Chambers' "rhizomatic becoming" remain inaccessible to the majority of the 
Palestinian collective. As a result, the statelessness of the Palestinian refugees is a continuous 
reminder of their histories and thus prevents them from truly escaping the territoriality that is 
inherent in their nationalism. This is further demonstrated by the fact that the participants 
repeatedly reference the Right of Return and the hope of achieving it in their interviews, 
indicating that their understanding of the Palestinian diasporic condition is that it is temporary. 
This understanding is key to the Palestinian identity, as it is not only a part of the identities of 
the participants of this study, but it is essential to displaced Palestinians everywhere. Hence, 
the development of plurality and hybridity within the Palestinian identity is simultaneously 
inevitable and futile, as its solidification in a "Home" is continuously deferred. 
The statelessness of Palestinians in the diaspora thus carries dual implications: it is 
simultaneously a conceptual space of disempowerment, where the achievement of belonging 
to a homeland and the creation of a united nationalism remain elusive, and it is also a legal 
reality that renders stateless Palestinians immobile, as the documentations most often carried 
by stateless Palestinians (eg. travel documents, green card, etc.) constrain their abilities to 
travel. As a result, Palestinians are entrapped within a paradoxical "alien space" where their 
uprooted statelessness and the lack of a definable and discrete Palestinian home or identity do 
allow them a measure of fluidity and mobility in crossing the borders of imagined communities, 
yet where their official "stateless" status highly restricts and anchors their migratory 
movements. 
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Thus, where the post-modern alternatives to nationalism - "transnationalism," the 
"third space," "rhizomatic becoming," and "diasporic perspective," etc. - attempt to undo the 
journey confirmed in "the point of departure, secured in the presumption of eventual 
homecoming," (Morley 211) the Palestinian identity's "statelessness" coupled with its "refugee 
status" is a constant process of reinstating that eventual homecoming into its narrative. 
Therefore, the conceptual and physical spaces in which the Palestinian identity is framed and 
that are limited by the constraints of "statelessness" subvert its potential pluralities and re-
inscribe them into its self-essentializing universal narratives in order to preserve, mobilize, and 
survive. Furthermore, the lack of complete resettlement for Palestinians due to the ongoing 
nature of the conflict with the occupier prevents their achievement of permanent homes in 
their host countries, and creates an ongoing sense of temporality in the displaced identity 
which in turn further reifies the permanent-temporariness of their lives "in-between". This 
liminal space therefore becomes one where the absolute "authenticity" of the Palestinian 
identity cannot be entirely dismantled in favor of a more fluid identity, yet where it is still an 
identity that is in constant flux due to its engagement with the identities of the nations in which 
Palestinians reside. 
As a result, the Palestinian identity resides not in a "third space" of "rhizomatic 
becoming" and "diasporic perspective," but rather exists "in a state of 'tenuous stalemate' in 
which 'they cannot go backwards and they cannot go forwards' ... stuck in an eternal situation of 
transience". (Morley 227) This is not to say however that the Palestinian identity remains static 
and unchanging, but rather that the process of confluence of authenticity and plurality in its 
identity that is constantly in flux repeatedly leaves its parameters unresolved. The stateless 
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Palestinian identity in the diaspora can therefore be perceived to occupy an "alien space," 
wherein plurality and hybridity can emerge, but only to be re-embedded in its historically 
specific and culturally essential universal ideals. Thus, the mobility and lack of a homeland for 
Palestinians become the ideological frameworks that determine their identities, placing them 
within spaces of legal constraint where they are recognized as "stateless" and are prevented 
from achieving any resolution over where it is exactly that they belong. Hence, the pressures 
for survival and continuity repeatedly come into conflict with the persevering desire to achieve 
the hopelessly deferred and elusive "homeland" from which to develop and grow as a nation, 
leaving Palestinians "stuck in an eternal situation of transience". 
"The outside world is exile, 
exile is the world inside. 
And what are you between the two? 
I do not define myself 
so that I would not lose it. I am what I am. 
I am my other, a duality 
gaining resonance in between speech and gesture. 
Were I to write poetry I would have said: 
I am two in one, 
like the wings of a swallow, 
content with bringing good omen 
when spring is late. 
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Chapter 5. Memory and Myth 
The diaspora of the Palestinian nation is an inherent component of its identity, as the 
events that led to the dispersal and displacement of the Palestinian people are inescapable and 
prominent moments in the Palestinian history and narrative. As Palestinian historian, essayist, 
and novelist Elias San bar writes, "[t]he contemporary history of the Palestinians turns on a key 
date: 1948. That year, a country and its people disappeared from maps and dictionaries". (87} 
As such, the Nakba of 1948 functions as a key moment in the collective memory of the 
Palestinian identity, along with other historically significant events such as the Naksa and the 
intifadas, which also feature prominently in the Palestinian collective memory and largely affect 
Palestinian identity. 
However, as previously demonstrated, the scope of the different historical events 
classifies them within a hierarchy of experience that affects the influence and power of each 
memory in shaping the Palestinian identity. This hierarchy of experience varies from one 
Palestinian community to the next so that, for instance, those affected by the war of the camps 
in Lebanon may relate more powerfully to the Sabra and Shatila massacre than the expulsion of 
Palestinian refugees from Libya. However, the most significantand the most universal memory 
in the Palestinian collectivity remains that of the Nakba, the original displacement, and the 
source of the following history of struggle in the diaspora - "[t]he year 1948 mark[ed] the 
beginning of al-ghurba (exile or diaspora) and al-nakba (disaster or calamity), words intensely 
resonant in the Palestinian lexicon. After this decisive date, one can affix 'pre-' or 'post-' as 
markers of an apocalyptic moment". (Peteet 627) 
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The impact of the Nakba is therefore manifold: it is simultaneously the one all-
encompassing memory that ties the Palestinian collective together both in the diaspora and in 
the occupied territories, and yet the memory of the Nakba also acts as a space that separates 
the Palestinian identity from its other cultural narratives in ways that stunt its growth and 
progress. The inescapability of this memory entraps its subjects within the narrative of the 
Nakba - the catastrophe - of displacement and homelessness. On the one hand, the Nakba of 
1948 is the memory of the original rupture, and as such, creates a romanticized nostalgia for 
the Palestine remembered by the first wave of exiles and idealizes the "authentic" Palestinian 
identity. On the other hand, the Nakba writ-large, which includes not only the events of 1948 
but also all the Palestinian nation's consequent losses and struggles, has become "a Palestinian 
event and a site of Palestinian collective memory; it connects all Palestinians to a specific point 
i'n time that has become for them an 'eternal present"'. (Sa' di 177) As a result, the Nakba and 
its associated alienation thus form a distinct sub-identity within the overarching Palestinian 
identity, creating an intrinsic duality within the national Palestinian identity where Palestinians 
are continuously renegotiating the internal borders of the fixed and essential original 
catastrophe against the adaptability of their cultural identities. 
Collective Memory and Collective Identity: The Nakba of the Palestinians 
That memory functions as a significant component of individual identity is indisputable, 
but it is also true of the importance of memory for the formation of collective identities. In his 
introduction to the book Palestinian Collective Memory and National Identity, Mier Litvak writes 
that "[n]o group identity exists without memory as its core meaning; the sense of continuity 
over time and space is sustained by remembering, and what is remembered is defined by the 
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assumed identity .... These reconstructed images of the past provide the group with an account 
of its origin and development and thus allow it to develop a historical identity". (1) Similarly, 
Ron Eyerman argues that collective memory "is defined as recollections of a shared past which 
are passed on through ongoing processes of commemoration, officially sanctioned rituals which 
remember a group through calling upon a common heritage, with a shared past as a central 
component". (161) Collective memory can therefore be understood as an image or concept of a 
history that reflects the narrative of a community, that binds the collective together, and that is 
an integral component of national identity. 
As a reconstructed image of the past, collective memory both draws on individual 
histories and memories in its formation, and yet it also forms and shapes those individual 
reflections in the memories of its members. Eyerman continues to argue that, due to the nature 
of collective memory as a foundation of collective identity, "individual memory is conceived as 
[a] derivative of collective memory. It is the collective memory which orients a group, providing 
[its] temporal and cognitive map". (161) This implies that collective memory is not only the 
product of the memories of a collective community, but that collective memories in themselves 
have the power to influence and direct individual memories. Collective memory thus shapes 
and impacts the formation of collective and national identity by providing roots that can be 
remembered and that can provide a stable point of reference for the perpetuation and 
sustainability of identity. This creates a circular loop of meaning-making where collective 
memories are constructed out of the individual recollections of a community, but where those 
collective reconstructions gain symbolic meaning and resonance enough to direct and reaffirm 
individual memories and identities. 
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The collective memory of the Nakba is one that is tacitly acknowledged in the 
Palestinian community, and its dissemination is therefore an instinctive or "natural" process. It 
is most often passed down through generations through the stories of the elders as parents and 
grandparents alike share the stories of their experiences, imparting a sense of ownership over 
their histories to their later generations. As a result, the Nakba becomes the inherited 
alternative for the Palestinian nation whose homes and land are otherwise inaccessible. 
[Ayman:] It's the same narrative that you hear from most Palestinians: the one of 
being kicked out of your homeland, the one of longing to return; the beauty that 
is Palestine, the beauty that is returning to our homeland. Songs by Fairouz19, 
national songs, we had tapes of them that my dad would play in the car; of even 
the national anthems, Mawtini2°. We used to listen to them a lot. There was a 
radio station that would play them continuously and my mom would record 
them, and till this day we've kept the CDs - we converted the cassette tapes into 
CDs and kept them. In my car right now we have those CDs. Oh and the food! 
Palestinian food is all we eat. We have a Palestinian flag in my house, we have a 
poster that talks about the cultural clothing, the different embroideries of the 
different cities and villages. My parents have also told us a lot of stories of what 
Palestine was like, what their parents told them, how their parents were kicked 
out. They talked about the camps. My mom talks about it more than my dad. I 
think my dad may have been traumatized by it, but he sometimes mentions 
stories of what he went through. 
[Haya:] I think there were the two different types of memories - there were the 
painful memories, like the Nakba when they were expelled from their homes, 
and I'm sure many other Palestinians have those as well. And there was, you 
know, the memory of, for example my grandmother's story of how her brother 
was killed in a terrorist Israeli bombing, and that was one interaction with the 
occupier that I'm sure many other Palestinians have experienced in some way or 
another. And in terms of just the everyday life, it was living by the sea, a lot of 
people lived on the coast and I'm sure they have that as part of their memory. 
And the groves, the orange groves, the olive groves - the traditions, the 
weddings, the ceremonies, the events; things like that, you know. My 
19 Nouhad Wadi Haddad (Arabic: JI~ J4J) (born November 21, 1935), known as Fairuz (Arabic: j.J-»9, also spelled 
Fairouz or Fayrouz, meaning "Turquoise" in Arabic) is a Lebanese singer who is among the most widely admired 
and deeply respected living singers in the Arab world. Her songs are constantly heard throughout the region, and 
still spark Arab and Lebanese national pride. 
20 Mawtini (Arabic: ~yi "My Homeland") is a popular poem written by the Palestinian poet Ibrahim Touqan circa 
1934, that then became the de facto national anthem of Palestine. 
grandmother would tell me about all the different dances and the songs and the 
ways of dress and all those cultural traditions they had. We try to keep those 
memories alive, even things as simple as our food, the Palestinian cuisine, you 
know, Palestinian artwork, Palestinian poetry - I try to learn more about it and 
try to keep that in our everyday life in one way or another. I guess I pick and 
choose the things that I do like and want to continue so that part of it is the 
aesthetic or beauty of the culture that I want to keep. But yeah I feel compelled 
to because it is a part of myself that would only be there if I actively tried to keep 
it a part of my life and, you know, for our family. If we tried to ignore that, then 
it'll be gone forever. There's no country that we can go back to that can keep 
reminding us of these things. 
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The dual narratives of memory within Palestinian identity are thus depicted by the participants, 
as they describe both the narratives of Nakba, loss, and displacement, as well as the cultural 
narratives and traditions that are remembered in the diaspora. Unlike other national identities 
whose cultures are propagated in their own homelands, Palestine's "authentic" culture is 
treated as a stunted relic that is remembered alongside the rupture of connection with their 
homeland. As a result, the anthems and songs, artwork and poetry, traditional garb and cuisine 
etc. are actively preserved in the diaspora much the same way that the ethereal memories of 
the Nakba are preserved across its generations. It is important however to note in this case the 
differences between these two types of memories: where the memories of the Nakba reside 
literally in the memories of Palestinians and their recorded histories, memories of Palestine 
reside in its cultural relics - the pictures of its villages, towns, and cities, as well as its customs, 
traditions, and heritage pre-1948. As a result, these subtle divisions mark memory for 
Palestinians in different ways, linking the memories of the Nakba with the historical 
authenticity and legitimacy of Palestine, and the performed tangible memories of culture with 
the authenticity of Palestinian-ness and being Palestinian. 
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Therefore, as demonstrated by the participants' responses, the collective memory of the 
Palestinian nation hinges on the narratives that allow it access to its history and to its heritage, 
providing a substitute for their lost homeland. In their recollections, participants distinguish 
between the collective memories of the Nakba and the memories of Palestine, marked by 
stories of its traditions, culture, and way of life, signifying the intrinsic duality of their identities. 
These two narratives thus become the defining histories of origin, belonging, and ownership 
that are prevalent in Palestinian discourse, and provide the foundation of a nation that has 
otherwise ceased to exist. 
Memory: Individual, Localized, and Collective 
However, where memories of Palestine and Palestinian culture are easily discernible 
and function to restore its image in the minds and memories of its later generations, memories 
of the Nakba are more complex. Due to the vastness of the narratives of the Nakba, and the 
degree of fragmentation of Palestinian communities and generations, its memories are 
necessarily perpetuated through various means and are experienced in various ways. In an 
overarching web of experiences, it is not surprising that all the events in recent Palestinian 
history are rooted in the Nakba of 1948, and pour into the Nakba of Palestinians' daily lives. 
However, as previously demonstrated, this web is not a flat network of experiences but rather 
is a stratified grading of value and importance of each incident. As a result, three forms of 
memory become especially pertinent in the case of Palestinian identity in the diaspora: 
individual memory, localized collective memories of the various fragments of Palestinian 
communities, and the overarching collective memory of the Palestinian nation. Each node in 
this web of remembrance - such as Black September in Jordan, or the exodus from Kuwait -
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represents a "localized" collective memory that is more immediately relevant to those 
Palestinians who were directly affected by its events than to Palestinians who did not 
experience those events firsthand or were not directly affected by them at all. This also means 
that from the perspective of each community at each node, the hierarchy of experience differs 
as their own memories influence their identities more powerfully than other localized collective 
memories. The interconnectivity of these localized collective memories then generates a 
universal image of the Palestinian collective memory as one that is rooted in the Nakba and in 
Palestine pre-1948, and that samples the Nakba's various following struggles and experiences. 
Localized collective memories therefore serve as common histories to the fragmented 
communities within the overarching Palestinian collective, and function as components of the 
meta-Nakba of Palestinians. Yet due to the internal hierarchies of experience within the 
Palestinian collective memory, localized collective memories do not carry as much weight in 
forming individual identities in the Palestinian collective as the overarching and all-
encompassing memory of the Nakba. As a result, this renders the Nakba as an inescapable 
memory that entraps Palestinian identity in its narratives of catastrophe and dispossession. 
Memories of the Nakba of 1948, and the following "nakbas" or catastrophes of each localized 
memory - such as the repeated expulsions and the intifadas - therefore become signifiers for 
the entirety of the Palestinian experience. By focusing on the narratives of the original 
catastrophe, the Palestinian identity thus keeps circling back to the questions of its national 
legitimacy, its existence, and its Right of Return. 
Hence, the positioning of the Nakba of 1948 as the source of all the following calamities 
that have befallen the Palestinian nation simultaneously renders it as the biggest catastrophe in 
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terms of value - as it is the source - and the biggest catastrophe in terms of scope, as all 
following calamities continuously pour into its narrative. Thus, when Palestinians in the 
diaspora remember their history, the Nakba is always the point of entry into that history. It is 
the most remembered narrative, and is always remembered first. Therefore, the Nakba also 
becomes an overarching collective memory that is preserved at the expense of Palestinians' 
individual and localized collective memories, as it includes and symbolizes the rest of the 
Palestinians' calamities in its own narrative, and therefore precludes the need to address those 
sub-narratives separately. 
Mythologizing Memories: Memory-Identities and Lived Conditions 
Consequently, the memory of the Nakba works to simultaneously preserve and erase its 
own individual and localized memories, as its stories and symbols of the original catastrophe 
acquire ever-expanding value and meaning, thus overshadowing all sub-narratives of its 
identity. In their own responses, participants demonstrate this process by continuously circling 
back to stories of the original Nakba of 1948 inherited from their families and learned from the 
mainstream discourses of Palestinian history. 
[Carla:] I've been told by my grandparents from my mother's side much more, 
because they were the ones that left Palestine. You hear my grandmother talk 
about how they were scared away by rumors, you know, "soldiers are coming, 
and they're killing people". There were lots of rumors going around. So people 
got scared, packed their stuff and, ya/la, ya/la, yalla21, quick, quick, quick, they 
grabbed whatever they could - not even their papers, their documents - and 
they fled. I got goosebumps hearing that. I remember that my grandfather used 
to say that in the camps they were scared of being attacked. But they don't go 
into detail about it, it's almost like a memory that they want to erase, you know. 
Whenever I ask, they'd just talk about the inconveniences of life in the camps. 
When they were in the refugee camps, my grandmother's dad went back, only to 
find that the Zionists had taken over their home I Already! They scared off the 
21 
"Ya/la" (Arabic: .ilil;i) is a common expression denoting "come on," "let's get going," and mostly meaning hurry. 
people, they deserted the area, and the Jews came and took over my 
grandmother's house! It was like - like, I tell you to flee, you flee your house, 
fast, fast, fast, you go back there after four days, five days, to see another family 
in your house, using your own things! And my grandmother talks about how they 
had special tablecloths that they used only during Christmas and special 
occasions. So when my great-grandfather went back, he saw that they [the 
settlers] had taken them out and spread them on the table. Imagine. So it makes 
you wonder sometimes when you hear Israelis saying that this is their promised 
land and they've been there forever and then you hear your family talking- it 
breaks your heart, you know. 
[Kismet:] This reminds me of my grandparents' journey. How they went from 
Jaffa to the West Bank, and from there to Jordan and Syria. It reminds me of 
pictures of the Nakba. Till this day, whenever I see these pictures I feel really, 
really sad. It's something I cannot get over. Have you ever watched the TV show, 
"El-Taghreebe E/-Fa/asteeniyye" 22? Those episodes where they were forced to 
leave - I still remember them - were extremely painful. 
Both Carla's and Kismet's inherited memories are typical of the Nakba narratives that are 
shared by Palestinians in and outside of Palestine. They clearly depict detailed events of the 
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1948 ethnic cleansing, and the individual stories of their grandparents' fleeing of Palestine in 
ways that eternalize the rhetoric of the Nakba. However, these accounts also minimize the 
value of other memories, rendering the Nakba itself a symbolic history of the Palestinian 
nation: the experiences of Carla's grandparents in the camps directly after the expulsion are 
vague and inaccessible, similarly, Kismet automatically reverts to referencing the prolific photos 
of the Nakba in order to better depict her family's own unarticulated experiences. Thus, one 
can see how individual experiences stand as representative moments that signify the entire 
experience of the Nakba, and vice versa, and thus function as points of connection to the 
overarching collective memory. Memories of the Nakba consequently provide Palestinians with 
22El-Taghreebe El-Falasteeniyye (Arabic:~' 4.!.,;Lill) "The Palestinian Exodus" or "The Palestinian Emigration," a 
Syrian TV series aired during Ramadan of 2004, is considered the most important work of dramatic treatment of 
the Palestinian cause, depicting the British occupation of Palestine and the guerilla massacres of Zionist 
settlements between the thirties and sixties of the last century. 
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points of entry into the general narrative that then distill the collective memory into individuals' 
own stories. In this way, the collective memory that is constructed out of the stories of entire 
communities becomes conflated with the individual memories of its people. It does not merely 
exist in the past as a passive history, but rather the relations drawn from these points of entry 
into the collective memory allow it to become part of the individuals' ongoing identifications, 
such that either individual memories or the collective memory of the Nakba can stand in for 
one another. 
The significance of collective memory is therefore in its power to affect both collective 
and individual identities within a national imagined community. So much so, that the degree of 
value and meaning acquired by certain collective memories, the Armenian genocide for 
instance, arguably constitute identities in and of themselves. That is to say that the scope of 
collective meaning such memories gain provides them with distinct identities, where the 
memory of the Armenian genocide becomes not only a reference point for the Armenian 
community's history, but also provides the language for the discourse around similar events 
such as the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, the Nakba, etc. Such collective memories form 
intrinsic identities in and of their own, that are definable and recognizable, and can stand alone 
as universally acknowledged and understood signifiers from which identities are drawn and to 
which collectives are tied. Such memory-identities thus link "collective memory to the 
formation of collective identity and bring it close to myth and to ideology". (Eyerman 162) 
The Nakba, the Catastrophe, is one such recognizable and universally acknowledged 
memory of rupture and displacement whose trauma is undeniable. Due to the passage of time 
and the emergence of several generations who experienced various nakbas as a result of the 
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original catastrophe, the memory that is "Al-Nakba" has grown to encompass several narratives 
of several communities and an entire history of dispossession and repeated upheaval. As a 
result, the Nakba is, by its very nature, a memory that is constructed out of the multitudinous 
memories of its communities; it is a signifier for more than just the collective memories of its 
communities and amounts to "more than the sum of the memories of the individuals that 
compose the collective". (Anastasio 42) The multitude of narratives that is the Nakba thus 
becomes the accumulation of the calamities that have befallen the Palestinians, formulating an 
ideological discourse that represents the Palestinian identity and to which Palestinians are tied. 
Therefore, as a result of its significance in the Palestinian collective, the memory of the Nakba 
becomes "a lived condition, not a historical possession [that perpetuates] Sanbar's formulation 
about the refugees having 'gambled everything on taking [Palestine] with them, gradually 
becoming the temporary replacement of their homeland"'. (Allan 51) 
Symbolizing the Nakba 
If "belonging to an imagined community is constantly reproduced and bolstered through 
invented traditions, commemorations, the construction of national museums, and the creation 
of national cultural canons and national heroes," (Sa' di 176) memory-identities then produce 
and become linked to symbols that propagate their narratives by distilling them into key 
elements and emphasizing their most significant moments. These tactics of preserving and 
disseminating the memory of the Nakba can all be found in the Palestinian identity where dates 
and cultural symbols become used as signifiers for the Nakba and the Palestinian condition 
writ-large: May 15th for instance is the annual commemoration date of the Nakba for the 
majority of the Palestinian community in the diaspora. Similarly, Land Day on the 30th of March 
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is the annual day of commemoration of Israeli appropriation of Palestinian land since 1967, and 
has come to represent resistance against all Israel's acts of land-grabbing and settlement 
building on Palestinian land. ("Land Day") Such dates are regularly utilized by Palestinian 
communities to remember the original displacements of their families, often through 
organizing demonstrations and rallies and political demands for the Right of Return. 
In addition to the dates of commemoration, the Palestinian community also turns to 
cultural symbols of its dispossession such as poetry and art that depict the Nakba and the 
Palestinian struggle. Palestinian artists, such as highly acclaimed poet Mahmoud Darwish 
"whose considerable work amounts to an epic effort to transform the lyrics of loss into the 
indefinitely postponed drama of return," (Said 142) have thus become regarded as national 
heroes. Darwish's poetry is therefore frequently referred to as the voice of Palestinians in the 
diaspora, with his poems often recited at events commemorating Palestinian history and 
culture. Similarly, another symbol of the Palestinian Nakba is Palestinian cartoonist Naji Al-Ali's 
character of "Handala" 23 who has become the mascot of the Palestinian cause and a symbol of 
its struggle and resistance. 
[Haitham:] I commemorate the dates as part of the activism that we do. Keeping 
them alive, remembering, raising awareness about them, and continuing- it's a 
way of resistance too, continuing the struggle. [Pulls out Handala pendant 
necklace] I wear this every day. This is Handala - I think handala means 
miserable. And it's a symbol of the Palestinian struggle to return home. He has 
his back turned to the world because no one cares about his plight. And it's also 
a cartoon character that makes a very effective mascot for the struggle. Also, 
Mahmoud Darwish for instance was a symbol of Palestinian resistance - poetry is 
important, in every struggle there's poetry, and a lot of meaning and power to it. 
[Haya:] I like Handala, I think it's a good way that's not over dramatic of showing 
exactly how we feel as Palestinians. 
23 Refer to Image 3, Appendix D 
[Kismet:] Handala makes me think about Naji Al-Ali and how he was 
assassinated, but most importantly I think about how great his artwork is. Not 
just his artwork about Palestine, but about the Arab world in general and how 
the Arab regimes failed Handala - failed the Palestinians. In Arabic, handala 
means something that's really bitter, and the reason why Naji Al-Ali called him 
Handala is because of the bitterness of Palestinian life. 
[Ayman:] Handala, Naji Al-Ali. I mean, it is what it is. It's a symbol of the 
Palestinians. When I see it I just think of my grandfather. I feel it's a symbol of 
the Palestinians that left, who suffered the Nakba. It's a symbol of being kicked 
out, marginalized, he's patched up, he's poor, he's a refugee. That image is 
strong and he's turned his back to the world, he's despondent, dejected by the 
way that he's treated. 
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Caricaturing the Palestinian condition, Handala is poor and dispossessed, his back is turned to 
the world in dejection and in desolation at the way he is treated. His name, Handala (Arabic: 
~), which is also the name of a bitter fruit, further signifies the bitterness of the Palestinian 
struggle. Through the ubiquitous use of Handala in Al-Ali's cartoons, and in countless political 
discourses even after Al-Ali's assassination, he has become the de facto representative of the 
Palestinian cause and a symbol of solidarity and resistance. The symbolism of Handala, 
Darwish's poetry, and other forms of commemoration, thus works to consolidate and link the 
Palestinian collective memory to the individual identities of its members across its various 
communities. As a result, their meaning to the Palestinian collective expands to include its 
entire history by representing a few key narratives that then stand in for the whole -
dispossession, bitterness, and the hopelessly deferred homeland. 
Inheriting Palestine - Inheriting Memory 
In his introduction, Litvak writes that "[i]n the words of Ernest Renan, 'suffering in 
common unifies more than joy does. Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of 
more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort,"' (1) and the 
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greater the suffering and grief, the greater the value of the memories in shaping collective 
identities. Looking at the Nakba reveals that its narratives of shared suffering through the 
experiences of dispossession and displacement thus actively shape Palestinian identity by 
providing impetus for its propagation. The duties imposed by the narratives of the Nakba thus 
become inextricably connected with discourses of activism, resistance, and above all the Right 
of Return. 
[Ayman:] Looking at what you've known to have lost -what was taken from you -
it invokes the same emotion that the Palestinian flag invokes: the idea that we 
have something to return to and that it's bigger than the lines that are drawn. It's 
bigger than establishing a Palestinian state, it's much bigger issues than that. 
That's what I think it represents - it represents the complexity of the Palestinian 
identity. It's a history of what's happened, it's a history of lives impacted. And 
learning about it from your parents-your identity stems from your parents. Your 
parents instill in you a sense of being Palestinian and what it means to be 
Palestinian, because the identity isn't there for you, it's not molded by society for 
you - although it might be in terms of the "othering" that we as Palestinians 
experience. But the story, the narrative is given to you by your parents. So, it's our 
parents' mission to instill it in us - we're what's left of Palestine. And that makes 
sense too because, I'd say that on the one hand, I don't want everything that my 
family was put through to be in vain. And that's something they tell us, that their 
suffering and struggle has all been so that we could fight for Palestine and return 
to Palestine. On the other hand I would say that I truly believe that I have a right 
to return to Palestine and to live there, regardless of what my parents believe or 
have taught me. 
[Carla:] When I see these images I think of all the generations of Palestinians that 
are coming or that are here - the generations that have come, and that are to 
come. I wonder if they would ever see these pictures and long to go back to 
Palestine like I do. Because I feel like, more and more, we're forgetting who we 
are. I just wonder about the generations to come, if they'll look at something like 
this, or even know what Handala is. At least in your case, your parents told you 
about the Right of Return, I had to read about it online. This is why resistance is 
important, this is why activism is important. So that we don't lose what's left of 
Palestine and the Right of Return, which we hope for. 
In discussing their inherited identities and memories, the participants' responses repeatedly 
reverted to the ideas of return, activism, and resistance. Thus one can see how the concept of 
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the Nakba not only refers to the events of 1948, but that as a collective memory, the Nakba 
inherently also includes the longing for return. The narrative of the Nakba therefore 
encompasses more than its memories, and becomes a lived and performed identity that 
requires actively remembering and memorializing the Palestinian identity on a daily basis. It 
thus symbolizes struggle, injustice, and the ideals of resistance, and has grown to include the 
history of Palestinian dispossession since 1948. It is used to reference both the key date of 
1948, as well as the entire Palestinian narrative since, and hence carries significant meaning for 
the Palestinian community and the Palestinian identity. 
These key symbols form the collective memory that is indisputable and that is 
collectively acknowledged as part of the essential heritage of the Palestinian nation, regardless 
of whether or not, or to what extent, it has been individually experienced by its members. 
Michael Milshtein captures the symbolism of the Nakba for the Palestinians, writing that 
[t]he memory of the Nakba evolved as a central national myth that elucidated three 
issues: the way in which their past evolved, the course in which their present is 
conducted, and the goals they must strive for in the future. It has become a powerful 
tool, shaping and disseminating Palestinian national consciousness and mobilizing the 
community. Hence, the memory of the Nakba was never merely the object of grief and 
longing, nor an idea encouraging passivity, but a means of stimulating Palestinian 
activism, inter alia, by enhancing the yearning for return (a/-'awda).The Palestinians 
never portrayed the Nakba as a story of the distant past, but as a living, continuous 
event, integrated into the present and spanning several generations, different sectors of 
the population, and geographic origins. (48) 
Thus in an attempt to maintain the preservation and nurturing of the uprooted Palestinian 
identity, and the protection of its collective memories through future generations, the Nakba 
therefore becomes "a rhetorical performance in which an imagined community is invoked," as a 
self-essentializing and authenticating of the Palestinian identity "in order to mobilize for 
action". (Morley 237) Hence, the Nakba in fact becomes an "authentic" and essential identity 
inherited in combination with the Palestinian cultural identity that continuously strains and 
influences individual identities as well as the image of Palestinian identity within the 
imaginations of its collective. 
Hybridity in Memories of the Nakba 
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It is important to note however that the authenticity derived from the collective 
memory of the Nakba does not exclude the plurality of individual memories. In his article, 
"Catastrophe, Memory and Identity: Al-Nakbah as a Component of Palestinian Identity," Ahmad 
Sa' di writes that "[s]imilar to various Third World peoples who have experienced centuries of 
colonization, the question of identity among Palestinians has become intimately connected to 
the 'restoration of the individual's subjectivity'; that is, a national narrative has been 
constructed through life stories, documents, and viewpoints of individuals". (176) Not only does 
this underscore the value of individual memory in the creation of collective memory, but it also 
reveals the diversity of narratives and viewpoints that come into play in its construction. 
Due to the transient nature of memory, and its inherent openness to interpretation and 
difference, individual memories serve as supplements to the universalized and undisputed 
collective image, rendering collective memory far more capacious and inclusive of difference 
than understandings of collective identities. This is not to say that "essential truths" are not 
drawn from collective memory, however, despite the propensity to authenticate and 
essentialize collective memory, its ephemeral and transient nature as well as its reliance on the 
consolidation of localized and individual memories maintain its capacities for diversity. Where 
collective identities can be defined within boundaries of difference and markers of belonging, 
the borders of collective memory remain highly fluid and unfixable. Therefore, by its very 
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nature, collective memory comes in the form of a dialogue between authenticity and plurality, 
and between universals and particulars, rather than as divisions between them. In other words, 
collective memory allows for an overlapping of authenticity and plurality rather than posing 
each set as mutually exclusive possibilities. In a sense, collective memory thus poses the 
ultimate in hybridity, as its ephemeral nature does not allow for fixity or discreteness, and its 
assemblage of memories into a universal narrative renders it categorically fluid. This locates 
collective memory in a space where it is in continuous reconstruction as new memories are 
added, old memories are reinterpreted, and where the flux of identity and memory are 
inextricably intertwined. 
This framework of memory and identity discussed thus far highlights collective memory 
as a vital component of national identity that is both constructed by and that also shapes and 
informs individual memories. This structure however is further complicated in the case of the 
Nakba and Palestinian identity due not only to the wide geographic fragmentation of the 
community, but also due to the passage of time and the emergence of second, third, and even 
fourth generations of Palestinians in the diaspora. As the memory of the Nakba itself "still 
resides in a liminal zone between history and memory - that is, between the past as object of 
dispassionate study and the past as an affective part of personal and collective consciousness," 
(Goertz 33) it is vulnerable to decay and the influences of time. In addition, the timelessness of 
the memory of the Nakba and its ongoing nature as a "lived condition" of diaspora and 
dispossession prevent its relegation into a distinct history of the past, but reconfigure it into an 
evolving and current commemoration and performance of identity. The inheritance of both the 
memory of the Nakba of 1948 along with the Nakba as a living, continuous existence is 
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therefore complicated by the dissemination of these collective memories, which themselves 
are ethereal and imperfect constructions. As a result, the collective memories of generations 
born after 1948 differ significantly from the mythical Nakba of the generations who 
experienced it firsthand. 
Palestinian Post-Memory, "Survivor's Guilt," and "Imposter Syndrome" 
Marianne Hirsch proposes the term "post-memory" to describe a hybrid form of 
memory that "distinguishes itself from personal memory by generational distance and from 
history by a deep personal connection. Post-memory should reflect back on memory, revealing 
it as equally constructed, equally mediated by the processes of narration and imagination .... 
Post-memory is anything but absent or evacuated: It is as full and as empty as memory itself'. 
(Hirsch 8-9) Post-memory is therefore a more useful descriptor of the image of the Nakba that 
resides in the memories of its newer generations, as it diminishes the all-encompassing 
identification that the Nakba serves to provide by revealing its ethereality and its changeability 
over time. Post-memory in the Palestinian identity therefore dismantles the myth of the Nakba 
through generational distance, and thus reorients the identity of the Nakba from a dogmatic 
and fixed narrative to one that is open to interpretation and interrogation. 
Post-memory is most visible in the Palestinian identity in the sense of detachment to the 
narratives of the Nakba amongst its newer generations. Due to the passage of time, the 
memories of the events of 1948 and the journeys of the first wave of displaced Palestinians 
become difficult to relate to as the newer generations of Palestinians born in exile live 
comparatively normal lives with minimal upheaval or suffering. As a result, memories of the 
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Nakba and Palestine assume fairy-tale-like qualities as they appear to be in a far off land from 
the far off past, and are thus non-immediate and untenable. 
[Haya:] I've had -we do have conversations about Palestine. And it's a lot more 
of a myth now or a fairy- not a fairy-tale, but it's far removed enough that it's 
not an immediate - I don't know how to put it - it's not immediately there, it's 
far off, it's like a story, not very tangible. Yeah, so it's much more abstract and 
theoretical an idea rather than the concrete Palestine that we would move to 
tomorrow. I think my parents have distanced themselves from it a little bit, so 
that it -they don't even romanticize -there's no nostalgia there. It's just facing 
the hard facts of what it is today, and the fact that that's completely different 
and inaccessible than what it used to be. I used to have a lot of conversations 
with my grandma about Palestine, and because to her it was much more of an 
immediate reality, you know, she was much closer to it and to romanticizing that 
ideal of Palestine, because she lived there and she remembered it. So that was a 
different type of conversation. It was much more immediate and real to her. 
[Haitham:] My dad told me the story of' 48, of his grandfather in 1948. He owned 
a business in Beer el-Sabe', which later became Beir Sheva. And that house was 
bombed and they had to flee back to Gaza. My dad would also sometimes tell us 
the story of '67; actually I've only heard it from him twice - two or three times. My 
dad was kicked out at 16, he managed to return eventually through a family 
reunification program. And my mom - she was five years old at the time. The 
house was bombed, they were lucky they hid in a room that didn't explode. They 
actually argued over which room to go to, and the one they didn't go to was 
bombed - the bomb fell there. I feel like part of me wants those experiences to be 
more real, but it's hard, because I feel a disconnect. My parents had a different 
experience of life than I did, so different. And especially my dad, and I don't really 
talk much to him. So it's hard. It depends on the person really, some people - I 
feel like they'll never understand. Other people who aren't from Palestine, I feel 
like they understand more. I think a lot of Palestinians will be desensitized or will 
be disconnected. You can't really go to them for understanding because they 
already understand - like "you're not the only one". That's the kind ofthing other 
Palestinians might give off, they have the capacity to understand it, but someone 
who hasn't experienced it will lend you an ear whereas someone who's been 
through it though might not. It might be due to collective trauma. It really 
depends on the person. It's like that with my dad. So, I might not be comfortable 
talking with some Palestinians about it. I know someone who is a survivor of the 
Sabra and Shatila massacre and I feel that in talking to that person about my 
family experience ... it just doesn't compare. 
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In their responses, the participants demonstrate a sense of distance from the immediacy of the 
Nakba's memories, describing it as "abstract," "like a story, not really tangible," and not as 
"real" as they would like it to be. This "disconnect" is further consolidated in the relations 
between the various fragments and generations of Palestinians, as the range of experiences 
create divisions in which one fragment of the Palestinian community is unable to relate to the 
other. This in turn results in instances where connectivity to the symbols of the collective 
memory eclipse connectivity to its actual narratives, leading to feelings of even further 
disconnect from the grand-narrative of the Nakba so that it is not only difficult to relate to due 
to its historical distance, but it is also difficult to internalize within individual identities due to its 
vast difference of experience from their own experiences and day to day lives. 
As a result, the inherited collective memories of the Nakba fit awkwardly in the 
identities of newer generations of Palestinians - the Nakba is undeniably their inheritance, yet 
it does not resemble their lives in any way and is thus difficult to internalize, leading to an 
emergence of "impostor syndrome," particularly for Palestinians in the diaspora. In his own 
self-reflections, Alain Finkielkraut coined the term "imaginary Jew" to describe the process of 
living a fictional, inauthentic life based on the borrowed identities and experiences of 
persecuted predecessors. Writing that 
[o]thers had suffered and, because I was their descendant, I harvested all the moral 
advantage. The allotment was inescapable: for them, utter abandonment and 
anonymous death, and for their spokesperson, sympathy and honor ... The effect 
produced wasn't intentional. I did not set out like a cynical and sordid swindler to 
embezzle what they possessed. But it isn't only intention that matters. I owed to the 
bond of blood this intoxicating power to confuse myself with the martyrs, (18-19) 
Finkielkraut developed the concept of an "imaginary Jew" to explain the feelings of in-
authenticity his lack of experience of the Holocaust lent his privileged identity. While 
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Palestinians are not as frequently treated with "sympathy and honor'' due to their Palestinian 
heritage as Jews connected with the Holocaust are, parallel feelings of survivor's guilt, fraud, 
and a diminished claim to the "authentic" Palestinian identity persist in newer generations' 
identifications due to the generational and experiential distances from the catastrophe of the 
Nakba. 
[Ayman:] I feel that about myself. I might not be entitled to, even though I'm 
Palestinian, I'm not entitled to judge what goes on there. Like, let's say recently: I 
have a friend of mine who goes to UTM and she's from Gaza and I was talking to 
her during the latest war on Gaza24 and she was talking about the different 
political factions, and she said "how can you support them? Look at all the 
people dying!" So that makes me feel like I'm not entitled to judge - who am I to 
judge? I'm not from there, I've never been there or lived there. 
[Kismet:] Sometimes I used to feel that I was pretending to be Palestinian. Not 
that it's not who I am, just that I'm too far away to be Palestinian. I always feel 
grateful for everything that Palestinians inside Gaza and the West Bank are 
doing. That was one of the reasons I wanted to go to Gaza, to let them know that 
we're really grateful. Not that it makes a difference, but just to make me feel 
better. Seeing how hopeful the people in Gaza were when I met them, I realized 
that if the people suffering the most didn't feel hopeless, then we on the outside 
didn't have the luxury of feeling hopeless. 
The fact that none of the participants had personally suffered injustice beyond the fact that 
they could not visit or live in their native lands, whilst narratives of tremendous suffering 
suffuse the Palestinian identity in every way, thus presented an obstacle to their full 
identification with the Palestinian collective memory. Participants actively exclude themselves 
from the grand-narrative of the Palestinian identity because of the privileges of their lives in 
Canada that Palestinians elsewhere cannot access, and thus face internal conflicts of belonging 
to the Palestinian identity. 
24 Operation Pillar of Defense, which took place during November 2012. 
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What is most significant in this process of disconnecting from the authenticity of the 
Palestinian identity is that it is not a division that is present in the image of the Palestinian 
identity itself, but is rather a process that individuals undergo as a result of internalizing the 
hierarchies of experience in the Palestinian narrative as they see them. Although it may be true 
that the greater the tragedy, the greater its value is in the Palestinian national identity, the 
reverse is not necessarily a foregone conclusion. The idea that the more privileged individuals 
are, the less of a claim they have to the Palestinian identity is not one that is universally 
accepted nor utilized in excluding Palestinians from their claims of belonging. Therefore, this 
process of self-differentiating and self-exclusion from the collective is an often unspoken yet 
prevalent form of internal self-alienation and struggle with the dogma of the Nakba of the 
Palestinian narrative. As a result, resolving this conflict then becomes reliant on individuals' 
own experiences and memories that may mimic or echo the collective memory of the Nakba in 
order to maintain their connections to the collective and to internalize the memory of the 
Nakba as a living aspect of their identities rather than as a relic of the past. 
Reinterpreting "the Nakba" 
In his introduction, Litvak writes that "[e]very group develops the memory of its own 
past and so highlights its unique identity vis-a-vis other groups .... The past the group prizes is 
domestic: the histories of foreign lands are alien and incompatible with its own past. National 
identity requires both having a heritage and believing it to be unique". (1) This suggests that 
even in memory, moments of distinction, essentialism, and authenticity arise. Authenticity in 
collective memory thus refers to those memories that are indisputable and that have gathered 
such scope of symbolism and universal meaning that their references and meanings become 
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absolute and all-encompassing to the extent that they could be deemed ideological. As 
demonstrated, the memory of the Nakba is one such memory-identity and its preservation is 
maintained partially through the differentiation of its narrative from all other histories, just as 
the vulnerability of the exiled Palestinian identity is compensated for by the narcissistic fixation 
on its essential authenticity. 
However, in instances of post-memory, the restricted and enshrined dogma of such 
memories becomes reinterpreted and opened to dialogue with narratives of the Other in order 
to create a point of reference to which members of a community can relate. Due to the 
vastness of its collective memory and the length of time and number of generations that it 
covers, the integration of the Nakba into the individual memories of emerging generations has 
necessitated opening its ideological meanings to different experiences and different collective 
memories. If the collective memories of the Nakba of the first generation who experienced it 
developed within the Palestinian identity to become essential truths, the post-memory of later 
generations interrogates those truths in ways that dismantle their inherent dogma. 
[Haya:] I think Palestinians share a history but since the Nakba, in those 65 
years, those three generations have gone through so many different life 
experiences that there can't be a universal anymore. They can understand that 
part of me, and that part of my identity, but you know, my current world view, 
or my current way of thinking might be completely different because of the 
past three generations. So for a deeper level of connection, yes it would make a 
difference if someone shares that history with me or not. But it doesn't have to 
be a Palestinian living in exile, it can be anyone who's had a similar experience 
of having had to leave their country. So I do relate to Armenians, or any other 
immigrants who have a similar diaspora. The same goes for the Holocaust. In 
the case of the Holocaust and Zionism - I disassociate the two. Simply because I 
don't think that whatever, you know, bad things that happened to me as a 
result - or from the Israelis - I don't want to associate that with people who are 
descendant from the Holocaust because I know that there are many Holocaust 
survivors who have nothing to do with the Zionist and Israeli project. And I 
don't want to take away any of their experience and trauma because of 
wanting to focus on my own. 
[Carla:] I compare myself to Armenians, Armenians who've never been to 
Armenia. They read, they write, they speak fluent Armenian, you ask them what 
they are, they're going to say Armenian. They have a country, Armenia, but 
because of the Armenian genocide they hold on to their identity through 
generations. Even those born outside Armenia, who've lived their lives away 
from Armenia, speak and dress as though they just arrived from there. So I 
compare myself to them, but at the same time it's different. 
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Relating the memories of the Nakba to other narratives that Palestinians in the diaspora more 
commonly come into contact with is thus one of the ways they interrogate and reinterpret their 
own inherited collective memories. The narratives of the Armenian Genocide or the Jewish 
Holocaust, which are ever-present in the mainstream discourses of the Western world thus 
provide unlikely points of connection to the narratives of the Nakba. Post-memory therefore 
encapsulates the experience of later generations of Palestinians who inherit the Nakba from 
their parents and grandparents through their own individual stories, whilst simultaneously 
bringing them into dialogue with the narratives of the non-Palestinian Other. This dialogical 
process works to reinforce and link the Palestinian collective memory to individual identities of 
its people across its various communities, through the use of shared symbols - in this case, 
displacement, dispossession, and genocide. 
Memory, Crises, and Identity 
In addition, the internalization of collective memory into the individual identities of its 
members is further facilitated by the emergence of moments of crisis. In his theory of identity, 
Erik Erikson identifies adolescence as a critical moment in individuals' identity formations, 
where "[t]he psychosocial crisis of late adolescence [is] postulated to be identity versus identity 
diffusion (or confusion, in Erikson's later writings)". (Kroger and Marcia 32) This indicates that 
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during adolescence, individuals are faced with choices that would determine their identities, 
and that the necessity of making those choices represents crises in the creation of individuals' 
identities. Erikson focuses on two instances of choice that arise at the cusp of adulthood: the 
choice of occupation, and the formation of an ideology; and argues that it is these choices that 
direct the identities of adolescents. Erikson's perspective is therefore useful in understanding 
the ways in which the ideology of the Nakba - which is predominantly a narrative of the severe 
suffering and struggle - has become a key element in the lives of its later generations. Similar to 
the "crisis" identified by Erikson's theory, moments of crisis arise in the Palestinian collective 
that connect collective memory and post-memory to individual memory, thus integrating it into 
and cementing it within the personal identities of its emerging generations. 
One instance of collective crisis identified by all the participants as a turning point in 
their identifications as Palestinians is the Second Intifada. This is particularly significant, as the 
Second Intifada in fact took place at the time when the participants were in their adolescence, 
and was a moment that provoked a questioning of their Palestinian identities. It was also a key 
moment in their histories, as it was the first violent encounter with the occupier that this 
generation of Palestinians was able to experience in real-time through the extensive 
broadcasting of its events. The Second Intifada therefore became an instigator for many 
Palestinians in the diaspora - the participants of this study included - for deeper examination 
of and connection with their Palestinian identities. Similarly, the following wars in Gaza -
Operation Cast Lead, and most recently, Operation Pillar of Defence - repeated the cycles of 
crisis and introspection as the third generation of Palestinians in exile matured. 
[Kismet:] I was 14 when the Second Intifada happened I think - and I was really 
shocked to see it. That was the first time when I organized something for 
Palestine in high school. This is when Palestine was no longer a story that my 
grandmother had told me about. This was the first time I remember feeling sad, 
angry, and helpless. Then when I came here, in the first few years I didn't really 
have an identity- I was really focused on studying and I didn't question 
anything. But when the massacre in Gaza happened, that was the time that I had 
a crisis. It was so painful, I dropped three courses, I couldn't sleep at night, I was 
crying, I lost weight - because I felt that people were dying for no reason and we 
kept asking them to be strong so that we could have the Right of Return. It was a 
sort of survivor's guilt, and it was the hardest thing I ever had to deal with 
because I had to live a regular life while they were suffering. I felt that I had to go 
to Gaza, I needed to go, and I did end up going there in May 2009. It was all 
these experiences and that crisis that happened that solidified my Palestinian 
identity for me. 
[Carla:] I first - well - because my parents were never clear on what it was, you 
know, when I asked where we're from. It was later actually; it was around when 
I was 11-12, during the Second Intifada that I found out. I remember going on 
the TV and what not, and we had Arabic satellite at that time. I remember seeing 
children throwing stones, and like - there were, do you remember that Arabic 
song, the one called "El-Helm El-Araby25"? I remember watching it and crying, 
crying, why are these people dying what - what is this? And my dad and my 
mom explaining to me that this is the conflict between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis, and my dad - I would hear him yelling, yelling, and I never used to get it. 
I didn't understand why or what was going on. I didn't get it because when I used 
to ask them "where are we from?" they would tell me "say we're from Jordan". 
You know? So when my dad once said "say you're from Israel," to me, that was 
when enough was enough. So I dug deeper, I did my own research and then at 
the end, my parents gave up and they told me "Yeah, I'm from Ramleh and your 
dad is from Ram eh, etc. etc". [Emphasis hers] 
[Ayman:] The Second Intifada - it made it feel real. Going back to that idea of 
evidence of what has happened, and that there is something that has happened: 
although I didn't see the Nakba, I related the experience of seeing the suffering 
of the Intifada and the resistance of the Intifada to what it would have felt like to 
be part of the Nakba. Because the way you experience stuff is through making 
relations to experiences you've had before. There was also a TV series, "El-
Taghreebe El-Falasteeniyye," that was broadcast during Ramadan of- I forget 
which year - where they showed the story of the Nakba and what happened and 
that was really strong for me. A couple of scenes hit home for me. 
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25 El-Helm El-Araby, meaning "The Arab Dream," (referencing the dream Pan-Arabism) is an Arabic song released in 
1998, that gained widespread popularity in September of 2000 during the Second Palestinian Intifada. The 
operetta featured singers from each country of the Middle East, representing the ideal of Pan-Arabism that it 
endorsed. 
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These events that strongly echoed and reiterated the memory of the Nakba thus illustrate 
Erikson's crisis in which the need for ideological formation and affiliation became a pressing 
need, and thus compelled Palestinians in the diaspora to internalize the memory of the Nakba, 
who until then had felt a "disconnect" with the narratives of the Nakba and "wanted those 
experiences to be more real". The intifadas and wars that happened within the lifetimes of the 
third generation thus formed individual memories that then created strong ties to the 
overarching collective memory of the Nakba, further perpetuating the same processes of 
conflation and mythologizing that previous generations of Palestinians had performed. 
As a result, the memories of Palestinians, individual, localized, or collective, have 
amalgamated into a narrative of Nakba, loss, and catastrophe. In the same way that belonging 
in the Palestinian identity opens out to other identities, the dogmatic memory of Palestine and 
the Nakba opens out to the individual and localized memories of the various fragments of the 
Palestinian community, yet re-inscribes those memories within the original and all-
encompassing narrative. This positions the collective memory of the Palestinian community as a 
key influence on Palestinian identity and a demarcating signifier of Palestinian authenticity, as it 
includes both the essential narrative of dispossession as well as the ever-expanding tales of 
struggle that simultaneously challenge and reinforce the underlying reality of the Palestinian 
Nakba. 
Hence, one can see that The Nakba, whether it is the Nakba of 1948 or the following lived 
condition of the Nakba and the Palestinian struggle, remains the prevailing narrative of the 
Palestinian identity and creates a distinct memory-identity that carries its own ideologies and 
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symbolic language within the overarching Palestinian identity. Its development from a localized 
collective memory distinctive to the first generation of Palestinian exiles to an overarching and 
all-encompassing narrative in which post-memory and individual memory are continuously in 
dialogue thus creates an intrinsic duality within the national Palestinian identity where 
Palestinians are continuously renegotiating the internal borders of their fixed and essential 
original catastrophe against the changeability and ethereality of their inherited memories. 
Thus, post-memory in the emerging generations of Palestinians is a process of continuous 
opening-out of the original narratives of th~ Nakba so that its significance works to 
simultaneously homogenize and divide the Palestinian identity, as its fixed historical narratives 
compete with the emerging interpretations and experiences of its newer generations in 
defining the essential and authentic qualities of what it means to be Palestinian. 
As a result, the collective memory of the Palestinian community today encompasses far 
more than the narratives of catastrophe and trauma originally referenced in the formation of 
Palestinian identity. In fact, the memory of the Nakba in Palestinian identity today can be said 
to allow Palestinians to "find their agency in a form of the 'future' where the past is not 
originary, where the present is not simply transitory. It is ... an interstitial future, that emerges 
in-between the claims of the, past and the needs of the present," (Bhabha 219, emphasis in 
original) and thus creates an identity that is at once fixed and rooted in the infallible narratives 
of the Nakba, and fluid and open to new and differing experiences of plurality and hybrdity. 
"He loves a country and he leaves. 
[Is the impossible far off?] 
He loves leaving to things unknown. 
By traveling freely across cultures 
those in search of the human essence 
may find space enough for all to convene ... 
Here a margin advances. Or a centre 
retreats. Where East is not strictly east, 
and West is not strictly west, 
where identity is open unto plurality, 
not a fort or a trench 
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Chapter 6. Cultural Pluralism, "Hybrids," and Citizenship Enactments 
If Palestinians could be said to have reached a consensus and understanding of their 
national identity amongst each other, the question then arises of how this nationality is 
translated into visible and recognizable markers that engage with the state and citizens of its 
host countries. When it comes to Palestinians living in the diaspora, particularly for those born 
in exile, competing national identities are a matter of daily occurrence. Furthermore, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, home and belonging are not definite or easily elucidated concepts 
in the case of stateless Palestinian refugees. The lack of statehood, particularly for Palestinians 
descendant from the occupied territories of 1948, therefore creates greater challenges and 
tension in terms of belonging and achieving official and recognized citizenship. 
In addition, if the image of the Palestinian national identity can be understood as 
intrinsically dual, where the Nakba and the cultural heritage of Palestine both equally dictate 
the image of the Palestinian identity, Palestinian identity is then almost entirely determined by 
individuals, as opposed to government institutions or state imposed laws and regulations due 
to its lack of official statehood. In other words, the Palestinian identity in the diaspora is 
composed entirely in the consciousness of its people, where "the question of identity ... has 
become intimately connected to the 'restoration of the individual's subjectivity"' (Sa' di 176) 
without the influence of traditional markers of official Palestinian citizenship or regulated civil 
rights and responsibilities. This is not to say however that Palestinians don't engage with those 
forms of authorized personhood as the achievement of belonging and recognition within host 
countries is imperative to their survival. As a result, Palestinians engage with the concepts of 
citizenship and official nationality in ways that result in plural cultural identities, whilst 
maintaining distinct differences in their national identities and allegiances. 
Performativity and National Cultural Identities 
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As demonstrated in Chapter 3, identity is composed of various intersecting modes of 
identification that include an individual's gender, class, sexuality, beliefs, etc., and that render 
self-identification as a process of layering and interlocking of various identities to create a 
singular and cohesive individual identity. Similarly, nationalism and nationhood require the 
creation of an imagined community where an image of the nation, and thus its national 
identity, is constructed out of the various ideologies, hegemonies, traditions, and heritage of a 
collective. These include its essential heritage - of ethnicity, language, territory, and genealogy 
- as well as its history, collective memories, and its cultural customs and traditions. 
In her writings on queer theory, Judith Butler posits that gender identity is performative, 
where "to say that gender is performative is to say that it is a certain kind of enactment; the 
'appearance' of gender is often mistaken as a sign of its internal or inherent truth; gender is 
prompted by obligatory norms to be one gender or the other (usually within a strictly binary 
frame), and the reproduction of gender is thus always a negotiation with power". (i) This 
suggests that identity - particularly gender identity - is never a latent and "essential" 
component of a person's being, but is always a matter of choice, action, and performance. 
Butler's argument frames gender identity within the discourses of power, where markers of 
gender - both in the physical characteristics of the body and in the behaviors and presentations 
of that body- constitute a language of being. This language is then further encoded and 
decoded within society's matrices of meaning-making and within society's hegemonic and 
ideological understandings of sex, gender, and gender roles. 
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Similarly, national identity also carries performative potential, where the ethnic and 
essential physical markers of the body are considered as signs of an inherent truth that is 
validated (or not) through further reflections of the nation's collective image in the individual 
self - namely through performing the behaviors and norms that are indicative of that 
collective's ideologies and hegemonies. This implies that, for example, color is the 
"appearance" of a person's race and ethnicity, yet their performance - the way they dress, 
speak, behave etc. - supplements that information in ways that consolidate their racial and 
national identities. It is these performed signs that thus constitute a language of being a 
national. However, it is important to note that these signs are by their nature socially and 
conceptually produced, where a person's dialect for instance is a characteristic that is learned 
and acquired from the society in which they reside rather than an inborn trait. As a result, being 
a national identity requires access to a society's cultural identity in order to acquire such 
markers of belonging. National cultural identity, and the acquisition of these signs, thus 
grounds national identity within the individual body and within personal identity, and thus 
allows members of a national community to actively embody, represent, and perform their 
identities. 
As with the possibilities for the emergence of imagined communities that do not 
constitute nations, cultural identity exists both within and without the discourses of 
nationalism. Therefore, it is important to note that where cultural identity can encompass any 
selection of cultural markers, be they "native" or "foreign," national cultural identity is 
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constructed out of the culture that is understood to belong to a collective due to its pervading 
historical presence, folklore, and traditions etc. In the idea of national cultural identity then is a 
strong implication of essential authenticity, where cultural markers such as accents and dialect, 
modes of dress, traditional rituals, etc. are considered to inherently belong to a community by 
virtue of its existence, and are considered "naturally'' inherited much the same way that ethnic 
physical distinctions are naturally inherited. Therefore, where common genealogy and ancestry 
foster feelings of fraternity and solidarity within a national collective, shared cultural signs and 
traditions reflect that solidarity and locate it within a national narrative through various modes 
of ownership such as the institutionalization of traditions, the passing down of heritage, etc. 
Hence, if national identity can be deconstructed into the individual and the collective, the 
essential and the fluid, the universal and the particular, cultural identity can be understood to 
include similar dynamics and spectrums of identification. 
Cultural Capital 
Cultural identity can be understood as the amalgamation of common markers of 
belonging to a collective, with national cultural identity further specifying the types of markers 
used to distinguish a national collective as opposed to other types of collectives and 
communities. The "image" of a cultural identity then is composed of the cultural capital that is 
common to that collective culture, and can be both tangible, as in the cultural products that are 
unique to a particular group, or intangible, so that it is "the cultural knowledge and 
competencies that an individual holds, but which are not necessarily articulated by society in 
formal manners". (Karim 147) 
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In his examination of cultural identities, Pierre Bourdieu defines cultural capital as "the 
collection of symbolic elements such as skills, tastes, posture, clothing, mannerisms, material 
belongings, credentials, etc. that one acquires through being part of a particular social class". 
("Cultural Capital") He argues that cultural capital can be embodied, as in the accents and 
dialects of a community, objectified, in products that carry symbolic cultural meaning, and 
institutionalized, as in the validating degrees and certificates that indicate the level of cultural 
capital acquired by an individual. ("Cultural Capital") Thus cultural capital provides individuals 
with the language of performing identity through its embodied, objectified, and 
institutionalized signs of belonging and is therefore vital to achieving belonging in an imagined 
community. It provides the language for decoding, absorbing, and performing the imagined 
consciousness of a nation in its heritage and traditions, and thus allows individuals to gain 
membership and recognition within that imagined community. 
Cultural capital in a national collective is therefore a fundamental component of its 
identity and its imagined communities, as it is one of the ways by which the image. of the nation 
is reflected and in fact performed in the daily lived experiences of its people. Cultural capital 
thus becomes embodied, objectified, and institutionalized into performative signs that 
individuals can constantly "read" and identify in their interactions with one another. As a result, 
it can be argued that cultural capital offers individuals various ways of performing belonging as 
well as identifying it in one another, so that just as ethno-specific features such as dark/fair skin 
are "read" as markers of race, the cultural capital of an accent, a kofeyye, or a passport become 
markers of national affiliation. 
The Role of Cultural Capital 
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Hence, the performativity of cultural capital in a national identity allows it a far greater 
degree of agency than essential markers of ethnicity, as it can be selectively performed 
depending on the situations individuals find themselves in and the collectives to which they 
wish to belong at any given moment. For a nation such as Palestine, in which the physical 
features of its members vary widely and are not explicitly distinctive, cultural capital therefore 
becomes vital in the processes of connecting the national image to the individual members of 
that community, and recognizing members of the Palestinian nationalism. This results in a 
heightening of the significance of Palestinian cultural capital in the Palestinian identity, as it 
becomes the most effective means of recognizing, performing, and claiming belonging within 
the Palestinian nationalism. 
[Haya:] Even with Arabs, I think I feel very different as a Palestinian from the 
others. It could be as simple as, you know, our accents are different, our food is 
different, our traditions and weddings and things like that are different. So we 
may be all from that country - or from the original pan-Arab area - but it is a 
very distinct cultural identity. 
[Ayman:] I don't speak Lebanese, my parents don't speak Lebanese. We're 
Palestinians, why should we speak Lebanese? And it does make a difference. 
Look - anything that you share with another person, culture, identity, makes a 
difference. I am different with my Arab friends than I am with my non-Arab 
friends. The more you can relate with another person, the more you can 
connect. I feel more connected with a Palestinian refugee than with an Algerian 
Arab. And I feel more connected with an Algerian Arab than, let's say, a South-
Asian etc. These commonalities make a difference in how connected you feel. 
[Haitham:] Those moments are very much part of what gives me belonging. I 
take pride that the "Kna/eh el-Nabulsiyyeh26" is the best one, and it's Palestinian. 
I always say it's better than the Lebanese Knafeh. Because, you know, they cook 
the best, but our Knafeh is better. I know some Gazan dishes, Summa'eyya27 etc. 
26 Kena/eh (Arabic: ~\.A, pronounced: kanafah), also spelled knafeh, kunafeh, or kunafah, is a traditional Arab 
cheese pastry soaked in sweet syrup thought to have originated from the city of Nablus, Palestine, and popular in 
the eastern Mediterranean cuisines. 
27 Summa'eyya (Arabic: 'Y!~) and Ma'loobeh (Arabic: ~fo) are both traditional recipes part of the Palestinian 
cuisine. 
So that's part of it. But also studying the history and being politically active also 
contributes to· me feeling that I belong there. The more I know about Palestine, 
the more I feel a sense of belonging. 
[Carla:] Yes! This is Palestinian culture, this all about what we are other than the 
fact that - listen there are two sides of our culture, we take out the war, the 
injustice, the bloodshed, but we also have other ways of remembering our land. 
This picture of dabke28 is, like, epic. It shows you first the Palestinian thoub29, the 
Palestinian kofeyye, Palestinian embroidery. This is our culture. And add to that 
the dabke which is - we're the leading nation in dabke if you will. I'm actually in 
a dabke troupe, but it's not Palestinian. They're Lebanese, Syrians, and I'm the 
Palestinian. There's also our food! El-Ma'loobeh25 - typical Palestinian. This is our 
culture. There's always the bloodshed and injustice as I said and all that but we 
also have to not forget our roots and the cultural beauty of Palestine. So for 
instance, the thoub. When we were kids, whenever we had guests coming over 
my mom would always wear e/-thoub - the embroideries, the colors, you feel 
grand when you wear that. And of course nothing compares to the Palestinian 
kofeyye. This is our struggle, our revolution, but also our culture. 
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In their responses, participants reflect on the various markers of Palestinian identity that are 
considered "authentic" or essential to Palestine, and thus define their Palestinian identities 
through their accents and dialect, the cuisine, the embroidery, the kofeyye etc. The sentiments 
of pride and ownership expressed by the participants therefore indicate that these signs of 
Palestinian cultural capital are the distinguishing features that demarcate its unique identity 
and its national difference from other Arab and non-Arab identities. Furthermore, the 
participants' responses demonstrate that, similar to the binary of gender identity outlined in 
Butler's theory of perfomativity, cultural capital in the Palestinian community can be classified 
into Palestinian cultural capital versus Other cultural capital (which can be further classified into 
Arab cultural capital and non-Arab cultural capital) that is acquired from their experiences in 
various countries and homes. These distinctions reflect the idea of an "authentic" Palestinian 
28 Refer to Image 7, Appendix D 
29 Thoub (Arabic: y_jJ, pronounced: thawb) is a gown traditionally worn by women in Arab countries. The 
Palestinian thoub is marked by the styles of collars, sleeves, colors, and embroideries that differ from one region to 
the next and are symbolic of the different cultures. 
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identity that is "naturally inherited" versus other "foreign" identities that are "acquired" as a 
result of experience, thus reiterating the binary of essential versus inauthentic qualities within 
the national identity. The "authentic" Palestinian identity, distinguished by discrete Palestinian 
cultural capital, thus becomes the original centre against which Other identities are defined and 
separated. 
This process of othering is reflected in the ways participants read and perform cultural 
capital, as their responses not only indicate the prevalence of Palestinian cultural capital in their 
lives, but also elucidate the hierarchies of value into which the various sets of cultural capital 
fall - Palestinian culture being the one they most relate to, followed by Arab culture, and then 
by the different cultures they interact with. For instance, Ayman's explanation of the different 
ways he is able to relate to and connect with members of other nationalisms demonstrates the 
importance and value of the presence of Palestinian cultural identity and Arab cultural identity 
versus Other cultural identities in his achievement of belonging and building meaningful 
relationships within his community. 
In addition, it was important for Ayman to emphasize that his parents don't speak with a 
Lebanese accent, despite having grown up in Lebanon, as a signifier of how strong their 
Palestinian identity is. Similarly, the other participants also compared their Palestinian identities 
to other Arab identities in order to signify their authentic and essential difference. Not only 
does this demonstrate the jealously guarded preservation of Palestinian culture in relation to 
Other cultures, but such perceptions which are highly common in Palestinian communities 
indicate that to the Palestinian community in the diaspora, the closer an individual's identity 
resembles the "authentic" Palestinian cultural identity, the more Palestinian they are, and 
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therefore the more valued their identities within the collective. Cultural capital in the 
Palestinian identity therefore functions both to consolidate national identity through the 
performance of its signifiers and to build connections amongst members of a community and 
establish their "place" within the collective by reflecting their degrees of authenticity. 
Performing Palestinian Identity 
That Palestinian cultural capital dictates the sense of identification that participants feel 
thus reflects its significance in their lives, as they identify as Palestinians first and Other second, 
rendering the Palestinian identity as the primary cornerstone against which their other cultural 
identities are constructed. Nevertheless, embodied and objectified forms of Palestinian cultural 
capital do not fully account for the entirety of the Palestinian cultural identity, no~ are they 
enough for the establishment of a cohesive nationalism. In addition to those forms of cultural 
capital is the side of the Palestinian identity that is preoccupied with its activism and the sense 
of responsibility for achieving social justice. As demonstrated in participants' responses 
throughout the study, discourses of politics, justice, and activism are rampant in Palestinian 
communities, as they are intimately connected to the narratives of the Nakba and the Right of 
Return, and act as substitutes to the inheritance of the land of Palestine. 
Therefore, as the responses of the participants indicate, knowledge and affirmation of 
the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian narrative also become vital knowledge forms of 
cultural capital for the achievement of connections and belonging, whether it is with other 
Palestinians or individuals of other nationalities. As a result, the value of the Palestinian 
narrative as a form of cultural capital becomes a defining signifier in the image of the 
Palestinian identity, and the performed cultural capital of the Palestinian identity become its 
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measurable signifiers. For instance, the wearing of the kofeyye or the use of countless Handala 
products such as key chains and necklaces like the one worn by Haitham become indicators of 
not only the Palestinian nationality of their wearers, but also the individuals' political stance 
and solidarity with the Palestinian cause. 
Conversely, the lack of such knowledge excludes Palestinians from the collective, thus 
creating internal divisions and alienations within the Palestinian identity. 
[Haitham:] I think that if someone who I know is Palestinian doesn't know 
anything about the history or care about anything, I might criticize them for that. 
But I wouldn't say they're not Palestinian. I think people can self-identify 
however they wish, it's no one's business. But if I know someone is originally 
Palestinian and they say they're Canadian or something else, it bothers me. 
They're privileged, that's what bothers me. They're really, really privileged. 
You're here because somebody was expelled, most likely, and you're acting like 
you don't care and you're acting like you're White. 
[Carla:] I can't deal with them. Especially Americans, you know those that go to 
America, who live there, and adopt the accent etc. - I feel that I wouldn't be able 
to connect with them. Especially American-Palestinians or American-Arabs in 
general - when they adopt American culture, they forget their roots. I can't 
connect with people like that. Don't get me wrong, I do have friends who have 
adopted other identities. We bond on so many different levels, but at the same 
time when they say they're American or Jordanian, or anything else, it still 
bothers me. 
The sentiments expressed here thus further illustrate the hierarchies of belonging in which the 
value allocated to an individual's cultural capital and performance relies on the collective's 
values, which in turn are dictated by the collective's degree of acceptance of plurality versus 
authenticity. In this case, the discarding of the "authentic" and essential Palestinian identity of 
an individual in favor of another acquired identity - for instance, identifying as American or 
Jordanian rather than Palestinian - places that individual at one end of a spectrum of 
identification, in opposition to the holistically and exclusionary "authentic" Palestinian identity, 
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thus alienating them from the overarching Palestinian collective. Therefore, while Palestinian 
cultural identity may be multiple and hybrid in its inclusions of foreign cultural capital such as 
multiple languages, passports, etc., it is not without internal boundaries that demarcate 
difference between the "authentic" and the "acquired," ranking them within a hierarchy of 
value rather than merging with other cultural identities in a non-stratified and fluid manner. 
However, this is not to say that it is only through these markers that knowledge of the 
Palestinian narrative, closeness to it, and therefore belonging are measured. Participants in this 
study consistently acknowledged the significance of plurality in their identities, indicating a shift 
in value from a purely "authentic" identity to one that is multitudinous, without entirely casting 
off its Palestinian origin and heritage. This shift therefore allows the Palestinian identity to 
continue to develop and adapt to its surrounding cultures and nations, yet also aids in 
preventing its complete loss and dissolution. Classifications and stratifications of belonging are 
thus established where different expectations of different groups set different standards of 
how much Palestinian cultural capital is required for connection, acceptance, and belonging. In 
individuals of Palestinian origin for instance, all forms of essential markers and Palestinian 
cultural capital become necessary for complete acceptance and belonging to the Palestinian 
community, whereas for non-Palestinian Arabs fewer markers of solidarity are expected for 
building meaningful connections, and even less are required of non-Arabs. 
"Othering" Palestinian Culture 
It is important to note however that just as the presence of Palestinian cultural capital in 
an individual's identity influences the measure of his/her acceptance and belonging within the 
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Palestinian collective, it also works in reverse to hinder their achievement of belonging within 
other national collectives and communities. 
[Kismet:] In terms of the Palestinian culture, in terms of poetry, and books, that's 
almost entirely what I read. It's what I like to read. I love reading history. And I 
know it sounds odd, because I tried to get a friend to read a book and he couldn't 
understand why I liked it so much - it's so sad and full of suffering. And what I 
think is that for him, it's a book. For other people, it's what actually happened to 
them, it's the story of their lives. It's hard to explain sometimes to people here in 
Canada to whom the Palestinian story is a totally new concept. To them, it's just 
a story, it's not a reality and you have to explain it to them. I find that part a little 
bit tough, because you're telling someone about how great this book or poem is 
and they can't relate to it. That frustrates me. I do feel more understood by 
other Palestinians because this struggle shaped my life. So the way my life runs is 
based on what I believe in, in terms of justice for Palestine and for others. The 
average Canadian citizen here doesn't know about any of these struggles and 
when I try to explain it to them it seems that it takes a lot of effort for them to 
understand. And it's basically because "'elly 'eedo be/may moo met/ elly 'eedo 
belnar''30• And they never experienced it or met anybody who experienced it. 
They were never friends with anyone who experienced injustice, even though 
here there are many injustices against the natives. But again, it takes a special 
type of person to question these things, the majority of the people don't 
question these things; and you find that most of the people who do have 
experienced injustice. So usually it's easier to explain things to people who are at 
least familiar with these concepts. So I've learned that just because someone is 
an Arab doesn't mean they understand the degrees and types of injustices 
happening, whereas left-leaning Canadian activists who are more politically 
literate could sometimes grasp the situation better, because of their political 
awareness. 
[Carla:] Of course, of course it makes a difference. It's unbelievable. Even though 
we've barely known each other, I can talk to you as if I've known you for years. 
It's weird. We have something in common and it's golden for both of us. We 
have something to relate to. We have the same stories, even the same things to 
share about; the same passion. If someone 'ajnabi31 asks me, "Where are you 
from?" "I'm from Palestine." [Says carelessly] "Oh Ok." You know? "Next." It 
doesn't mean anything for them, Palestine. That's probably it, I feel that they 
don't understand when I say Palestine. When you speak about Palestine, I'm like 
"wow-yes, this person knows". We share the same knowledge of the suffering, 
30 Arabic proverb: "he whose hand is in the water is unlike he whose hand is in the fire," meaning that suffering is 
less meaningful to those who hear about it, whilst living safely away from its reality, than to those who experience 
it firsthand. 
31 
'Ajnabi (Arabic: ~1), meaning "foreigner", is mainly used to denote outsiders or non-Arabs. 
the politics, but also the beautiful culture of it. So I feel that it lacks in other 
friendships. They lack something. 
[Haitham:] There's definitely something missing, they're not Palestinian at the 
end of the day. 
As the participants' responses indicate, Palestinian cultural capital does not only work to 
provide Palestinians with a sense of belonging to the Palestinian identity and a medium of 
connection amongst themselves. The distinctiveness of the Palestinian cultural identity also 
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works as a mechanism of marginalizing and othering Palestinians in their host countries, where 
the Palestinian narrative and Palestinian cultural capital are not adequately or even accurately 
represented in the mainstream culture, and do not exist in the imagined communities of the 
nations in which they reside. The fact that "it takes a special type of person" to understand, 
recognize, and reflect back the values and markers of cultural capital that constitute Palestinian 
identity demonstrates the difficulties Palestinians face in forming connections in which they 
feel fully recognized, accepted, and "at home". As a result, Palestinians feel the strongest sense 
of connection and belonging to communities and individuals where their Palestinian cultural 
capital - a vital and necessary component of their national image - is reflected back to them. 
Hence, cultural capital functions as the language through which the national cultural 
identity of the Palestinian identity is lived and performed. It thus provides individuals with a 
sense of their own identities and belonging, and allows members of a collective to recognize 
one another through the performances of their cultural identities. However, this also results in 
the emergence of dichotomies of authentic/inauthentic identities that create internal divisions 
within the Palestinian collective, and that work to marginalize and alienate Palestinians in their 
host homes. This reiterates the argument discussed in Chapter 4 where the internal boundaries 
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of identity for Palestinians in the diaspora that separate their Palestinian-ness from their other 
identities can never be erased to allow a free-flow of cultural capital, but remain as semi-
permeable borders that can only be reshaped by coming into contact with the identities of their 
host countries. The Palestinian identity can therefore never be fully reflected in another 
country's imagined community but requires its own nation in order to be holistically 
represented. As a result, Palestinians can only see the parts of their identities that coincide with 
other national narratives reflected within the nationalisms of their host countries, and it is 
therefore only in parts that they can achieve belonging. 
Cultural Capital and Effective Citizenship 
If belonging to an imagined community is a matter of consciousness, where membership 
is achieved by reflecting a nation's essential qualities, collective memory, and its national 
cultural identity, citizenship becomes the official and authorized form of recognizing that 
membership. It provides individuals with an acknowledged sense of belonging and participation 
in the community as it "refers to a status entailing a set of rights [and responsibilities] both 
claimed by and bestowed upon all members of a political community". (Pakulski 73) Citizenship 
thus becomes the validated representation of an imagined community's presence - it 
recognizes the parameters of a community's identity and translates its values and traditions 
into institutionalized, regulated, and authorized rights and responsibilities. Consequently, the 
citizenship role participates in the cultural capital of a nation's imagined community in order to 
certify and validate membership and create a sense of belonging within its community. As a 
result, national cultural capital becomes a necessary implement for individuals to achieve not 
only belonging and recognition in the consciousness of their communities, but also in achieving 
138 
and performing belonging as a lived condition, as it becomes the currency through which both 
implicit belonging and official citizenship are attained. 
It is important to note however that belonging to a cultural identity and attaining 
citizenship are not equal. The distinctions between cultural identity and citizenship that 
differentiate between membership at a cognitive level versus membership at an officially 
recognized level lie in the types of cultural capital required for achieving those two forms of 
belonging. As demonstrated thus far, the cultural capital required for achieving belonging to the 
cultural identity of a community lies in its national symbols and heritage. Citizenship, on the 
other hand, 
involves a range of forms of tacit knowledge, competence and taken-for-granted 
assumptions. Citizens must know how to engage in citizenship activities. They require 
basic working knowledge of the political system and skills in accessing and processing 
information, interpreting political talk, and debating public issues. All of this must be 
contained in the taken-for-granted knowledge which comprises their (shared) lifeworld. 
(Karim147) 
This indicates that cultural capital in the form of the tacit knowledge that is particularly linked 
to the citizenship role and civil behavior as opposed to cultural identity is "vital to having 
effective citizenship". (Karim 147) Therefore, the acquisition of such cultural capital in addition 
to the acquisition of a nation's cultural identity thus becomes imperative to achieving effective 
citizenship. 
However, if the cultural capital necessary for attaining membership in an imagined 
community and achieving effective citizenship resides in the consciousness of that community, 
the question then arises of how it is then to be acquired, decoded, internalized, performed, and 
engaged with by members of that community at the level of lived experience rather than 
merely as a conceptual and imagined representation. One of the ways of engaging with and 
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acquiring a community's cultural capital is through participation in its Habermasian "public 
sphere," as "citizenship rights are currently expanding towards a new domain of cultural rights 
that involve the right to symbolic presence, dignifying representation, propagation of identity 
and maintenance of lifestyles. This reflects the crisis of welfarism, the 'shrinking of the state', 
and the expansion of the public spheres". (Pakulski 73) 
Habermas's "public sphere" provides a space that allows "citizens [to] deliberate about 
their common affairs, and hence [is] an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction," (Fraser 
110) where a space in which equal and informed engagement is practiced through the medium 
of deliberative discourse. As a space in which the "right to symbolic presence, dignifying 
representation, propagation of identity and maintenance of lifestyles" (Pakulski 73) is achieved, 
the public sphere thus provides the space in which cultural capital is acquired and negotiated. It 
allows for individuals to interact with the dominant ideologies and hegemonies of a community 
in ways that challenge and subvert the prevailing discourse, and in fact arguably provides the 
space in which an imagined community is created and disseminated. 
Such interaction is facilitated by the distinction of the public sphere from the 
frameworks of a marketplace, by placing value on "debating and deliberating," rather than 
"buying and selling," (Fraser 111) and, perhaps more importantly, by distinguishing between 
the "public" and the "private" spaces. As a result, the negotiations over which types of cultural 
capital are valued and diminished, included and excluded, and which ideologies and 
hegemonies are challenged or not, ultimately occur in a nation's public sphere(s). The public 
sphere can therefore provide the space where the values of essentialism and authenticity to an 
imagined community are determined, and where markers of belonging are dictated by a 
discursive public. 
Power in the Public Sphere 
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The governance of a public sphere, whether state or self- governance, thus becomes 
crucial in the negotiations over ideology, hegemony, cultural capital, and belonging. Despite its 
capacity for plurality and the challenging and subverting of ideologies due to its openness and 
its deliberative qualities, Fraser demonstrates that the Habermasian public sphere remains 
constrained within the dominant and instinctively adhered-to narratives and frameworks of 
society. Writing that the Habermasian public sphere is bound by "an ideal of unrestricted 
rational discussion of public matters ... [where the] discussion was to be open and accessible to 
all, [and] merely private interests were to be inadmissible," (113) Fraser reveals that the illusory 
boundaries between "public" and "private" rationalize the differences between "admissible" 
and "inadmissible" discourse to the public sphere, and thus are complicit in reaffirming 
normalized hegemonies and ideologies. As such, participation in the public sphere allows 
individuals to acquire knowledge and cultural capital, yet it is also premised on a taken-for-
granted threshold of cultural capital that is based on the "reason" and normative 
understandings of the existing hegemony. It thus requires instinctive and unspoken 
understandings of what is and isn't admissible in the discourse of a public space as opposed to a 
private space, and therefore limits the scope of interaction and deliberation by constraining its 
subjects of discourse only to those admissible in a "public" space. 
Thus, as Fraser illustrates, the inability of the public sphere to effectively transcend the 
divisions of gender, class, race, sexuality- also affected by the rationality of the engaged 
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"public" - creates a "discourse of publicity touting accessibility, rationality, and the suspension 
of status hierarchies [that is] deployed as a strategy of distinction". {115) That is to say that the 
conceptual framework of a public sphere in fact could not apply in its reality, where "declaring 
a deliberative arena to be a space where extant status distinctions are bracketed and 
neutralized is not sufficient to make it so". (Fraser 115) As a result, the "reason" that governs 
Habermas's public sphere dictates the discourses, participants, and subjects of that sphere in 
normative ways that could not provide the space needed for the renegotiation of normative 
ideals. 
As a result, Fraser proves that a singular universalizing public sphere is an ineffective 
and insufficient tool for the creation of such powerful and all-encompassing concepts as 
nationalism. She suggests that "alternative publics" are more effective in providing spaces for 
the renegotiations of normative discourse. Fraser's "alternative publics" constitute "subaltern 
counterpublics in order to signal that they are parallel discursive arenas where members of 
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional 
interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs''. (Fraser 123, emphasis in original) In a 
sense, these alternative publics then feed into subaltern imagined communities - the 
commonalities being in the marginalized discourses that these counterpublics engage in. 
Similarly, in his article, "The Elusiveness of Full Citizenship: Accounting for Cultural Capital, 
Cultural Competencies, and Cultural Pluralism," Karim H. Karim posits the notion of "public 
sphericules" to denote the sub-cultures and sub- public spheres that arise within the dominant 
public sphere of a collective. In looking at the public sphere, Karim notes that 
[t]hose whose membership is drawn from elite groups generally have easier access to 
the larger public sphere since the discourses with which they articulate issues have 
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often become entrenched in society through the ability of these groups to dominate 
public culture .... Non-elite groups tend to lack such cultural capital. They have to work 
much harder to be able to access public discourses and to participate in broader societal 
arenas. {153) 
Thus these distinctions, where the discourse of a public sphere is regulated by the divisions of 
"public" and "private," and where access to the discourse itself is predicated by prior 
knowledge and understandings of the hegemonic cultural capital of a society, fail to fully 
emancipate the Habermasian public sphere from the normative ideologies and hegemonies of 
society - namely the bourgeois, masculinist frameworks that shaped it. 
Thus the governing frameworks of the public sphere render its construction of a 
nationalism "as a fabrication of elite groups ... [where] these elites seek to manipulate the 
masses by inventing traditions. They link the masses to the past, in order to legitimize their hold 
on power and to divert the social grievances of the masses against foreign states, thus foiling 
both revolutionary processes and democratization". (Litvak 6) Therefore, if the public sphere is 
only accessible to the elite class - or what Stuart Hall terms as the "power-bloc," then "public 
sphericules" can be seen as "the sites where the struggle for and against a culture of the 
powerful is engaged," (Hall, "Notes on Deconstructing the Popular'' 71) they are not spheres 
where a fully formed, unambiguous culture can be expressed, but rather provide a space where 
that culture can be constituted. 
National Public Spheres and Palestinian Sphericules 
Hence the public sphere can be understood as a space in which dominant ideologies and 
hegemonies are discursively constructed by the elite power-bloc and thus dictate the national 
identity of a community as it is determined by a select few, and that public sphericules or 
subaltern publics provide the spaces in which alternative identities are constituted and 
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performed. However, the Palestinian identity in the diaspora refutes the popular conception 
that nationalism is "instilled and passed on only by ruling elites. In this regard, the 
Palestinians-both 'inside,' in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, and 'outside,' in the diaspora-
are an exception, since they have never lived under sovereign Palestinian rule". (Milshtein 71) 
As a result, the culture of Palestinians in the diaspora can thus be seen as one that is 
constituted in both the public spheres of their host countries, and the public sphericules of 
Palestinian communities. 
This varies the discourses in which the Palestinian identity participates, allowing it to 
accrue the cultural capital of both the nationalisms of its new homes, as well as the ideologies 
of its own collective. However, the lack of institutionalized forms of disseminating knowledge 
about Palestine (such as museums and school curriculums in which its history would be taught, 
etc.), along with the lack of a national home in which the community would be united, have 
circumvented the emergence of a unified Palestinian public sphere. Therefore, if the national 
public sphere demarcates what knowledge is "public" and what knowledge is "private" in a 
nation's discourse and its identity, then in all countries other than Palestine, Palestinian cultural 
capital is marginalized in relation to the nation's own discourses and is thus relegated to 
"private" spheres and/or subaltern counterpublics. 
As a result, Palestinian homes and communities in the diaspora represent sphericules in 
which the Palestinian identity is deliberated, enacted, and performed; and it is therefore in 
these spaces that the discursive spheres of communication in which the Palestinian identity is 
constructed arise. It is important to note however that within those private spheres, the same 
power dynamics and frameworks of inclusion and exclusion of certain discourses also arise, so 
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that the inherent hierarchies of value that are present in the Palestinian national and cultural 
identity receive corresponding value in the deliberative spaces of those spheres. The tacit 
knowledges of the Palestinian identity thus become the implicit conditions of being Palestinian, 
and are represented in the language spoken, the food that is prepared, and the customs that 
are followed etc., whereas the discourses of memory, the Nakba, and politics, etc. are included 
in the deliberative spaces of the communities. 
[Ayman:] Take the dabke for instance. It's culture. I don't dance it unfortunately, 
I haven't actively tried to learn it, but it's definitely something I like and see as a 
symbol of culture. The dresses on the men and women are very traditional. 
Dabke invokes happiness for me, I guess that's because it's what we usually do 
during weddings and celebrations. Now, it's important for us to maintain our 
culture and to not totally lose it, because it's the untold story if you will. It's 
untold - it's invisible in that, for instance, my parents haven't taught me dabke, 
but they've told me about our political history. I wasn't around for the Nakba, I 
don't think that any parents sit down and show their kids evidence of what 
happened during the Nakba, but the dabke is evidence that there is in fact a 
Palestinian identity. It's not that it's neglected, but in terms of dabke ... there's 
nothing to tell. I physically see dabke, or eat the food, there's no need for 
anyone to tell me that this is Palestinian. But I need to be told about the Nakba. 
Our cultural identity is ongoing, it's what I eat every day, I can experience it all 
the time. What you can't experience has to be told to you or else you wouldn't 
find out about it. 
Ayman's examples of how he has experienced Palestinian culture through food and dabke 
versus the ways he's learned of the Nakba demonstrate the difference between the 
deliberative qualities and the essential and fatalistic qualities of the spaces in which Palestinian 
identity is constructed - the cultural capital of performed heritage such as dialect, food, 
clothing, and cultural customs is taken-for-granted and is thus rendered "invisible," whereas 
the intangible heritage of the Nakba and its associated collective memories is necessarily 
relegated to a discursive space that is open to discussion of the past, history, and politics. As a 
result, the heritage of cultural capital such as the Nakba through a discursive space results in 
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the emergence of post-memory where the collective memories of the Nakba are reinterpreted 
by the newer generations, as opposed to the tacit knowledges that remain unchallenged due to 
their invisibility in the deliberative sphericules of Palestinian communities. 
Negotiating a Palestinian Public Sphere 
Due to the geographical distances and the dispersal of the Palestinian nation, and the 
limitations to access imposed by their diaspora, the creation and dissemination of the 
Palestinian knowledge that is necessary for participation in its discursive spheres become 
dependent on active personal interest. This causes Palestinians to turn not only to their older 
generations for information about Palestine, but also to forms of communication that can 
expand their deliberative discourses beyond the private spheres of their homes and 
communities. As a result, written works - such as histories and literature - that could be more 
widely accessed become the educational tools that Palestinians in the diaspora rely on for 
gaining access into Palestinian discourse. Furthermore, in recent years, social media has also 
become a large influence in creating a Palestinian discursive public sphere, in which Palestinians 
all over the world could participate in debating and constructing their identities. 
[Haya:] I started asking a bit more about our family history and our stories about 
our time there. But I also felt that our experience in Palestine may not have been 
as representative of most other Palestinians' experiences - there were so many 
different experiences. So I actually turned a little bit to Palestinian literature, in 
translation or in Arabic, poetry and stories by Palestinian writers. And I also turned 
a little bit to, just, you know, histories written either by Arab historians or British 
historians or whatever, to, you know, get different facts and information about 
Palestine in the twentieth century. 
[Kismet:] I love reading about Palestine, in terms of politics and in terms of other 
forms of cultural resistance. And I try to stay involved as much as I can, not only 
involved in going to events here - because I'm well connected with Palestinians 
here and in Gaza and in Syria and lots of other places, I feel it plays a very 
important role, because everything I know about what's going on inside Gaza or 
inside Palestine, I know it through Facebook. And everything that's going on 
here, I know it through Facebook. I guess when I was younger, a teenager, it 
wasn't real as it is right now. I still sympathized but not in the same way. Even 
before 2008, just the level of awareness, maturity, and having time to actually sit 
and think - it started in 2006 and Lebanon, but at that point in my life I didn't 
have time to be actually involved. That's when I started getting angry, and then a 
big part of it was actually SAIA32 at UofT. After I saw that there were so many 
activities going on, I wanted to be part of it. And then little bit by little bit, I felt 
like this is what I want to do. Not because I feel obligated, but because it makes 
me happy. But I would say that 2008/9 Gaza33 was a major turning point. Before 
that, I would go to events if I had time. After that, I would make time. 
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The forms of participation referenced by the participants thus become of particular importance 
for Palestinians living in the diaspora, as the public sphere of each host nation dictates the 
degree of inclusion of the Palestinian identities of its members. Where the Palestinian identity 
is one that is excluded from the national narrative of their host countries, Palestinians in the 
diaspora turn to the subaltern publics of organizations such as SAIA in order to deliberate, 
construct, and represent their identities. In addition, the public sphere offered by the internet 
and social media provides a space that is not bound by any particular national cultural capital, 
and thus affords Palestinians access to the discourses in which their identities and cultures can 
be reflected and performed. 
However, this is not to say that the public sphere of host nations is always exclusionary 
to the Palestinian identity and its relevant discourses. The public spheres of "immigrant 
countries" such as Canada and Australia provide Palestinians, and most other migrant 
32 The student organization, "Students Against Israeli Apartheid" (SAIA), is a sub-organization of the Coalition 
Against Israeli Apartheid (CAIA), and "is a network of university students, faculty and staff working to raise 
awareness about Palestine and Israeli Apartheid as well as the need to sever economic ties between campuses and 
the support for Israeli state policies. We are connected with the growing Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions 
Movement against Israeli Apartheid. SAIA also organizes the annual Israeli Apartheid Week". ("Students Against 
Israeli Apartheid") 
33 Referring to "Operation Cast Lead" which took place from December 2008 to January 2009 
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identities, access to the public sphere in ways that recognize their own native identities whilst 
allowing for a dialogue with the national identity of their host communities. 
[Haya:] I don't think that they contradict each other, or that one is at the 
expense of the other, simply because I feel that the Canadian identity has room 
in it for you to be another and Canadian, which I don't feel is the same for other 
countries that are more homogenous. I don't feel any less Palestinian because 
I'm Canadian. I think, with the Canadian narrative, you are an outsider, you are a 
person who's come from a different country, and so a lot of the Canadian ways 
of being and traditions and the things that they identify with are also things that 
are for immigrants and not necessarily for people who are born Canadian. I feel 
like they're all hybrid in the end, you know. Thanksgiving is not necessarily the 
way that - there's no one way to do thanksgiving. In my family for example, 
when we do thanksgiving, we do it with our own Palestinian food, we still use the 
occasion to give thanks for whatever blessings we have, but we don't tie it to the 
history of the settlers and the pilgrims and all that which is - it's American and 
not even Canadian. So I think we co-opt what we want to from our culture and 
Canadian culture and we still feel that it's no less Canadian and no less 
Palestinian. 
As demonstrated by Haya's response, Palestinians living in Canada thus feel a greater degree of 
autonomy and empowerment in its public sphere, as its normative ideologies and hegemonies 
automatically afford room for migrant identities such as the Palestinian identity within the 
discourses of Canadian nationalism and Canadian national identity. The fact that "there is no 
one way to do thanksgiving" implies that the exchange of cultural capital that occurs as 
Palestinians and other migrant identities "co-opt" aspects of the different cultural identities 
present within the Canadian public sphere allow them to perform their identities in new and 
unexpected ways (such as celebrating thanksgiving with Palestinian food) that enhance their 
sense of belonging. As a result, the Palestinian cultural identity begins to accrue new cultural 
capital from its host nationalism in ways that expand its plurality, whilst maintaining its 
authenticity. 
Yet despite their ability to perform their Palestinian identities in the Canadian public 
sphere, participants acknowledged that there are also limits to the engagement of the 
Palestinian identity in Canadian discourse and politics. 
[Kismet:] When I have to listen to Harper, Kenney, or Baird speak about the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict it makes me really angry, because they don't represent 
all Canadians. So I don't think that there's a conflict between my Palestinian and 
Canadian identity, it's just that these people exist in this place, and they don't 
represent me. So I wouldn't say that it conflicts, I would say that Canadian 
politicians and people who carry those ideas make me angry and I try to avoid 
them. 
[Ayman:] I'm angry when Harper makes statements that don't represent me, 
because I'm a Canadian too. As much as I'm a Palestinian, I'm a Canadian too. 
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These limitations further emphasize the normative divisions between the discourses that are 
allowed to participate in shaping national identity, and where the Palestinian identity continues 
to be marginalized. However, despite its tendency to perpetuate normative ideologies and 
hegemonies, the importance of an overarching public sphere in which the unification of 
alternative publics under the umbrella of nationalism is facilitated remains undiminished. The 
creation of solidarity and cohesion amongst the different subaltern counterpublics and their 
incorporation into the dominant discourse becomes essential in order to shape effective 
nationality. 
It is not enough however for a public to reach a consensus over its ideologies and 
hegemonies in order to establish a distinct nationalism -formalization of those conclusions is 
necessary for the creation of a nation. The translation of a public sphere's consensus into 
nationhood therefore requires the formation of state apparatuses that sanctify its ideologies 
and hegemonies into measurable parameters of belonging. Citizenship therefore also becomes 
a construction where the "bestowing and granting of rights should be viewed as a complex 
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process, in which the content and scope of claimed rights for protection, recognition, provision, 
etc., on the one hand, and the content of rights that are recognised as legitimate by the state 
and effectively sanctioned on the other, may differ". (Pakulski 73, emphasis in original) 
However, since the Habermasian public sphere cannot provide the adequate space for the 
discursive interaction between these Palestinian subaltern counterpublics and the decision 
makers of the nations in which they reside, different forms of engagement emerge. Different 
modes of communicating in the public sphere that are not bound by the same logic of reason 
that limits discursive engagement are enacted by individuals in order to claim belonging. As a 
result, effective participation in the public sphere necessitates not only the use of discursive 
engagement, but also performing the citizenship role through actively pursuing and acquiring 
the cultural capital of the nation in its various forms. 
Performing Citizenship 
In her article "The Repositioning of Citizenship and Alienage," Saskia Sassen argues that 
citizenship enactments and participation in a nation's public sphere create denationalized 
modes of citizenship that can reaffirm or subvert, at any given time, either a) the 
conceptualized image of a nation, b) the state's institutionalized values, or c) all of the above. 
Sassen illustrates how performance in compliance with a nation's institutionalized values 
secures membership in that nation's imagined community, and affords access to its 
nationalism. These negotiations of granting citizenship and belonging suggest that the relations 
between individuals, imagined communities, and the state lead to a "relationship between 
citizenship and nationality [where] the evolution of the latter [is] towards something akin to 
'effective' nationality rather than as 'alleigance' to one state or exclusively formal nationality". 
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(Sassen 80) Sassen further argues that these modes of engagement with a state's imagined 
community and its conceptual nationalism constitute "denationalized forms of citizenship," (80) 
and thus can be more useful in developing effective nationality than Habermas's discursive 
public sphere alone, rendering the utilization of performance and citizenship enactments a 
necessary mode of participation in a nation's public spheres and decision-making process. 
In the case of Palestinians living in the diapora, the plurality of belonging and 
nationalisms in which they engage necessitates a balancing act between the Palestinian cultural 
identity and their Other cultural identities. Yet in terms of citizenship, the lack of a Palestinian 
state and Palestinian citizenship compels Palestinians in the diaspora to turn to their host 
countries for the rights and freedoms of a citizenship role, and thus the cultural capital 
necessary for performing that role. 
[Haya:] I mean, the way that I feel that I belong to Palestine is much more like we 
said before, in an abstract way - it's the Palestinian identity, and the culture and 
the literature and all of that and the history. It's different from the way I identify 
as belonging to Jordan - which, I know Jordan's streets, I know Jordan's, you 
know, the way of life there and I don't identify with the Jordanian identity per se. 
In Canada it's a bit of both, it's identifying with the culture and the politics and 
the cultural references and things like that, and knowing the city itself. But I also 
feel I belong as a citizen to the country, and I fully identify as a Canadian. I follow 
Canadian politics, and I vote in elections ... I can see my future here. 
[Haitham:] Would I move back to Palestine under the current circumstances if I 
was allowed to go back? No. I see myself as being more effective here. I've been 
involved with the BDS34 movement and it's a huge thing, and I'm very much -
like I said Toronto is now another home. I'm connected to people here, I know 
people and people know me and the community here - I would have to start 
from scratch if I were to go back there, my activism. My Arabic is weak, I can't 
read properly. And the culture is also - culturally different now. I'm making much 
more of a difference here, and for me, I'm not just a Palestine activist. The 
34 
'7he global movement for a campaign of Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BOS) against Israel until it complies 
with international law and Palestinian rights was initiated by Palestinian civil society in 2005, and is coordinated by 
the Palestinian BOS National Committee (BNC), established in 2007. BOS is a strategy that allows people of 
conscience to play an effective role in the Palestinian struggle for justice". ('1ntroducing the BDS Movement") 
majority of what I do is Palestine, but what I've read, what I've studied, what I've 
discussed with other activists - I'm an internationalist. It's not just in Palestine 
that injustices are happening. This is an issue of capitalism, globalization, neo-
liberalism, colonialism, imperialism. So for me, I don't see it as - the way to be 
Palestinian is to go and live there. I see that as more of a nationalist act that's 
legitimate, but at the same time I see a broader analysis than "Palestine" and 
going to live there. There's a responsibility to fight for justice and our rights. We 
have human rights, and that's our responsibility. 
[Ayman:] I work with SAIA, unlike my brothers who have never done any political 
work - or at least they haven't done as much as I have. They're knowledgeable 
about stuff. My dad has always talked about the political parties, Fateh, Hamas, 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, etc. So even though we've 
never lived in Palestine, we're familiar with the politics and the political system. 
But none of that makes me a Palestinian citizen. We can talk about Palestinian 
politics all we want, it still won't change anything in the system. On the other 
hand, I also follow Canadian politics, I'm very active, and I vote in elections. I 
know what's going on in Canada, I've studied the political organization of 
Canada. So of all the countries I'm tied to, the country I have the most stake in is 
Canada - it's the only country I have citizenship in. It's only Canada that I am 
empowered in or that I can participate in. 
As demonstrated by the participants' responses, maintaining a Palestinian identity whilst 
performing a Canadian citizenship thus necessitates a blending of different types of cultural 
capital - where Haya's cultural identity for instance is reliant on the distinctly Palestinian 
151 
knowledge of the traditions and heritage, her knowledge of the Jordanian or Canadian context 
relies on the daily experiences of living in those countries and learning their systems and 
ideologies. Similarly, both Haitham and Ayman illustrate their sense belonging in the Canadian 
identity through their participation in the activities of discursive political engagement that 
would otherwise not be accessible to them. 
Therefore, the involvement of the Palestinian identity and Palestinian cultural capital in 
the Canadian public sphere is reflected in the degree of Palestinian activism that is present in 
the Canadian context, and in this case would imply that the Palestinian sphericules present in 
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Canadian society arguably carry greater power in shaping the ideologies of Canadian culture 
than they would elsewhere. What the responses of the participants illustrate then is that where 
the cultural capital of a nation's cultural identity provides individuals with a sense of 
themselves, their history, and their imagined communities, effective citizenship or citizenship as 
an enabling condition allows them to exercise their membership in ways that validate and 
perpetuate their feelings of belonging. As a result, the performance of citizenship as an 
enabling condition thus becomes key to the development of effective nationality and a stronger 
sense of belonging and home. 
Thus, one can see that it is the relations between the individuals and their surrounding 
community that allow for their integration into the society and their ability to connect to the 
greater overarching nationalism of a country. In other words, it is the engagement of 
individuals with - and performance of - the cultural discourse and capital of a nation that 
determines their belonging and thus provides individuals with "effective citizenship," or 
"effective nationality". The capacities for political engagement that are inherent in citizenship 
as an enabling condition therefore provide individuals with an agency that allows the crossing 
of boundaries of ideological and essential belonging within the nationalism of a given state. 
Thus, the Palestinian identity can be seen as one where Palestinian cultural capital demarcates 
Palestinian cultural identity without preventing its interactions with and assimilations of Other 
cultural capital and identities. Ironically, the value of cultural capital to the Palestinian identity 
thus works to both unify it, through providing discernible and distinct Palestinian cultural 
capital, and to dismantle its cohesiveness as the Palestinian cultural capital of individuals mixes 
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with the cultural capital of their non-Palestinian environments and thus loses value and 
credibility in the Palestinian collective. As a result, the process of Othering in which the cultural 
capital of the Palestinian identity is valued above other types of cultural capital works to 
alienate and further fragment the Palestinian collective, as its uniformity is dissolved in the 
dispersal of Palestinians across the diaspora. 
Furthermore, Palestinians in the diaspora can also be seen to recognize the need for 
belonging in their resettled homes, and are therefore capable of achieving it through the 
combining of the various forms of cultural capital of their environments with their inherited 
Palestinian cultural identities. This process of interweaving of differing cultural capital further 
extends into the ways Palestinians achieve effective citizenship in the nations in which they 
reside as they acquire the languages and cultural capital with which to navigate their various 
public spheres, and thus use those knowledges to negotiate belonging. The acquisition of these 
diverse forms of cultural capital thus provides the Palestinian identity with the tools to adapt to 
its foreign environments whilst still maintaining its distinctive voice and perpetuating its own 
marked identity. 
It can therefore be argued that membership to a nation is achieved through the 
affiliation with its ideological perspectives as demarcated by its cultural capital and the 
connection with its essential characteristics, and that the imagined community's public sphere 
is the space where value of both aspects is negotiated and institutionalized by the nation's 
mechanisms of governance. However, due to the shifting nature of a nation's values and the 
lack of equal and full access to its decision-making process, participation in the public sphere 
becomes a matter of more than talk. It takes on the mode of embodying and enacting the 
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community's values in order to gain membership and recognition in the nation's overarching 
imagined community. 
Therefore, cultural identity - and through it, national identity - inherently represents a 
performative identity that utilizes the signs of cultural capital to demarcate belonging and 
difference. Cultural identity therefore allows individuals a greater measure of agency, as it 
provides them with the opportunities to perform various distinct identities. This is particularly 
useful and significant in the case of the Palestinian identity as its nationalism is composed 
entirely out of the cultural capital of its people in the form of their genealogies, their memories, 
their heritage, and their culture. Therefore, the Palestinian national identity can be understood 
as an intrinsically performative identity that cannot be measured or distinguished in ways other 
than through its enacted cultural capital. As a result of its statelessness and the inescapable 
emergence of plurality in its cultural capital, the Palestinian identity thus becomes even more 
essentially tied to notions of purism and "authenticity'' in validating claims of belonging. . 
Therefore, where the ability of the Palestinian identity to adapt and integrate Other cultural 
identities within its performance allows it a measure of fluidity where it can find belonging in 
any nationalism, it also simultaneously entraps it in a circular quest where the holistic and 
absolute representation of its own identity remains as perpetually elusive as the return to its 
native Palestinian homeland. 
Metonymy was sleeping on the river's bank; 
had it not been for the pollution 
it would have embraced the other side". 
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Elegy for Edward Said 
Mahmoud Darwish 
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Chapter 7. Conclusions and Further Research 
Findings and Results 
In conducting this study, it was my expectation to find that Palestinian national identity 
subsists in a liminal space where it is prevented from moving forwards or backwards due to the 
constraints of its displacement and disenfranchisement, yet where it acquires a high measure of 
fluidity and plurality as it continues to circle in its quest for achieving a stable and grounded 
nationalism. Palestinian identity is rooted in the traditional concepts of nationalism and the 
essential image of Palestine, yet it also encompasses the various experiences of diaspora in 
ways that allow it to transcend the universality of an overarching national identity. This results 
in a cyclical process of identification that starts by valuing essential and traditional qualities, 
expands to include the plurality of experiences of the Palestinian communities, and reverts back 
to the idealized and romanticized desire for "home" in the unrelinquished desire for achieving a 
right of return. 
The findings of this study confirmed my expectations, and indicated that Palestinian 
national identity is firmly rooted in its territoriality, yet has also developed to transcend its 
essential boundaries (of ancestry, genealogy etc.) to connect with, and incorporate, various 
other nationalisms, cultures, and collectives. Palestinians in the diaspora can therefore be seen 
to simultaneously display traits of essential belonging, where authenticity is highly valued in 
their sense of belonging and is identified through their essential ties to their ancestries; and to 
perform a large degree of plurality and hybridity, where citizenship, post-memory, and cultural 
identities of Palestinians are continuously in flux and are influenced by their surrounding 
societies. The understandings of traditional post-colonial nationalism therefore are not 
sufficient in unpacking Palestinian national identity, and require the inclusion of theories of 
belonging, collective memory, and effective citizenship, in order to delineate the Palestinian 
condition. 
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Recommendations for Further Research 
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Among the strengths of this study are that it provides a qualitative analysis of the ways 
Palestinian identity is developed and performed today, thus offering insight into an area of 
study where the research has been lacking. It provides a framework of understanding stateless 
identities as opposed to the typical migrant identities and illustrates the ways traditional post-
colonial nationalism has been influenced by the hyper-globalization of today's world. However, 
in looking at identity, my study has been limited in scope to looking only at national identity as 
a primary point of identification for Palestinians, which relegated all other layers of identity to a 
secondary level of importance. Therefore, various other identifications such as gender, class, 
and religion were only touched upon during the interviews, but not examined in depth. I was 
also limited to looking at only one small fragment of the Palestinian community- those living in 
Toronto - which precluded the ability to look at Palestinian identity as a whole. 
It would therefore be useful to continue the work of this research by looking at the 
various other layers of identification present in Palestinian communities, and to include the 
various fragments of Palestinians. Due to the limitations of access, I was only able to interview 
Palestinians of mid-upper class, living in North America, whereas a more in-depth study of 
Palestinian identity would necessitate the inclusion of Palestinians living in refugee camps, 
Palestinians who have been integrated into the societies of countries in the Middle East, 
Palestinians who have been able to re-settle in the West, and Palestinians who, through the 
work of the UNRWA, have been able to re-settle in South America. 
Conclusion: Confluence in Alienation 
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Palestinian national identity in the diaspora is a complex and indefinable identity in 
which questions of belonging, authenticity, and plurality constantly reconstruct the image of 
the collective Palestinian community. As demonstrated by this study, Palestinian national 
identity is both innate and strongly influenced by the significance of its essential qualities, as 
well as socially produced in that it also relies on the contexts within which value is accorded to 
its various markers. Although Palestinian "blood" is universally considered a determining sign of 
belonging, the internalization of the Palestinian national identity into individuals' own 
identifications necessitates a learning process in which the various markers of Palestinian-ness 
are encoded, decoded, and engaged with in order to construct a Palestinian identity that is 
simultaneously particular and universal. This process results in the heightening of the 
importance of essential and authentic signifiers of the Palestinian identity, where territoriality, 
genealogy, and ancestry confirm an essential belonging to the national Palestinian identity, and 
performance of cultural traditions and participation in collective memories validate authentic 
belonging to the Palestinian cultural identity. 
Therefore, Palestinian identity in the diaspora can be seen to inherently belong to the 
question of authenticity, where belonging to the collective identity is measured through the 
presence and performance of its "authentic" Identifiers as delineated in its national image and 
imagined community. As a result, a hyper-awareness of difference ensues in Palestinian 
communities as well as their host communities, where the essentializing and othering of the 
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Palestinian identity become the primary modes of engagement with it, further emphasizing the 
importance of authenticity in shaping the recognizable and indisputable Palestinian identity. 
However, due to the dispersal and fragmentation of the Palestinian collective, the 
construction of a universal identity is further complicated. The Palestinian national identity is 
one that is irrevocably rooted in its territoriality, as the rupture between the Palestinian 
community and their native homeland has since determined the fate of their nation. As a result, 
questions of "home" and belonging greatly influence the image of the Palestinian identity in its 
collective imagination. On a spectrum of traditional nationalism, transnationalism, diaspora, 
and nomadism, the stateless Palestinian identity can be seen to combine aspects of each mode 
of existence in order to sustain its nationalism across its diaspora and its emerging generations. 
Therefore, "Home" to the Palestinian community is an indefinable space that includes elements 
of their combined experiences, and in which the various "homes" to which Palestinians belong 
are in constant dialogue and negotiation with each other. The statelessness of the Palestinian 
identity thus renders home as a space of porous and semi-permeable fluidity where the various 
homes and experiences of the Palestinian community interact to create an illusory and fleeting 
sense of belonging that remains uprooted from a fixed and definable Home. As a result, the 
boundaries of the Palestinian identity remain unfixed and unfixable, leading to a greater 
reliance on its conceptualized authentic and essential values in order to connect and achieve 
belonging within its communities. 
The condition of exile in the case of Palestinians is therefore further removed and 
distinct from all other forms of transnational mobility as it exists in a tenuous stalemate, unable 
to achieve its own statehood or to assimilate into the cultures and nationalisms of its host 
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communities. Thus, the inevitable plurality of identity in the Palestinian diaspora imposed by its 
exile and statelessness results in a heightened threat of its disappearance, as it cannot be 
perpetuated in the typical nationalism of a state. Authenticity therefore becomes a highly 
valued signifier of Palestinian-ness and the preservation of the "authentic" Palestinian identity 
at the cost of achieving complete belonging in other nationalisms becomes a mechanism of 
self-defence that results in a process of narcissistic self-entrapment where the Palestinian 
identity is encapsulated in the discourses of "pure" authenticity as a means of claiming 
belonging to the Palestinian collective. This further emphasizes the importance of authenticity 
in the Palestinian identity in its struggles to maintain its tenuous boundaries as it is 
continuously relocated within various other nationalisms. 
However, rather than fix Palestinian authenticity in absolute and unchangeable 
signifiers, the multiple consciousness that arises within the Palestinian identity as a result of its 
statelessness leads to a dialogical negotiation of its "authentic" signs. As a result, different 
signifiers of authenticity arise in the various Palestinian communities of the diaspora, leading to 
an increase in the fragmentation and internal alienation of the Palestinian identity. Therefore, 
the creation of a cohesive overarching Palestinian nationalism that ties the fragmented 
Palestinian collective together becomes reliant on the assemblage of these various symbols of 
authenticity into an indisputable and universal Palestinian identity. Authenticity in the 
Palestinian identity thus becomes bound by the universal and indisputable signs of Palestinian-
ness, and the emergence of plurality and hybridity in the identities of Palestinians becomes a 
process that is separate from, but in dialogue with, their "authentic" Palestinian identities. As a 
result, the Palestinian identity resides not in a "third space" of "rhizomatic becoming" and 
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"diasporic perspective," but rather exists in an "alien space" where the process of confluence 
plurality and authenticity in its identity is constantly in flux, and continually leaves its 
parameters unresolved. 
Furthermore, due to the statelessness of the Palestinian identity and the impact of the 
events of 1948 on the trajectory of its nationalism, memories of the Nakba play a significant 
role in shaping Palestinian identity. By providing a common history of displacement and 
struggle, the Nakba simultaneously acts as a universal and all-encompassing memory that 
perpetuates the Palestinian identity, yet that also entraps it within the narratives of the past. 
The Nakba therefore constitutes a sub-identity within the overarching Palestinian identity, 
where the memories of rupture, displacement, and strife are continuously remembered and re-
embedded within the daily experiences of the Palestinian narrative. As a result, the collective 
memory of the Nakba becomes the inherited alternative for the Palestinian nation whose 
homes and land are otherwise inaccessible, rendering the Nakba as an inescapable memory 
that entraps Palestinian identity in its narratives of catastrophe and dispossession. 
However, despite the heightened significance of the universal collective memory of the 
Nakba in shaping Palestinian identity, the emergence of post-memory in its later generations as 
a means of interrogating and reinterpreting the mythology and dogma of the Nakba narrative 
has resulted in an opening-out of the absolute collective memory to new and plural 
possibilities. Where in previous generations the Nakba referred specifically to the historical 
events of the diaspora and the loss of the romanticized and idealized historic Palestine and the 
symbolism associated with those losses, within the generational distance of Palestinian youth 
tod~y the Nakba has come to signify not only the victimization Palestinians,,but also their 
empowerment and activism. 
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In addition, reconciling the traumatic memories of the Nakba with the relatively 
ordinary day-to-day lives of third generation Palestinians in the diaspora today has necessitated 
a crossing over between the discourses of the Nakba as well as the discourses of other parallel 
histories and collective memories, such that "The Nakba" has lost much of its mythological aura 
and has instead become a history among histories of struggle and loss. Thus, the internalization 
of the innately traumatic memories of the Nakba within the identities of Palestinians living in 
the diaspora today has become a process of negotiation and dialogue between various 
narratives of individual and collective memories in order to assemble an accessible 
understanding of the Nakba. As a result, coHective memory and post-memory in the Palestinian 
diaspora perpetuate the processes of authenticating and validating identity - in this case, 
through memory - only to then disrupt and uproot its essential truths through the emergence 
of plurality within its fixed narratives. 
Hence, identity and all its facets can be understood to be fundamentally performative, 
where claiming an identity and belonging to a collective necessitates the internalization of its 
values and understandings, and their reflection in the performance of the individual self. As a 
result, cultural capital, which constitutes the discourse and signs through which identities are 
performed, becomes a vital tool for claiming and enacting identity. In instances where 
universality and authenticity are highly valued as they are in the diasporic Palestinian identity, 
cultural capital then also becomes classified and stratified into distinctions of authentic and 
inauthentic, Palestinian and Other, etc., resulting in greater emphasis on the authenticity of 
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individuals' degree of Palestinian-ness. Thus, the enactment and 'performance of Palestinian 
identity becomes reliant on not only the presence of visible essential ethnic traits and traceable 
Palestinian genealogy, but it also necessitates the performance of embodied, objectified, and 
institutionalized forms of Palestinian culture such as the dialect and accents, cuisine and 
traditions, knowledge of the history and memories, etc. These distinctions thus reflect the idea 
of an "authentic" Palestinian identity that is inherited versus other non-Palestinian identities 
that are "acquired" as a result of experience, further reiterating the binary of essential versus 
inauthentic identities. The "authentic" Palestinian identity, distinguished by Palestinian cultural 
capital, thus becomes the original centre against which Other identities are defined and 
separated. 
Conversely, the agency afforded to identities by the performative nature of cultural 
capital expands their potential for pluralities, as various forms of cultural capital are acquired, 
enacted, and combined. The distinctions between absolute identities - and their absolute 
cultural capital - thus become blurred, as individuals assimilate their inherited and acquired 
cultural capital to shape their own individual identities. This in turn influences the choices 
individuals make in deciding when and where to perform which sets of cultural capital in order 
to claim particular identities to suit their advantage. However, as the cultural capital necessary 
for claiming belonging to a nationalism and enacting its citizenship role is most often in the 
form of tacit knowledge and take-for-granted assumptions, its acquisition and performance 
necessitates a negotiation of the public sphere and sphericules of society in which it is encoded, 
decoded, and disseminated. In the case of Palestinian identity, these negotiations result in 
inclusions and exclusions where the performance of the Palestinian identity in the private 
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sphere utilizes different Palestinian cultural capital than it does in the public sphere -for 
instance, the use of the Palestinian accent and dialect at home becomes an authenticating 
performance of the Palestinian identity, whereas involvement in Palestinian activism and the 
use of objectified markers of the Palestinian identity such as the flag, the kofeyye, Hand ala, etc. 
become the accepted modes of performing Palestinian identity in the public sphere. These 
differentiations further result in the emergence of subaltern publics or Palestinian sphericules 
that are more inclusive of markers of the Palestinian identity, and where Palestinian individuals 
utilize a greater measure of Palestinian cultural capital in order to claim, recognize, and validate 
their belonging to the overarching Palestinian collective. 
The processes by which cultural capital accrues symbolic meaning to signify identity 
through the discursive interactions of the public sphere and/or sphericules further reiterate the 
idea that identity is as much a socially constructed mode of claiming personhood as it is an 
essential and inherited trait, for it is through the social matrices that the essential 
characteristics of individuals gain referential meaning to their ethnicities, heritage, race, and 
nationalities. Therefore, the essential ism of the Palestinian national identity is constantly in 
dialogue with the changeability of its signifiers, as its individuals and communities internalize 
and synthesize their identities, creating a circular loop of meaning-making wherein the 
collective informs the individual and vice versa. As a result, one can see that Palestinian 
national identity is in a constant attempt at fixity that is invariably disrupted by the flux of its 
surrounding social ideologies and hegemonies that continuously subvert and re-inscribe its 
essential and authentic meanings. 
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The result 'of these experiences and the fluidity of the cultural capital and memories of 
Palestine that in fact signify all its meaning due to its detachment from an actual homeland, is 
that Palestinian identity in the diaspora and specifically within the newer generations has 
achieved a great measure of plurality, where its essential roots and its autonomous plurality are 
equally important and valued in its national and racial frameworks. Palestinian identity is 
therefore strongly rooted in the land, in its history, and in its memories, yet it is also malleable 
and encompasses the pluralism enforced on it by the process of diaspora and displacement. It is 
therefore a highly complex identity that is capable of retaining its authenticity whilst 
incorporating difference for maintaining its survival without diminishing from its original ties to 
the land and its Right of Return. Therefore, Palestinians in the diaspora manage to blend the 
essentialism of the Palestinian identity with the pluralism of its diaspora in unexpected ways 
that free Palestine, in a conceptual sense, from the occupation of its history, whilst also 
remembering and retaining the heritage and culture of their unattainable homeland. 
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Additional Notes 
Notes on Palestinian food 
Food was the one unprovoked reference that all the participants strongly connected 
with. That food is a significant marker of their Palestinian-ness indicates the value placed on not 
only the heritage of the cuisine, but also the values associated with food. In Palestinian 
heritage, food has always played a large role in shaping society - most Palestinians were either 
farmers or fishermen, and many of the bourgeois class acted as estate managers to the upper 
class who were almost entirely composed of landowners who rented olive and orange groves to 
tenants. Furthermore, the trades of oranges and olive oil of which Palestinians were global 
leaders prior to 1948 have thus left traces that preserve the symbolism of food in their national 
pride and culture. For instance, these trades not only shaped Palestine's economy prior to the 
Nakba, but they also brought about cultural traditions and folklore, such as the dabke, which 
originated in the stomping of olives for the production of olive oil. The kofeyye was also the 
result of the traditions of farming, as it served to protect farmers from the sun. In addition, 
food and the eating of food has traditionally been a communal undertaking that brought 
together families, and so was a vital component of the social glue that bound the Palestinian 
nation. 
Moreover, in Palestinian culture, food, language, land, and history are intimately 
connected. For instance, Fattiish (Arabic: ~_,19), a garden salad common to the Levant and that 
is distinctive for its use of chipped pita bread and roughly chopped vegetables and greens, is a 
word made of Arabic "fatt," meaning "crush" or "break," and the suffix of Turkic origin "ush". 
Coining words this way was common in Syrian Arabic as well as in other dialects of Arabic due 
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to their intermingling with Turkish culture during the reign of the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, 
hummus (Arabic: ~), the Arabic word for "chickpeas" and hence the name of its pureed dish, 
requires Tahini - a loanword from Arabic "tahinah" (Arabic:~), or more accurately "tahinia" 
(Arabic:~), derived from the root "t-h-n" (Arabic: 0 r ..b) which, as a verb "tahan" (Arabic: 
~) means "to grind," - not coincidentally, the way Tahini is made. Jaffa oranges, which once 
dominated the global market, are named after the Palestinian coastal city of Jaffa in which they 
are grown. Maintaining the recipes, names, and traditions of these foods is therefore not only a 
part of maintaining the traditions of Palestinian culture associated with them, but it is also a 
form of resistance against their co-optation into Israeli culture. 
Notes on Language 
Although all the participants in this study were given the option of conducting the 
interview in Arabic and were repeatedly prodded during the interviews to switch to speaking in 
Arabic, few actually did so. Only two of the participants spoke substantively in Arabic during the 
interview, despite all of them having a relatively strong working fluency in the language. They 
all acknowledged their familiarity and comfort with English, remarking that it is indeed for them 
a more "yielding" language and that Arabic is the "language of their dreams," and were more 
comfortable speaking in Arabic after the interviews were concluded. 
All the participants further remarked on their accents and dialect - often emphasizing 
that it is their deliberate choice to speak in a Palestinian accent when they have the capabilities 
to mimic other Arabic accents. However, the accents of the participants could not be deemed 
homogeneous as they've all been influenced by the Syrian, Lebanese, Jordanian, and Egyptian 
accents of Arabs around them. It is therefore worth noting that the fluidity of language for 
Palestinians in the diaspora is beyond their control, and betrays their constant mingling with 
other cultures, despite their attempts at retaining their "original" accents. 
Notes on Education 
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The concept of crisis developed by Erikson focused on the choices of deciding on an 
occupation and the formation of an ideology specific to individuals' identity. Significantly, for 
Palestinians in the diaspora, these choices are intimately intertwined. At on point in her 
interview, Carla states that one of her driving motivations for success is the desire to prove her 
abilities as a Palestinian, to "show them that a Palestinian is going to do this" [emphasis hers]. 
Furthermore, one important ideal in the Palestinian collective in the diaspora that was briefly 
mentioned in interviews and implicitly taken-for-granted is the pursuit of knowledge and the 
value of education. Palestinians are repeatedly reminded that education is their strongest 
weapon and the value of education within the Palestinian collective is considered 
immeasurable. This is reflected in the level of education presented by the participants who 
have all attended post-secondary institutions and are determined on pursuing higher 
education. Furthermore, the fields of study most valued in the Palestinian identity are also 
reflected in the choices of the participants, as they have all chosen to pursue careers in highly 
competitive fields and areas of study. 
Notes on Naji Al-Ali, Edward Said, and Mahmoud Darwish 
Naji Al-Ali, Edward Said, and Mahmoud Darwish are three of the most prominent 
Palestinian figures whose lives were dedicated to the Palestinian cause. Naji Al-Ali was the 
political cartoonist who developed the character of "Handala" that became the most used 
symbol of the Palestinian struggle and Palestinian resistance. Al-Ali's cartoons frequently 
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critiqued Arab regimes and Israel and strongly expressed his stance as a fierce opponent of any 
settlement that would not vindicate the Palestinian people's right to all of historic Palestine, 
and thus "were sharply critical commentaries on Palestinian and Arab politics and political 
leaders". (Farsoun 111} He was eventually assassinated due to his political ideas and his rising 
popularity amongst Arabs and Palestinians in particular, yet his contributions to the Palestinian 
identity and political outlook remain highly significant in the Palestinian narrative and to 
Palestinians everywhere. ("Naji Al-Ali") 
Edward Said "was a Palestinian-American literary theoretician, University Professor of 
English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual who was a 
founding figure of the critical-theory field of post-colonialism". ("Edward Said") Throughout his 
career, Edward Said was a strong spokesperson for the Palestinian cause and wrote several 
works on the Palestinian condition, including The Question of Palestine; The End of the Peace 
Process: Oslo and After; and Reflections on Exile and Other Essays. His intellectual contributions 
thus earned him the admiration and respect of the Palestinian community, where he became a 
figure of resistance and a voice for dispossessed Palestinians. Similarly, Mahmoud Darwish was 
a Palestinian poet and author whose life and work was dedicated to representing Palestine and 
the struggles of diaspora and exile. Regarded as a poet of the resistance, Darwish "committed 
himself to the ... objective of nurturing the vision of defeat and disaster (after the June War of 
1967), so much so that it would 'gnaw at the hearts' of the forthcoming generations". (Butt 9} 
Countless of Darwish's poems poignantly describe Palestine as "a metaphor for the loss of 
Eden, birth and resurrection, and the anguish of dispossession and exile". ("Mahmoud 
Darwish") 
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The poem selected for the representation of Palestinian identity in this study, "Elegy for 
Edward Said," therefore combines the voices of two of the most prominent Palestinian 
spokespersons. In a conversation between Said and Darwish, the poem illustrates the condition 
of exile and the complexities of achieving belonging to a Home. Darwish's imagery combined 
with Said's theorizing of identity is highly provocative of the Palestinian statelessness and its 
inability to escape its narratives of dispossession and displacement. As a result, it further 
demonstrates the ways Palestinian identity is constructed in the diaspora, and how the essence 
of the Palestinian identity remains a metonymy35, where "had it not been for the pollution, it 
would have embraced the other side". 
35 
"metonymy /mi'tnmmi/ noun (pl. metonymies): [mass noun] the substitution of the name of an attribute or 
adjunct for that of the thing meant, for example suit for business executive, or the turf for horse racing. origin mid 
16th cent.: via Latin from Greek metonumia, literally" change of name' 111 • ("metonymy") 
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Appendix A 
Informed Consent Form 
Study name 
Authenticity and Hybridity in Alienation: National Identity in the Palestinian Diaspora 
Researchers 
Researcher name: Ghina Al - Dajani 
Masters Candidate 
Graduate Program in: Communication and Culture 
Email Address: account@domain.com Phone: 123-456-7890 
Purpose of the research: The purpose of my research is to understand what being Palestinian 
today means, as there is a need for research in this area, and to provide a launch pad for further 
research into the various fragments of Palestinian communities in the world. 
What you will be asked to do in the research: Your participation in this research will include 
an interview (approx. an hour and a half) in which you will be asked general questions, such as 
"How do you respond when someone asks where you're from?" and 'Why?" and be allowed to 
direct the conversation. You will be given the choice of conducting the interview in English or in 
Arabic, or a combination of both. You may be asked for a follow-up interview (that would not 
exceed 15-20mins) to reflect on the initial interview's conversation. There are no incentives 
offered for participation. 
Risks and discomforts: It is possible that you may experience a backlash from your peers who 
may not approve of the study, should they learn of your participation. You may also realize 
personal identity conflicts that may strain your loyalties - whether to the Palestinian community 
or to your adopted communities (eg. Canada). This in turn could lead to being ostracized or 
judged by your peers according to where you ultimately align yourself. 
Benefits of the research and benefits to you: This study will provide an unprecedented voice 
for Palestinians in the diaspora, and a greater insight into the ways Palestinian identity is 
influenced by its dispersal fragmentation. Participants are likely to gain a deeper understanding 
of themselves and their identities as a result of their participation, and that is likely to lead to a 
greater sense of belonging to their communities. 
Voluntary participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may 
choose to stop participating at any time. Your decision not to volunteer will not influence the 
relationship you may have with the researchers or study staff or the nature of your relationship 
with York University either now, or in the future. 
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Withdrawal from the study: You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, 
if you so decide. Your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, 
will not affect your relationship with the researchers, York University, or any other group 
associated with this project. In the event you withdraw from the study, all associated data 
collected will be immediately destroyed wherever possible. 
You will also be provided the opportunity to review the analysis and conclusions drawn from 
your interview, with the freedom to strike any or all of your contribution from the study, should 
you choose to do so. All associated data will then immediately be destroyed. 
Confidentiality: The interviews will be recorded and transcribed. All identifying information will 
then be coded by a key that only I (the researcher) will have access to. The key will be securely 
stored for the duration of the study and then destroyed upon its completion, leaving all 
identifying information completely anonymized. The coded information of the participants identities 
will be retained until the end of the study - that is, once the thesis has been completed. All electronic files 
containing this information will then be deleted, and hardcopies will be destroyed. Confidentiality will be 
provided to the fullest extent possible by law. 
Questions about the research? 
For any questions about the research you may contact: the researcher, Ghina Al - Dajani, 
telephone 123-456-7890, e-mail account@domain.com; or the supervisor, Prof. Daniel Drache, 
e-mail drache@yorku.ca; or the Joint Graduate Program in Communication & Culture, 3013 TEL 
Centre, 88 The Pond Road, telephone , e-mail comcult@yorku.ca. 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Human Participants Review Sub-
committee, York University's Ethics Review Board and conforms to the standards of the 
Canadian Tri-Council Research Ethics guidelines. If you have any questions about this process, 
or about your rights as a participant in the study, you may contact the Senior Manager and 
Policy Advisor for the Office of Research Ethics, 5th Floor, York Research Tower, York 
University, telephone 416-736-5914 or e-mail ore@yorku.ca 
Legal rights and signatures: 
I, , consent to participate in 
Authenticity and Hybridity in Alienation: National Identity in the Palestinian Diaspora conducted 
by Ghina Al - Dajani. I have understood the nature of this project and wish to participate. I am 
not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form. My signature below indicates my 
consent. 
Signature Date 
Participant 
Signature Date 
Principal Investigator 
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Additional consent: 
I, , consent to allowing the 
researcher to record my participation in the interview process. I am not waiving any of my legal 
rights by signing this form. My signature below indicates my consent. 
Signature Date 
Participant 
Signature Date 
Principal Investigator 
Personal Information Form 
Study name 
Authenticity and Hybridity in Alienation: National Identity in the Palestinian Diaspora 
Researchers 
Researcher name: Ghina Al - Dajani 
Masters Candidate 
Graduate Program in: Communication and Culture 
183 
Email Address: account@domain.com Phone: 123-456-7890 
Participant Age: ___ _ Gender: 
----
Phone: 
----------
Email address: 
~-------------------------~ 
What is your highest level of education? In what field? 
Where in Palestine is your family originally from? 
How old were you when you moved to Canada? 
Where did you live before moving to Canada? 
Do you carry Canadian citizenship? 
What citizenship do you carry along with/did you carry before gaining Canadian 
citizenship? 
Have you ever had a Palestinian passport or ID? If yes, do you still have it and use it? 
How fluently do you speak Arabic (eg. fluent/read and understand but not speak/speak 
and understand but not read and write/not at all/etc.)? 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide 
1. Tell me where you're from. Tell me a little bit about your history. 
a. Would you be more comfortable doing the interview in Arabic? 
2. How do you respond when someone asks where you're from? Why? 
3. What is your nationality? Is it the same as your citizenship on your passport? 
4. Were you ever "stateless"? What does that term mean to you? 
5. Is your nationality the same as that of your parents? 
6. Do you ever reflect on the nature of your racial and national identity? In what instances do 
you feel compelled to do so? What conclusions do you come to? 
7. What do you feel influenced your feelings of belonging most? Parents? Community? 
School? Your own interest and research? etc. 
8. [ASK IN ARABIC+ENGLISH] Do you ever experience conflicting feeling of belonging to more 
than one location? (What country do you feel most patriotic towards or devoted to? What 
country do you feel a greater sense of belonging to and why?) 
9. Has there been any sense of disillusionment/imposter syndrome about your identity? 
Shame, fear, disappointment? 
10. Do you participate in the collective memories of your community? What history is it? If not, 
why? 
11. Do you know the Palestinian national anthem? 
12. I will show you a series of images and I would like you to tell me what you associate each of 
them with, and which you relate to the most. 
13. [ASK IN ARABIC] Are there any significant dates that you associate with the Palestinian 
identity or Palestinian culture? For example, do you commemorate the Nakba or do you 
commemorate Land Day etc.? How do you participate in those memorials? 
14. Are you familiar with Mahmoud Darwish's poetry? What parts of this poem resonate with 
you? 
15. Do you feel more understood by people from a similar background as yours or do you feel 
freer to be yourself with people who know nothing about it? 
16. Do you feel a connection (whether based on history or just blood) amongst members of the 
diaspora community? 
17. Do you consider "blood" to be the main ingredient for inclusion into the community? Or do 
you consider people's actions and choices to be more important? Or can actions and 
choices exclude people from the community, but never include them if they do not have the 
necessary "blood" ties? 
18. [ASK IN ARABIC] How do you feel about the "Right of Return"? Would you like to have a 
Right of Return? 
19. Are you an activist in the Palestinian community? Do you campaign for the Palestinian 
cause? 
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20. Do you feel that you "perform" your identity? Do you feel the need to behave in certain 
ways deliberately to show your loyalty and belonging or do you do things almost 
unconsciously because you feel that you belong? Eg. do you vote? Do you participate in 
online forums for the Palestinian community? Do you take a particular interest in things like 
Palestinian films or Bayt Zatoun's cultural events or the Toronto Palestine Film Festival etc.? 
21. Has this conversation affected your perception of your own national identity? How? 
r. 
Appendix C: "Elegy for Edward Said" - Mahmoud Darwish 
Elegy for Edward Said 
He says: I am from there, I am from here, 
but I am neither there nor here. 
I have two names which meet and part ... 
I have two languages, but I have long forgotten 
which is the language of my dreams. 
I have an English language, for writing, 
with yielding phrases, 
and a language in which Heaven and 
Jerusalem converse, with a silver cadence, 
but it does not yield to my imagination. 
What about identity? I asked. 
He said: It is self-defence ... 
Identity is the child of birth, but 
at the end, it is self-invention, and not 
an inheritance of the past. I am multitudinous ... 
Within me an ever new exterior. And 
I belong to the question of the victim. Were I not 
from there, I would have trained my heart 
to nurture there deers of metaphor ... 
So carry your homeland wherever you go, and be 
a narcissist if need be/ 
The outside world is exile, 
exile is the world inside. 
And what are you between the two? 
I do not define myself 
so that I would not lose it. I am what I am. 
I am my other, a duality 
gaining resonance in between speech and gesture. 
Were I to write poetry I would have said: 
I am two in one, 
like the wings of a swallow, 
content with bringing good omen 
when spring is late. 
He loves a country and he leaves. 
[Is the impossible far off?] 
He loves leaving to things unknown. 
By traveling freely across cultures 
those in search of the human essence 
may find space enough for all to convene ... 
Here a margin advances. Or a centre 
retreats. Where East is not strictly east, 
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and West is not strictly west, 
where identity is open unto plurality, 
not a fort or a trench/ 
Metonymy was sleeping on the river's bank; 
had it not been for the pollution 
it would have embraced the other side. 
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Image 1 
The map of Palestine, depicting the original 
territories of Historic Palestine (100% 
Palestine remaining), the Partition Plan 
proposed by the UN in 1947 (48% Historic 
Palestine remaining), the annexation of 
Palestine by 1967 (22% Historic Palestine 
remaining), and the annexation of Palestine 
by 2001 (12% Historic Palestine remaining). 
Image 2 
The map depicting the escape routes of 
Palestinians during the Nakba, and the 
numbers of displaced Palestinians from each 
location. 
Image 3 
Naji Al-Ali's Handala, a cartoon character 
developed to symbolize the Palestinian 
condition: he is poor, dispossessed. His back 
is turned to the world in dejection and in 
desolation at the way he is treated. His 
name, Handala (Arabic:~), which is also 
the name of a bitter fruit, further signifies the 
bitterness of Palestinian life. He has thus 
become a mascot of the Palestinian cause, 
and a symbol of solidarity and resistance. 
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Image 4 
A cartoon depicting the instilling of the Right 
of Return in the growing generations of 
Palestinians. The Right of Return is 
represented by the key, which symbolizes it 
due to the fact that the first displaced 
generation retained the keys to their homes 
despite being evicted. The baby is dressed in 
the colors of the Palestinian flag and wears a 
Palestinian kofeyye, signifying that it is a 
Palestinian baby. 
Image 5 
The images of Mohammad El-Durra who was 
shot and murdered by Israeli forces as he hid 
behind his father during the Second Intifada. 
This image was widely disseminated in the 
media during the Second Intifada as a symbol 
of Palestinian resistance, victimhood, and 
struggle. 
Image 6 
Graffiti on the Israeli Apartheid Wall that is 
continuously dividing and annexing areas of 
the West Bank. Here, the narrative of 
resistance is emphasized, illustrating the 
inherent struggle of the Palestinian identity. 
190 
Image 7 
The dabke, (Arabic:~~) from the root word 
dabk (Arabic: ~~) meaning "to stomp," is a 
line or round dance common to the Levant 
and Iraq. The Palestinian dabke is said to 
have developed from the traditional 
stomping of olives for the production of olive 
oil. Different national dabkes are 
distinguished by the music used and the 
footwork patterns of the dance. In this 
image, the women are dressed in traditional 
Palestinian thoub, and the men in the 
traditional Palestinian garb and wearing the 
kofeyye. 
Image 8 
The kofeyye, a traditional square-cut 
headdress common to the Middle East, and 
worn to protect from the heat of the sun. The 
different kofeyyes of the Arab region are 
distinguished by the varying patterns and 
colors used in the design. The Palestinian 
kofeyye, as illustrated, is traditionally black 
and white, with widely spread connected 
squares in the centre and a border of 
continuous curving lines, ending in twined 
dangling threads and tassels. 
